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REVERSING T H E DEGUNE? TRABE UNION STRATEGIES IN BRITAIN 
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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis examines the responses of British trade unions to declining 
aggregate membership during the 1980s and early 1990s. It describes the 
development of union services, contributions policies and organising 
strategies, looking in particular at the implementation of organising campaigns 
at the local level. Drawing on interviews with union full-time officials, and an 
analysis of documentary and statistical material, the thesis shows that during 
this period union organising campaigns consisted of more than empty 
pronouncements by national leaderships. There was clear evidence of an 
attempt to prioritise organising activity at the local level, although there was 
an unevenness in the extent to which organising activity was effectively 
prioritised, both between and within unions. Whilst some recruitment gains 
were made as a result of the organising campaigns, such initiatives were 
insufficient in themselves to halt the decline in membership, since unions 
faced severe difficulties in consolidating recruitment gains and in winning 
recognition from employers in the adverse economic and political climate of 
this period. 
The findings are discussed in the context of the literature on union growth and 
union strategy. Some support is found for the view that union growth was 
largely constrained by environmental factors in the short term, although it was 
an open question as to whether union organising strategies could exert a 
significant independent influence on aggregate membership levels in the 
longer term, by extending union organisation into new job territories. In this 
respect, the limited achievements of the union organising campaigns by 1991 
were only to be expected, and could not necessarily be taken to imply their 
failure in the longer term. 
REVERSING THE 0ECL1ME? TOAOE UfcSlON) STRATEGIES M BRITAIN 
DURING THI HiBQas 
idward John Snap© 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department 
of Economics, University of Durham, 1991. 
2 1 A P R 1992 
PAGi 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 3 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 6 
DECLARATION 9 
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT 10 
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION ft RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
1. Introduction. 12 
2. Research methodology. 21 
PART TWO: UNION STRATEGY IN CONTEXT 
3. Union growth, the business cycle and structural change. 53 
4. Trade union objectives, strategy and behaviour. 88 
5. Trade union strategy and the rational-choice theory of 
collective action. 104 
PART THREE: DEVELOPMENTS IN UNION 
BENEFITS & CONTRIBUTIONS 
6. The development of union services and benefits. 131 
7. Union strategy and the level of contributions. 168 
PART FOUR: UNION ORGANISING STRATEGIES 
8. The nature of union recruitment activity. 208 
9. The implementation of union recruitment strategies. 240 
10. A case study: The TGWU's Link Up campaign, 1987-1991. 297 
11. The experience of union organising. 340 
1 
PART FflVI »UWJMAIRY AMD CONCLUSIONS 
12. Summary of findings. 
13. Conclusions. 
384 
395 
Appendix 1: 
Appendix 2: 
Appendix 3: 
Appendix 4: 
Appendix 5: 
Appendix 6: 
Appendix 7: 
Appendix 8: 
Appendix 9: 
Appendix 10: 
Trade union membership and density in the UK, 
1950-89. 418 
Sample unions: membership trends in the 1980s. 419 
Schedule for interviews with local union 
officials. 424 
Membership turnover: some examples. 429 
The demand for union services: a time-series 
approach. 431 
Granger causation testing of the relationship 
between real contributions and union membership. 437 
Details and sources of data used in the time-
series analysis of union contributions. 440 
Details and sources of data used in the cross-
section analysis of union contributions. 442 
Chow test on the division of the cross-section 
sample into blue- and white-collar unions. 446 
Categorisation of unions according to the degree 
of organisation of core job territories. 447 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 448 
2 
EMT OF TABLE® AMD FEGUMES 
2.1 Unions from which the sample of full-time officials 
PAGI 
were drawn. 40 
2.2 Sample of full-time union officials by union and 
location. 42 
2.3 The broad phases of the research. 50 
3.1 Bain and Elsheikh (1976:106): a typical result for the 
UK, using data for 1893-1970. 55 
3.2 What do the "business-cycle" models of union growth 
tell us? A summary statement. 59 
3.3 Union density in Great Britain, Spring 1989. 67 
3.4 Principal findings of cross-section studies of 
unionisation in the United Kingdom. 69 
3.5 Growth of union membership and employment in the 
UK, 1979-89. 78 
3.6 Employment-related enquiries to Citizen's Advice 
Bureaux. 86 
5.1 Public, private and collective goods: definitions. 107 
5.2 Union density and the coverage of collective 
bargaining in Britain. 112 
5.3 Compulsory union membership in Britain, 1962-89. 116 
5.4 Method of paying union contributions. 118 
6.1 Trade union selective benefits. 134 
6.2 Union expenditure on cash benefits as a percentage 
of total union expenditure, 1935-89. 135 
6.3 Annual expenditure on cash benefits per member, 
1951-89 (at 1985 prices). 136 
6.4 EETPU financial services for members. 138 
6.5 The financial services bandwaggon. 140 
6.6 Reasons for belonging to a trade union: evidence 
from the British Social Attitudes Survey, 1989. 156 
6.7 Most convincing arguments used by union 
representatives in recruiting members. 157 
6.8 Do the new services and benefits help in the 
recruitment and retention of members? 162 
3 
7.1 Union contributions as a percentage of the average 
male gross wage, 1938-74. 171 
7.2 Union contribution income per member as a percentage 
of average earnings, 1975-89. 172 
7.3 Per capita income from members at 1985 prices, £ per 
member per annum. 173 
7.4 Variables used in the cross-section analysis. 186 
7.5 Regression results: cross-section analysis. 193 
8.1 A typology of recruitment. 209 
8.2 The scope for union recruitment in Great Britain: 
estimates for 1984. 211 
8.3 Union characteristics and recruitment. 214 
8.4 Union recognition disputes: completed ACAS 
conciliation cases, 1975-90. 219 
8.5 Proportion of ACAS conciliation cases leading to 
the granting of union recognition, 1976-89. 220 
9.1 Specified recruitment targets. 267 
9.2 Criteria used in the targeting of recruitment 
effort. 269 
9.3 Union region X: recruitment figures for 1988. 280 
9.4 Full-time officials' work patterns. 285 
9.5 Union density and the time devoted to recruitment 
by full-time officials. 287 
10.1 National recruitment targets, 1988-9. 306 
10.2 TGWU membership, 1979-89. 324 
10.3 TGWU membership gains and losses, 1985-90. 327 
11.1 Obstacles to recruitment and retention. 341 
11.2 The process of expansionary recruitment: a 
summary. 374 
11.3 The role of the full-time official in union 
organising. 378 
A2.1 Sample unions: rank order by % membership 
loss, 1979-89. 419 
A2.2 Membership of sample of unions, 1975-1989. 420 
A2.3 Membership as a proportion of GB employment: 
selected unions and industries. 423 
4 
A4.1 TGWU membership, 1985-9. 429 
A4.2 USDAW membership, 1988-9. 430 
A4.3 AEU membership, 1988-9. 430 
A5.1 Demand for union services: time-series results. 434 
A5.2 Implied price elasticities of demand. 434 
A10.1 Union density in core job territories 447 
5 
LEST OF ABBMEVMTEONS 
Tradl® Union ©mml§@itl©m: 
ACTSS Association of Clerical, Technical and Supervisory Staff 
AEU Amalgamated Engineering Union 
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organizations 
AM MA Assistant Masters' and Mistresses' Association 
APEX Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and 
Computer Staff 
ASTMS Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff 
AUEW Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers 
BALPA British Air Line Pilots' Association 
BIFU Banking, Insurance and Finance Union 
COHSE Confederation of Health Service Employees 
CPSA Civil and Public Services Association 
EETPU Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing 
Union 
EMA Engineers' and Managers' Association 
FTAT Furniture, Timber and Allied Trades Union 
FUMPO Federated Union of Managerial and Professional Officers 
GMBATU General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union 
GMWU General and Municipal Workers' Union 
IPCS Institution of Professional Civil Servants 
6 
IPMS Institution of Professionals, Managers and Specialists 
MATSA Managerial, Administrative, Technical and Supervisory 
Association 
MSF Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union 
NALGO National and Local Government Officers' Association 
NCC National Co-ordinating Committee 
NCU National Communications Union (Engineering and Clerical 
Groups) 
NGA National Graphical Association (1982) 
NUM National Union of Mineworkers 
NUPE National Union of Public Employees 
NUT National Union of Teachers 
SOGAT Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1982 (SOGAT) 
SRB Special Review Body 
STE Society of Telecom Executives 
TASS Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Section 
TGWU Transport and General Workers' Union 
TSSA Transport Salaried Staffs' Association 
TUC Trades Union Congress 
UCATT Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians 
USDAW Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 
7 
©Ute Atolbir@vi!a4i@in)s: 
AA Automobile Association 
ABTA Association of British Travel Agents 
ACAS Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
BEC Building Employers' Confederation 
BSAS British Social Attitudes Survey 
BTEC Business and Technician Education Council 
CAB Citizens Advice Bureau 
CRE Commission for Racial Equality 
EOC Equal Opportunities Commission 
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters 
IPM Institute of Personnel Management 
LRD Labour Research Department 
NACAB National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux 
NES New Earnings Survey 
NJIC National Joint Industrial Council 
RAC Royal Automobile Club 
UFS Unity Financial Services 
WIRS Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
YTS Youth Training Scheme 
8 
® I Q LA R AT I © fc5 
This thesis is the original and independent work of Edward John Snape. 
None of the material contained in this thesis has previously been submitted 
for a degree in this or any other university, polytechnic or college. 
9 
T A T E M E N T OF C O P Y R I G H T 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should 
be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
10 
PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
& 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
11 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 1979 and 1989, British trade unions lost over three million members. 
This decline was all the more significant when compared to the rapid growth 
of the previous decade (see Appendix 1), and is usually explained in terms 
of the adverse political and economic climate of the post-1979 period. The 
political climate moved against the unions in 1979, with the election of a 
radical Conservative government committed to the reduction of union power. 
The economy also took its toll on union membership, as the deep recession 
of 1979-81 led to major job losses in the unions' traditional strongholds in 
manufacturing. This led many to talk in terms of the "crisis" of trade unionism 
(Towers, 1989b). 
Some commentators have suggested that the severity of the "crisis" was often 
overstated. Kelly (1987a, 1988) notes that the decline in union membership 
was small compared to that of earlier periods, whilst the losses were 
concentrated in the private manufacturing sector, with the public sector and 
services being much less affected. The coverage of collective bargaining and 
the institutions of workplace industrial relations survived the early 1980s 
surprisingly well (Millward and Stevens, 1986; Batstone, 1984; Terry, 1986). 
Furthermore, whilst the decline in the number of strikes is often regarded as 
a clear indicator of union weakness after 1979, it could also partly reflect less 
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of a need to use sanctions, given the steady real wage growth after 1982 
(Mcllroy, 1988: 206-7). 
Whilst the above views are a necessary corrective to those who were 
predicting the demise of the union movement, the view that there was no 
cause for concern and that nothing needed to be done was losing credibility 
as the decline in membership continued into the mid and late-1980s, in spite 
of the economic recovery. Thus, increasingly, union leaders began to 
reassess the role and functions of unions, and a debate on union strategy 
developed (see for example: Carter, 1986; Clay, 1987; Edmonds 1984; 1986a; 
1986b; 1986c; Graham, 1986; Jewison, 1984; Lloyd, 1986; Mortimer, 1988). 
In fact, the concern with union strategy pre-dates the onset of falling 
membership. At its 1979 Congress, the TUC passed a motion calling for a 
review of: 
"how developments in the role, structure and services of the 
TUC could best be co-ordinated with similar developments by 
unions in order to mobilise the strength of the trade union 
Movement as a whole in implementing agreed strategies" 
(TUC, 1981b:4) 
Following consultation with affiliated unions, the General Council established 
a "TUC Development Programme" in 1981 to consider developments in union 
finances and services and in the role of the TUC. 
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However, the developments of the early 1980s gave a new urgency to such 
discussions. By 1983 it was becoming clear to many that the unions had to 
do rather more than simply ride out the worst of the recession and wait for 
better times. In that year Labour suffered a heavy electoral defeat, and the 
prospect of a return to a more favourable political climate appeared remote. 
Also, the economy was by now beginning to move out of recession, and 
employment was increasing, but union membership continued to decline as 
the new jobs were concentrated in sectors of low union density and amongst 
groups which lacked a strong tradition of union membership. 
The 1983 Congress saw the emergence of the so-called "new realism". 
Realising that they could not depend upon the return of a pro-union Labour 
government to deliver them from their difficulties, unions would have to find 
their own solutions to falling membership, and leaders such as Frank Chappell 
of the EETPU and Alistair Graham of the CPSA, championed a more 
conciliatory approach towards the Conservative government and towards 
employers. 
In response to motions passed at Congress on union strategy and services, 
the General Council published a consultative document on "TUC Strategy" in 
March 1984. This outlined the challenges facing the union movement, and 
sought to stimulate a debate on the future role and functions of trade unions. 
Whilst notions of compromise and new realism were to some extent 
overshadowed by subsequent events at GCHQ and in the 1984-85 miners' 
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strike (Macintyre, 1984), these debates remained important in pointing 
towards a need for a strategic approach. Thus: 
"While the changes that have taken place in the past in union 
organisation and union methods have been substantial and far-
reaching, they have occurred as fragmented and uncoordinated 
responses to gradually changing circumstances. The pace of 
current changes will not afford the luxury of gradualism. Unions 
must, as far as is possible, plan change. The task for each 
union is to build a sensible, flexible strategy to enable it to adapt 
to the changing economic and industrial environment" 
(TUC, 1984: 41). 
The TUC was to play an important role in stimulating and co-ordinating 
responses. This was taken further with the Special Review Body, set up after 
the 1987 Congress partly as a fudge to avoid confrontation on the issue of 
no-strike deals but also as an attempt to come to terms with the challenges 
facing the union movement. However, it was of course up to individual unions 
to determine their own strategies, and particularly during the late 1980s, 
several unions launched new initiatives on recruitment and retention, services 
and benefits, and on contributions (Industrial Relations Services, 1987a). 
There was some suggestion of more strategic thinking amongst union 
leaderships, and of attempts to win support for such initiatives within their 
unions. Thus, in September 1987 the GMB produced a discussion document 
"New Directions for the year ahead" aimed at communicating the union's key 
priorities to full-time officials and senior lay activists. The TGWU followed suit 
in 1988 with its "Forward with the T& G" document, approved by the 1989 
15 
Biennial Delegate Conference, and setting the union's organising and 
campaigning priorities for the following two years. 
This thesis reviews developments in these areas, and discusses the 
coherence and effectiveness of union strategies during this period. The thesis 
examines attempts to implement such strategies at local level, focusing on the 
role of local full-time union officials, seen by Kelly and Heery (1989) as 
occupying a critical position in union organising efforts, particularly if unions 
were to extend their organisation to new job territories. The research focuses 
in particular on the experience of a sample of nine unions, chosen to reflect 
something of the diversity of experience during this period. (Appendix 2 
provides a comparison of membership trends for the nine unions). 
A ims Of The Thesis 
In examining the experiences of trade unions, the thesis considers the 
following questions: 
1. What were trade unions doing to try to cope with the challenges of the 
1980s and early 1990s? Thus, our first aim was simply to describe the 
responses of unions to the membership "crisis". 
2. To what extent were such responses having an impact at the local 
level, and in particular were unions able to mobilise their local full-time 
officials behind their organising initiatives? Earlier writers had identified 
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local officials as a key group if organising initiatives were to be 
implemented, so that our second aim was to examine the extent to 
which union initiatives amounted to more than empty pronouncements 
by union leaders and headquarters. 
3. How effective were the various initiatives in promoting union growth? 
The mobilisation of the union behind an organising campaign, for 
example, may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for effective 
organising. Our third aim was thus to assess the effectiveness of 
union initiatives in dealing with membership decline. Given that our 
research was completed by 1991, it was unlikely that we would be able 
to assess the long-term impact of the initiatives, but nevertheless we 
aimed to provide at least a preliminary assessment. 
4. To what extent did union responses appear to be consistent with a 
coherent view of union strategy? Our aim here was to assess the 
significance of our findings in terms of the wider debates on union 
strategy. 
We chose to focus on what might be termed "internal" growth strategies, 
rather than on growth through merger. We made this choice for three 
principal reasons. Firstly, union mergers had already been the subject of 
considerable research in both the UK and the USA in recent years, and we 
preferred to focus our study on the less well-researched initiatives aimed at 
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internal growth. Secondly, discussions of the "crisis" of trade unionism had 
pointed to the decline in aggregate membership, something which the merger 
strategy does not directly address. Finally, although mergers represent an 
effective and highly cost-effective means of securing additional members for 
some unions, Mason and Bain's (1990; 1991) survey shows that unions 
themselves saw recruitment campaigns and the seeking of recognition from 
employers as their "top priority" strategy in the bid to reverse membership 
decline in the late 1980s. Only 7 per cent of unions cited mergers as their 
most important strategy, compared to 48 per cent and 32 per cent for the 
other two approaches respectively. (We discuss the question of alternative 
approaches to declining membership at greater length in chapter 4.) 
Sftc-yeftMir® Of Yb<& Thesis 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the structure of the thesis. 
There are five parts. Part one introduces the study, setting out the aims and 
the research methodology. 
Part two places union strategies in context by examining the literature on 
union growth, union objectives and the theory of collective action. Within this, 
chapter 3 summarises the literature on union growth and decline, thus 
attempting to provide an explanation for declining membership after 1979. 
Economic and structural factors, including employer attitudes to union 
recognition are found to be important, but it is not clear from the existing 
literature to what extent union organising strategies are able to exert an 
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independent influence on union growth. This question then becomes a major 
concern of the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 provides an explanation for the emergence of organising initiatives 
in the 1980s, in terms of a satisficing view of the union's organisational 
objectives. It reviews the consequences of membership decline, outlines the 
alternative strategies available to unions, and explains why we choose to 
focus on internal growth strategies in this study. Chapter 5 concludes the 
review of the relevant literature with an explanation of the rational-choice 
theory of collective action, drawing out several important implications for union 
strategy which are developed in subsequent chapters. 
Part three of the thesis examines the costs and benefits of union membership. 
Chapter 6 shows how, in spite of the continuing decline in the significance of 
traditional cash benefits, unions attempted to develop their provision of 
services to members, particularly by providing a wider range of discount 
benefits, in an attempt to increase their ability to recruit and retain members. 
Chapter 7 reviews the debates on union contributions, and in particular the 
argument that higher contributions were needed if unions were to significantly 
increase the level of services offered to members. The chapter shows that 
unions were constrained in this, but that a more innovative approach to 
contributions policy might offer a way of increasing available resources without 
deterring price-sensitive members from joining. 
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Part four discusses union organising strategies. Chapter 8 examines the 
scope for union recruitment activity during the late 1980s and describes the 
development of organising initiatives. Chapters 9 and 10 look at the 
implementation of organising campaigns, and find that whilst there was some 
evidence of a prioritisation of organising activity amongst officials, the results 
were often disappointing in terms of membership growth. Chapter 11 
discusses the reasons for this apparent lack of success in more detail, 
through an examination of the experiences and views of local full-time 
officials. 
Finally, part five provides a summary of the findings of the research and a 
discussion of their implications for the development of union strategies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduct ion 
The aim of this chapter is to describe and justify our research methodology. 
We begin by discussing the rationale for our methodology and for the 
particular techniques used in the collection of data, in terms of the debates 
in the methodology literature. Subsequently, we describe our data 
collection methods and research timetable in more detail. 
The research aimed not only to describe and account for the initiatives 
launched by unions, but also to examine their implementation at local level. 
Several writers had suggested that local full-time officials were likely to 
play a key role in union recruitment campaigns, particularly if unions were 
to break into new job territories (Kelly and Heery, 1989). However, much 
of the early research on union campaigns in this period took a national-
level perspective, comparing the initiatives of the various unions at national 
level (see for example Waddington, 1988b; Towers, 1989b; 1989c; Mason 
and Bain, 1991). Kelly and Heery (1989) and Watson (1988) studied the 
work of local full-time union officials, and whilst they refer to recent 
developments in union strategies they were concerned to develop an 
overall picture of the job of the full-time official, and thus did not examine 
the new initiatives in detail. 
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This thesis aimed to fill a gap in the literature by focusing on the new 
initiatives on recruitment and retention as perceived by those local full-time 
officials who have direct daily contact with the membership and lay 
activists. In particular, we aimed to explore the issues involved in 
implementing the new recruitment and retention initiatives at local level. 
This involved examining the impact of such initiatives on the work patterns 
of local officials, to discuss whether or not unions were able to prioritise 
recruitment activity amongst their officials. Our concern was not simply to 
describe changing work patterns in statistical terms, but also to explore the 
attitudinal and behavioural issues involved in developing a "recruitment 
culture" within unions. In addition, it was felt that by taking a local-level 
perspective, focusing on implementation rather than strategy design, we 
could more effectively evaluate the effectiveness of such campaigns. 
As we explain below, we opted for a largely qualitative methodology, with 
focused in-depth interviews as the principal research method, along with 
the analysis of documentary evidence. We do, however, make some use 
of quantitative analysis by way of corroboration in the analysis of 
recruitment and retention campaigns, whilst our analysis of union benefits 
and contributions relies largely on quantitative evidence drawn from 
surveys. Much of our analysis is based on a comparison of nine unions, 
although we also present a more detailed case study of one particular 
recruitment campaign 
22 
Tfo® B<B®®mch Beslgn: Rafttonale Umitat lona 
In this section, we discuss the underlying rationale for the research 
methodology and the choice of particular research methods. We begin the 
section with a general discussion of the reasoning behind our choice of 
research methods. We then focus in particular on three key issues: the 
choice between quantitative and qualitative research methods, the 
implications of the validity and reliability of evidence for the choice of 
research methods, and the generalisability of research findings. 
(a) The Choice Of Research Method 
In designing our approach to the research, a decision had to be taken on 
the breadth of the study and on the appropriate methods of data collection. 
One possibility was a detailed case study, perhaps involving participant 
observation of a single recruitment campaign. This option was seriously 
considered since it promised to provide in-depth, contextualised data at 
first hand. However, this was eventually rejected as our primary research 
method. We felt that valuable insights could be gained by comparing the 
experience of unions recruiting in different sectors, adopting a variety of 
approaches. Thus, we chose a comparative approach, so that a single 
case study was considered inappropriate. 
Having decided to compare the experiences of several unions, we felt that 
participant observation would not be an efficient method of data collection, 
and we considered using either a postal self-completion questionnaire or 
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face-to-face interviews. The chief advantage of the questionnaire is that 
it enables a large sample of responses to be collected, with a minimum use 
of resources. Data is typically in standardised, pre-coded format, and so 
can be subjected to quantitative analysis. However, we rejected this 
approach in favour of in-depth, face-to-face interviews for a number of 
reasons. 
Firstly, the face to face interview is likely to yield a higher quality of data in 
that direct communication is possible, and any misunderstandings can be 
dealt with. The interviewee can ask for clarification on questions and on 
the definition of terms, whilst the interviewer is able to probe in order to 
seek clarification and explanation of answers. This is likely to result in 
greater validity, in the sense that the responses are more likely to 
accurately reflect the phenomena under study than in the case of postal 
questionnaires. 
Secondly, if the interview has a flexible structure, as in the case of our 
research, the interviewer may return to particular topics later in the session, 
perhaps in a slightly different form, in order to seek corroboration. Answers 
may be probed, and examples may be sought in support of assertions, and 
once a rapport has been established, the interviewee's answers may be 
gently challenged. In this way a skilled interviewer may assess the 
truthfulness and credibility of the answers given, in a way which is much 
less feasible with the postal questionnaire. 
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Thirdly, the interviewer may be able to glean useful information on the 
mood of the interviewee from the tone of voice, pauses and body language. 
Such information is in itself data, and it also assists the interviewer, 
providing signals on when to probe. 
Fourthly, interviews provide the opportunity to develop a rapport with the 
interviewee. This may improve the latter's motivation to co-operate, so 
that responses are more considered. This is critical when dealing with 
complex attitudinal and behavioural questions, particularly where a 
"political" dimension is involved, and we are seeking to penetrate beneath 
official viewpoints. In our interviews, most clearly enjoyed the opportunity 
to speak at length on such issues, and many were thankful for the 
opportunity "to have their side of it aired for a change". 
Fifthly, where the answers sought are likely to vary considerably from case 
to case, if may be difficult or even impossible to devise a questionnaire 
which is meaningful to all respondents, at least without it becoming 
extremely complex and lengthy, and thus unsuitable as a postal 
questionnaire. This appeared to be the case in our own research, given 
the diversity of unions, with differing memberships, structures, initiatives, 
and official policies. 
Sixthly, open-ended questions during an interview provide the researcher 
with the opportunity to question his own concepts and ideas more freely 
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than with a structured questionnaire. Whilst some open-ended questions 
are possible with the latter, questionnaires require a higher degree of 
pre-conceptualisation from the researcher, who must determine the exact 
questions, probes and sometimes even response frames in advance. 
There is thus a much greater risk of imposing inappropriate and 
meaningless concepts on the respondent than with interviews. 
Finally, the TUC were currently conducting a survey of the workloads of 
officials, and this dealt in part with the effects of the new emphasis on 
recruitment and retention. Therefore, it seemed pointless to duplicate this 
work, and we draw on the findings of their survey to provide corroboration 
for our own conclusions (TUC, 1989). 
Of course, interviews are in no sense a perfect research method. Given 
the cost of conducting face to face interviews, sample sizes are typically 
much lower than for postal questionnaire-based studies. Indeed, the very 
cost of interviews may in itself be seen as a major disadvantage. There is 
an element of subjectivity, in so far as the interviewer is able to lead his 
interviewee and thus bias the responses, and the answers given may be 
biased by the interviewee's loss of memory or by post-hoc rationalisation 
and selective recall, particularly where the latter has an interest in 
presenting what he feels to be a favourable impression of himself and/or 
his organisation. However, given our earlier comments, and the safeguards 
provided by the use of corroborative evidence, we felt that the in-depth, 
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face-to-face interview was the appropriate method for much of our 
research. 
(b) Qualitative And Quantitative Research 
Researchers in the social sciences and in other disciplines have long 
recognised the basic distinction between "quantitative" and "qualitative" 
research. Quantitative research involves taking pre-existing concepts, and 
attempting to measure them, often using a sample of cases or 
observations, with the aim of testing a hypothesis and then making some 
form of generalised conclusion about the population represented by the 
sample. In contrast, qualitative research tends to focus on a smaller 
number of cases, or perhaps even a single case study, usually examined 
in greater depth and in context, with the aim of developing an 
understanding of the key concepts and relationships revealed by the cases. 
There has been considerable debate on the usefulness, and indeed the 
validity of each of these approaches. Those favouring the quantitative 
approach may dismiss qualitative methods as being non-scientific, 
subjective, insufficiently rigorous and non-generalisable. Qualitative 
researchers may retaliate by characterising quantitative research as 
superficial, as being capable of saying little about cause and effect 
relationships, and as often involving arbitrarily-defined variables which may 
have no meaning to the research subjects (see, for example, Halfpenny 
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(1979) on the contrasting characterisation of qualitative and quantitative 
data). 
In the literature on sociological research methodology, the debate on 
quantitative versus qualitative research has often been framed in 
epistemological terms (Bryman, 1984). In this view, quantitative methods 
are associated with "positivist" or "empiricist" approaches to social 
research, whilst qualitative methods are seen as being "naturalistic", 
"ethnographic", "interpretivist" or "constructivist". In the former the 
emphasis is on scientific objectivity, measurement and rigorous testing, 
whilst the latter involves attempting to see the world through the eyes of the 
research subject, with whom the researcher may become closely involved, 
the collection of rich contextual data, and possibly the discovery of the 
novel or the unexpected. Thus, the debate is one about the appropriate 
basis for the study of society, with the choice of research method seen as 
reflecting a deeper philosophical viewpoint on the relative importance of 
determinism and human agency. The implication, of course, is that one or 
other approach is correct. 
Alongside this epistemological debate, however, others have seen the 
choice between quantitative and qualitative approaches as a purely 
technical question, involving nothing more than choosing the appropriate 
technique for a given research task (Bryman, 1984; Spencer and Dale, 
1979; Banks, 1979). This could be called the "horses for courses" view of 
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research methodology. For example, a quantitative approach, such as a 
representative-sample survey with pre-coded response frames, might be 
used where the information sought is very specific and is familiar to the 
respondent and where the researcher has some prior knowledge as to the 
range of likely responses. A more qualitative method, such as in-depth 
interviewing or participant observation, might be used where the researcher 
has less prior knowledge of the area and where concepts are less well 
defined. 
The view of the choice of method as being a technical question has led to 
the common assumption that qualitative methodologies are appropriate for 
exploratory analysis in novel research settings, involving the development 
of concepts and the formulation of hypotheses. Indeed, to many this is an 
essential step in the research process, as theories which are derived 
inductively, or "grounded" in qualitative data (Glaser and Strauss, 1968), 
are likely to be superior to those derived deductively from a priori 
propositions. Thus, Spencer and Dale argue that where a purely 
quantitative methodology is used, based on the researcher's own 
pre-defined concepts and theories: 
it is not only possible but common to find research which 
is largely meaningless. (For example, measuring people's 
attitudes to objects of which they are both ignorant and 
uncaring; or using an aggregate of individual scale scores to 
make statement about social collectivities)." 
(1979: 702) 
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The appropriate role for quantitative methods is then seen as coming at a 
later stage, perhaps following on from an exploratory study using a 
qualitative approach, and involves the testing of hypotheses, once valid 
concepts have been developed which can be operationalised and 
measured. 
As Bulmer (1984) points out, this view of qualitative research as being 
suitable for exploratory research and quantitative research for hypothesis 
testing, amounts to an acceptance of the positivist view, with an insistence 
on the ultimate need for "objective" and "scientific" hypothesis testing by 
rigorous quantitative methods. Similarly, calls for "triangulation" , whereby 
qualitative data collected from interviews must have their reliability checked 
by reference to data from other sources, also reflects a positivist philosophy 
(Halfpenny, 1979). 
However, the view that qualitative research is only suitable for exploratory 
work has been challenged. The notion of triangulation itself admits the 
general usefulness of qualitative research in a variety of settings, so long 
as care is taken to ensure reliability. Hickson describes how qualitative 
research, based on "a deliberately selected sample under controlled 
conditions "(1988: 140), can be used to test hypotheses drawn from the 
academic literature. Bulmer (1979) outlines the process of "analytic 
induction", first formulated by Znaniecki, whereby the essential 
characteristics are abstracted from a given case to form a concept or a 
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working hypothesis, which is then tested against a relatively small number 
of other cases. When contradictory evidence is encountered, the working 
hypothesis may be reformulated, or the concept re-defined, to take account 
of this. Thus, by an inductive process, concepts and hypotheses can be 
developed and refined through contact with the data, a process which 
brings to mind the idea of "the exception that proves the rule". 
Similarly, the idea that quantitative research is concerned exclusively with 
hypothesis testing, and lacks any inductive, insight-generating aspects has 
also been challenged. Bryman (1988) quotes the work of Blau (1964) and 
Lipset (1964), both of whom maintained that their quantitative analysis and 
survey work often produced unexpected results and new insights. It 
appears that the clear-cut dichotomy between discovery and hypothesis 
testing may break down in practice. Bulmer (1979) even suggests that the 
quantitative-qualitative distinction itself is blurred, since most so-called 
qualitative research contains an element of head counting when developing 
insights, and, as Crompton and Jones point out," quantitative data always 
rests on qualitative assumptions" (1988: 72). 
What emerges from this discussion of quantitative and qualitative research, 
then, is that the crude identification of the former with testing and the latter 
with discovery is overdrawn. Furthermore, in spite of earlier 
epistemological debates, there is considerable support for, and merit in, 
using a combination of research methods. 
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What of our own research design? The present research is a combination 
of exploration and hypothesis testing. Whilst something was known about 
the nature of the new recruitment and retention initiatives emerging from 
union centres, and about the work patterns of local full-time officials in the 
recent past, rather less was known about the issues raised in attempting 
to prioritise and co-ordinate recruitment and retention activity within a union 
and about the effectiveness of the new initiatives. Thus, the key aim of the 
research was to develop insights and understanding in the latter two areas. 
Certain hypotheses relating to our key aim were derived from the literature. 
We set out to test these, and this gave the research a specific focus. 
However, we sought not to close off the opportunity for the development of 
theory, so that we treated these as working hypotheses, and we developed 
additional insights as the research progressed. 
The research aim thus appeared to warrant a strong element of qualitative 
research. Recruitment and retention initiatives had, according to our prior 
knowledge, been initiated at the central or national level of many unions. 
This reflected the problem of declining or stagnant membership levels as 
perceived at that level of the union. What was not known was the extent 
to which this view of the problem, its consequences and the appropriate 
response, was shared by local full time officials, who, we were told, were 
likely to be a key group in implementing the response. Thus, it was 
essential for us to explore the issues through the eyes of local full-time 
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officials, so that their viewpoint and reported experiences could be 
compared with the espoused policies of the national union. Clearly, we 
needed to allow our respondents at least some scope to define their own 
issues and problems, so that an open-ended response method was 
appropriate. Hence our choice of the semi-structured interview, rather than 
the precoded survey, as our principle research tool. 
However, our methodology did not rule out quantitative analysis completely. 
The initial questions on our interview schedule, dealing with the work 
pattern of the official, involved a pre-coded response frame, since previous 
research findings (of both a qualitative (Watson, 1988) and quantitative 
(Kelly and Heery, 1989) nature) had established clear categories and 
patterns of work, and we were interested in comparing our own findings 
with those of earlier studies. In addition we made extensive use of 
quantitative material from secondary sources for corroborative purposes. 
One final point on the use qualitative data, is that there is a dilemma in the 
analysis and presentation of such data (Dunkerley, 1988: 90). On the one 
hand, there is a desire on the part of the researcher to conceptualise and 
interpret, in an attempt to move beyond the purely descriptive. On the 
other hand, however, is a wish to avoid being overly-subjective and 
introducing a biased interpretation which has little relationship to the 
understanding of the research subjects themselves. Clearly, it is a question 
of balance. In our own analysis, we seek to minimise the risk of personal 
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bias by quoting the respondents at length and also by seeking 
corroboration of our interpretations from external sources where possible. 
(c) Validity, Reliability And The Choice Of Method 
In discussing research findings, we may be concerned with both "validity" 
and "reliability" (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985: 77-98). Validity refers to 
the extent to which the research instrument adequately measures the 
phenomena under study. We have seen that in the case of in-depth 
interviews, our chosen research method, bias may come from both the 
interviewer and the interviewee. We suggest, however that other methods 
are also subject to problems of validity, and that these may be more 
serious than in the case of interviews. 
Thus, face to face interviews compare favourably with postal questionnaires 
in this respect, in that with interviews the interviewer can provide 
clarification on misunderstood questions and, in a less-structured interview, 
can ask open-ended questions and avoid forcing responses into 
inappropriate or meaningless categories. Such arguments have led some 
researchers to suggest that less-structured research methods may have 
advantages in terms of validity (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985: 226; 
Banks, 1979). 
Reliability refers to the extent to which the responses gained from a subject 
would be consistent if measurement was repeated. The key test of 
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reliability is replication of the study, and social scientists often emphasise 
the desirability of replicability in research. However, the more unstructured 
the research approach, the less likely that a study could be effectively 
replicated, given the uniqueness of each data-gathering encounter. This 
means that it becomes very difficult to test the reliability of the findings with 
less-structured research methods. Bresnan therefore suggests that there 
is a trade-off in research between yielding valid insights and replicability: 
"A more reactive and unstructured type of approach is a 
double-edged sword: On the one hand, it yields valuable 
information and insights in a way in which a more 
pre-planned and structured approach does not; on the other, 
you lose the benefits of a more or less exactly comparable 
database..." 
(1988: 47) 
Similarly, Banks sees social research as involving a trade off between 
"objectivity" defined as the ability of readers to check and challenge the 
result of the research, for example by referring to sources or replication, 
and "precision", meaning the degree of "accuracy of the description of what 
people do" (1979: 567-69). Thus, at one extreme participant observation 
may achieve a high degree of precision, but it may lack a high degree of 
objectivity, whilst at the other extreme an analysis based on the content of 
literary sources, for example, may have the reverse characteristics. This 
trade-off often arises because of the sheer complexity of social behaviour, 
such that social research cannot strictly be compared with those natural 
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sciences such as chemistry, where it is provide to achieve high levels of 
both precision and objectivity in experimental work. 
The implication, according to Banks, is that there is no method of social 
research which is ideal in all situations. The choice of research method 
then becomes a technical, or even pragmatic matter. Research aims and 
non-methodological factors such as resource availability and research 
access become important in the choice of method. This harks back to our 
earlier discussion on the shortcomings of a purely epistemological approach 
to research design, and suggests that research is a question of achieving 
a balance between often conflicting objectives. 
One way to achieve such a balance is to use multiple sources of data and 
research methods. Thus, to reduce the risk of individual interviewee bias, 
we used multiple respondents from each union, and checked their 
responses for inconsistencies. Also, we compared our interview findings 
with material from other sources, including documents and secondary 
statistical material. This use of material from multiple sources is, as we 
have seen referred to as "triangulation" and aims to cross check data in 
search of corroboration (or contradiction). 
The desirability of using multiple data sources was reinforced by our 
research aims, which involved locating the views and reported experience 
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of local full-time officials within the context of the broader industrial 
relations environment and union policies. 
(d) Generalisation 
Rather than conduct a large postal survey of union officials, we chose to 
focus our attention on a small sample of unions and officials, and also to 
present a brief case study of one particular recruitment campaign. As we 
have seen, our rationale in choosing such a research design was to 
develop a deeper understanding of the issues, as opposed to measuring 
a pre-defined variable or testing a prior hypothesis for the whole population 
of union full-time officials. We felt that the latter approach, whilst tempting 
in terms of the apparent rigour and certainty of any findings derived from 
such a method, would be unlikely to yield sufficiently meaningful insights, 
given our chosen research aims. 
Our approach therefore involves what Mitchell (1983) refers to as 
"scientific, causal or logical inference", whereby we attempt to arrive at 
conclusions about causal linkages between characteristics revealed by the 
data. This is the process of concept and theory development referred to 
earlier. This can be compared with what Mitchell refers to as "statistical 
inference", where a representative sample is studied in order to make 
inferences about the likely characteristics of the population from which the 
sample is drawn. 
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Under the former, the selection of cases for study is not necessarily a 
search for "typicality" in terms of the population since the aim is to develop 
insights rather that describe the population as a whole. Thus, cases may 
be chosen on the grounds of their likely interest. This is related to the 
notion of "purposive sampling" (Dixon, Bouma and Atkinson, 1987: 140), 
as explained below. 
The clear limitations of our research design, at least in terms of the 
chapters on recruitment and retention, is that we cannot make what Yin 
(1984) refers to as "statistical generalisations" about the population as a 
whole. What we are able to do, however is to develop and test working 
hypotheses within the limitations of our data, and to make "analytical 
generalisations" in terms of concepts and hypotheses which could then be 
used to try to make sense of other cases. Again, the point is that the 
choice of research methodology involves trade-offs, and what we lose in 
statistical generalisability, we gain in quality and depth of understanding. 
IR@s@areB-i Methods 
In this section, we describe in more detail the main methods of data 
collection used in the research. 
(a) Interviews with a Sample of Local Full-time Officials 
Given the research aims, as set out above, it should not be surprising that 
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the core of our empirical research consisted of interviews with a sample of 
local full-time officials, drawn from different unions. 
Table 2.1 lists the unions from which our sample of local union officials 
were drawn. Several points can be made about our choice of unions. In 
order to gain an insight into experience in a range of different types of 
unions and sectors, we selected a sample of unions to give a mix of the 
following characteristics: 
Public and Private Sector 
Production and Services 
Blue-Collar and White-Collar Unions 
Above and Below Average Union Density 
Expanding and Contracting Sectors. 
Whilst aggregate union membership declined significantly after 1979, the 
experience of unions varied considerably, and we chose a sample to reflect 
this diversity of experience. (Appendix 2 provides a comparison of 
membership trends for the nine unions.) 
Finally, we chose to concentrate on larger unions for two reasons. Firstly, 
whilst our aim was not necessarily to develop a statistically representative 
sample of unions and officials, by choosing those unions which organise a 
majority of union members, our findings would be more likely to be of 
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TABLE 2 .1 : Umtoros From Which The S®mmpll® Off Ful l - t ime Official! 
Unions Kl@mlb)gratTiip, 1§B® 
(0OQ's) 
Amalgamated Engineering 
Union (AEU) 
Private Sector. Production. 
Mainly blue collar. 
High density. Contracting 
sector. 
742 
Banking Insurance & 
Finance Union (BIFU) 
Private Sector. Services. 
White Collar. Low density. 
Expanding Sector. 
170 
Electrical Electronic 
Telecommunication & 
Plumbing Union (EETPU) 
Private & Public Sector. 
Production. Blue & White 
collar. High density in core 
areas. Mix of expanding and 
contracting sectors. 
367 
General Municipal & 
Boilermakers Union 
(GMB) 
Public & Private Sectors. 
Services and Production. 
Majority blue collar. High and 
low density. Expanding and 
contracting sectors. 
823 
National & Local 
Government Officers 
Association (NALGO) 
Mainly Public Sector. 
Services and production. 
White collar. High density. 
Stable sector. 
751 
National Union of Public 
Employees (NUPE) 
Mainly Public Sector. 
Services and production. Blue 
collar. High density. Stable 
sector. 
605 
Transport & General 
Workers Union (TGWU) 
Public and Private Sector. 
Services and production. 
Mainly blue collar. High and 
low density. Expanding and 
contracting sectors. 
1271 
Union of Construction 
Allied Trades & 
Technicians (UCATT) 
Public & Private Sector. 
Production. Mainly blue collar. 
Mainly below average density. 
Fluctuating employment 
levels. 
258 
Union of Shop Distributive 
& Allied Workers 
(USDAW) 
Private Sector. Services. 
White and blue collar. Low 
density. Fluctuating 
employment levels. 
376 
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general interest. Our sample of unions accounted for 53 per cent of 
aggregate union membership in 1989. Secondly, the larger unions tend to 
have more officials based in our chosen regions, and hence are more 
accessible to a regionally based study such as ours. 
In order to minimise the risk of our findings being subject to the 
idiosyncrasies of particular individuals, we did two things. Firstly, we 
selected at least two officials from each union, and secondly, we drew our 
sample from different regions so as to avoid a single-region bias to our 
findings. However, an important limitation of our study is that, largely 
because of cost, we were unable to conduct interviews with officials 
working in the lower unemployment, faster-growth areas of the south and 
south east of England. 
Table 2.2 gives details of our sample by union and by location. It was not 
always possible to interview an official from each union in every region, but 
in all cases an official was interviewed in the North East of England and in 
at least one other region. 
Thus, we make no claim to have chosen a rigorously representative 
sample, either of unions or of full-time officials within unions. Our nine 
unions are a "purposive" rather than a "representative" sample (Dixon, 
Bouma, and Atkinson, 1987: 140), chosen to reflect a diversity of types 
rather than to represent the population as a whole. 
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TABLE 2.2: Sample off FyiS-flim© Union Officials by Union and 
Location 
Union Number of Full-time Off icials 
North Easfl 
England 
mm w©gs 
England 
Yorkshire Total 
AEU 3 2 - 5 
BIFU 1 1 1 3 
EETPU 1 1 - 2 
GMB 1 - 2 3 
NALGO 1 - 1 2 
NUPE 1 - 1 2 
TGWU 1 2 - 3 
4 UCATT 1 1 2 
USDAW 1 1 1 3 
TOTAL 11 8 8 27 
The interview schedule is included in Appendix 3. The interview was of the 
"focused interview" form (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985), in that whilst 
we had a set of questions to be answered, and whilst the rough sequence 
of the schedule was adhered to, we encouraged extended responses, using 
probes and asking for examples where appropriate. 
Considerable thought was given to the sequencing of questions in the 
interview schedule. We began the interview with questions about the work 
patterns of full-time officials, obviously a subject of considerable direct 
interest to the respondent. A pre-coded response form was handed to 
respondents for these questions to provide a coding frame for the 
42 
responses and to ensure comparability across respondents and with earlier 
studies. However, an open-ended response was encouraged, and 
respondents were probed for reasons behind their responses. The 
interview then moved on to look at the issue of recruitment, beginning with 
the role of full-time officials and going on to look at difficulties experienced 
in recruitment and retention and the experience of recent campaigns. The 
interview then moved on to the development of services and benefits. 
Union contributions were left until near the end of the interview, largely 
because we expected this to be a relatively sensitive area amongst 
full-time officials, given that they may be in the front line for member's 
complaints about increases, which may well take the form of semi-serious 
comments on the fact that contributions are spent largely on the salaries 
of officials. We therefore felt that this issue was best dealt with once a 
degree of trust and rapport had been established, and once respondents 
had been given the opportunity to discuss the benefits of union 
membership. At the end of the interview, we asked the respondent for any 
further comments, either on substantive issues, or on the interview and the 
research project itself. 
Thus, the main emphasis was on the collection of qualitative material, 
although there was an attempt to quantify a limited number of variables. 
At all stages of the interviews respondents were invited to explain their 
responses at length. 
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All interviews were carried out on an individual basis, and usually lasted 
around two hours, with the shortest around ninety minutes and the longest 
over three hours. In some cases, we made return visits or follow-up 
telephone calls to check on detailed points or to get an update on the 
progress of particular initiatives. Thus, whilst our sample of officials was 
relatively small, a large amount of detailed data was gathered. 
(b) Interviews With National And Regional Level Union Officials. 
Early in the research, we interviewed a national-level official of the TGWU, 
the GMB and the TUC. The aim here was to explore trends in strategic 
thinking at the centre in more detail than was possible through published 
sources (see below). We explored the rationale for the recruitment and 
retention initiatives, and discussed the issues raised by attempts to 
co-ordinate campaigns from the centre. In the case of the TGWU and 
GMB, this was followed-up with in-depth interviews with regional officials 
with particular responsibility for organising. This allowed us to follow-up 
the issues raised at national level, and provided us with a regional 
perspective. 
The national level interviews also allowed us to explore developments in 
TUC policy, and particularly the issues raised by the Special Review Body. 
The interviews were of a semi-structured nature, using a checklist of 
interview points and probe areas. These checklists were specially prepared 
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for each interview, following a survey of the academic literature, media 
coverage and union journals. The aim was to discuss the issues raised by 
such secondary sources in more detail, to seek corroboration, and to 
explore the rationale behind key initiatives. Interviewees were also asked 
to provide copies of any relevant documents, such as conference reports, 
recruitment literature, internal discussion and briefing papers, research 
documents, etc. 
Given that our primary interest was in the implementation of recruitment 
and retention issues at local level, we concentrated our resources on 
interviewing a sample of local officials, rather than interviewing national 
officials of all our nine unions. However, something of a national 
perspective for each of these other unions was provided by a review of 
union literature, journals and also by correspondence and telephone 
conversations with officials at national level (see below). 
(c) Secondary Sources 
A variety of secondary sources were used in the research, with three aims 
in mind: Firstly, to provide basic information on union recruitment and 
retention initiatives, debates on union strategy, and trends in union 
membership and finance. We thus sought to become familiar with the 
major national initiatives prior to our interviews. Secondly, TUC and other 
survey results, and other material were used to provide corroboration for 
the data collected in interviews. Finally, given their importance in the 
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debates on union strategy, we made detailed studies of union benefits, 
services and contributions, based largely on secondary survey data. In this 
section we briefly describe the main sources of secondary data, of both a 
quantitative and a qualitative nature. 
We kept a systematic log of union recruitment and retention initiatives for 
the entire period of the research, drawing on press and media sources as 
well as on our interviews and union literature. Our aim was to develop a 
reasonable overview of developments in the field. This analysis was 
categorised by union (all union and staff associations were included, not 
just our sample of nine), and covered the following broad topics: 
Union membership 
Union finances and management 
Union strategy debates 
Recruitment and retention initiatives 
Developments in benefits and services 
Union contributions 
Union rivalry and co-operation 
Union mergers 
We also logged material on the TUC, and in particular on the Special 
Review Body and other initiatives. 
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This was supplemented by a review of union journals and annual reports, 
including the TUC Annual Report, which provided particularly useful 
information on special initiatives and union strategy. In a few cases, we 
followed up a particularly interesting initiative by post and/or telephone, to 
seek further details. 
Background statistical information was drawn from a variety of sources, 
including the Certification Office, the TUC, the Department of Employment 
and ACAS. Sources are acknowledged in the body of the thesis. The TUC 
also gave us access to the raw data from some of their annual financial 
surveys, which we used in our analysis of union benefits and contributions. 
In addition to the above, we also collected a large amount of documentary 
evidence when conducting our research interviews. Systematic requests 
were made for the following types of material during all our interviews with 
both local, regional and national officials: 
* Recruitment leaflets, brochures and posters etc. 
* Membership application forms. 
* Leaflets outlining membership benefits, services and 
contributions. 
* Recruitment campaign briefing documents and packages. 
* Relevant union training materials. 
* Representatives' and branch officials' handbooks and briefings. 
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* Copies of monitoring documents (officials' time sheets, membership 
monitoring forms, etc). 
* Any other reports or documents referred to during the interviews. 
Thus, we left each interview with a package of material. We found such 
material invaluable in checking detailed points of information, and in 
providing additional information on target groups and campaign issues. Of 
particular interest was the fact that many unions produced customised 
recruitment and campaign literature for specified target groups. Having 
systematically analysed such material between interviews, we were able to 
raise any issues arising from the analysis, either on return interviews or in 
interviews with other officials of the same union. In several cases, we 
gained access to internal reports, research, briefings and correspondence, 
which proved to be extremely valuable in the research. This included 
minutes and reports of officials meetings and seminars, strategy discussion 
papers, membership and lay activists survey reports, amongst other items. 
(d) Link-Up Case Study 
Finally, we draw from many of the above sources to present a case study 
of the TGWU's Link-Up recruitment campaign. The aim in presenting such 
a case study is to provide an analysis of the implementation of a nationally 
co-ordinated recruitment campaign, with particular emphasis on the 
relationship between central co-ordination and local implementation, on the 
selection of recruitment targets, the mobilisation of full-time officials and lay 
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activists behind the campaign, and the monitoring and evaluation of the 
campaign. The case study thus provides us with some important insights 
into some of the problems and the effectiveness of such campaigns. 
The case study draws on a variety of interviews and documentary sources. 
This included interviews with a national official responsible for the co -
ordinating committee, Regional Organisers in three regions of the union, 
and local TGWU officials (the latter form part of our sample of local 
full-time officials, as referred to above). Documentary sources included 
recruitment leaflets, briefing packs and materials for full-time officials and 
lay activists, and internal TGWU reports and briefing documents. Finally, 
a systematic analysis of the union's journal was carried out, covering the 
whole period 1986-91. This provided reports on local campaigns, 
recognition bids and other news items related to the campaign and to 
recruitment and retention generally. 
The Research Timetable 
The research was conducted according to a broad timetable, as outlined 
in Table 2.3. Thus, whilst the interviews with the sample of local officials 
are in a sense the core of the research, these took place towards the latter 
part of the fieldwork phase. This was a deliberate part of the research 
design in that it was important to have a reasonably detailed knowledge of 
the various recruitment and retention initiatives prior to the local interviews, 
so that the latter could be focused mainly on issues of implementation, 
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monitoring and evaluation of the initiatives. Interviews were in some cases 
followed up on several occasions so as to gain some understanding of 
developments over time. This was particularly important in the case of the 
TGWU Link Up case study, where interviews spanned almost a four year 
period, with follow-up visits on up to three occasions. 
In this chapter, we have set out our research aims and methodology, and 
provided the rationale for our choice of research methods. 
T A B L E 2.3: Tlh© Broad Pitas®© ©If to® R®@@aiirelhi 
IF3@s@air@lh) Ptas® ©uraflll®ini 
Literature survey - union growth, 
strategy and theory. 
September 1986 to August 
1987. 
Systematic monitoring of media 
and union journals and other 
literature for union initiatives. 
September 1986 ongoing. 
Interviews with national- and 
regional-level union officials 
(GMB, TGWU, TUC) 
Initial interviews September 1987 
to March 1988, with follow-up 
interviews ongoing. 
Collection and analysis of 
statistical material on union 
services, benefits and 
contributions. 
Mainly 1988-1989. 
Interviews with sample of local 
full-time officials. 
Mainly June-August 1989-90 
(with some follow-up interviews). 
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The methodological debates point to the usefulness of qualitative research 
in developing insights. However, we rejected the crude view that qualitative 
research can be used only for discovery, whilst qualitative research is 
useful solely for the testing of prior hypotheses. Our aim was to use both 
qualitative and quantitative methods to gain insights and to test and 
develop working hypotheses. 
In selecting our interviews no attempt was made to choose a statistically 
representative sample. Our sampling was purposive rather than random, 
with the aim of providing analytical rather than statistical generations. 
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PART TWO 
UNION STRATEGY IN CONTEXT 
CHAPTER 3 
UNION GROWTH, 
THE BUSINESS CYCLE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Introduction 
What factors determine the level and density of union membership? Clearly, 
an answer to this question is necessary in order to put union strategies into 
their proper context and to enable us to assess their likely impact. The 
question can be approached in two ways. Firstly, we may try to explain the 
change in union membership and density overtime, by applying econometric 
techniques to time-series data. Secondly, we may adopt a cross-section 
approach, attempting to account for the pattern of union membership across 
industries, establishments or individuals at a given point in time. 
In this chapter, we review the major studies in each of these areas for the 
United Kingdom. We find that whilst much of the decline in membership and 
density during the 1980s was attributable to short-term economic or political 
factors, the unions faced a more gradual but longer-term challenge in the 
form of structural changes in the labour force. We discuss the implications 
of these findings for union growth in the future, and whether there appears 
to be an independent role for union strategies in influencing union growth. 
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We conclude that the models provide at best only a partial explanation of 
union growth and density, so that one cannot necessarily rule out a role for 
union strategy in influencing not only the incidence of growth (i.e. which 
particular union gets the members), but also the aggregate level of union 
growth. 
Business-eyele (t ime-series) Models 
Most of the early business-cycle models use time-series data to explain the 
annual proportionate rate of change in aggregate union membership. 
Following pioneering work in the USA (see for example, Ashenfelter and 
Pencavel, 1969), Bain and Elsheikh (1976) estimated such a model for the 
UK, using data for 1893-1970. A typical result is given in Table 3.1. Their 
findings support the view that union growth is positively related to the 
business cycle. 
Their interpretation of these results is as follows. Price inflation is said to 
contribute to workers' propensity to unionise via a "threat" effect. As inflation 
threatens to undermine real pay, so workers are more likely to seek union 
membership to protect their living standards. Price inflation also encourages 
employers to feel less inhibited about conceding union recognition and pay 
increases. Bain and Elsheikh find, however, that the impact of price inflation 
on union growth moderates beyond a threshold inflation rate of around 4 per 
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cent per annum (reflected in the P.St term in the equation). Their argument 
here is that people tend to become "numbed" to the effects of accelerating 
inflation beyond a certain level; with an increase from 2 to 3 per cent having 
more of an impact than an increase from 19 to 20 per cent, for example. 
TABLE 3 .1 : Bsta ft i l she l kh (1976: 106): A T ^ t a ! Rdsioflft for the UK, 
Usorag Data for 1813-1970. 
A T t = 6.0406 + 0.5831. A R - 0.3861. aP.St + 0.4684. A Wt - 0.3506. Ut-1 + 0.4028 . Ut-2 - 0.2029. Dt-1 
(4.3187) (5.8599) (2.6856) (4.1814) (1.3254) (1.6119) (5.4005) 
R2adj = 0.7018 D.W. = 1.6352 
(Figures in parentheses are t' values). 
Where: &Tt is the annual proportionate change in union membership. 
&PI is the annual proportionate change in retail prices. 
aP.St is a variable which shifts the slope of the relationship between prices and union 
growth for higher values of P. S is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 where 
P >= 4%, and 0 where P < 4%. 
AWt is the annual proportionate change in money wages. 
Ut-1 , Ut-2 is the unemployment rate, lagged by one and two years respectively. 
Dt-1 is the level of union density, lagged by one year. 
The positive impact of wage inflation on union growth is said to reflect a 
"credit" effect, as workers give unions the credit for winning increases in 
money wages, thus affecting their propensity to unionise. 
The unemployment rate, lagged by one year, has a negative impact on the 
rate of union growth. This may reflect a dampening effect on the opportunity 
to unionise, as employers' bargaining power is enhanced in a slack labour 
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market. It may also reflect a tendency for unemployed workers to allow their 
union membership to lapse, the lag being understandable in this respect. 
The latter interpretation is supported by the finding that unemployment lagged 
by two years has the reverse sign when included in the same equation, 
suggesting that the rate of change of unemployment is important as a 
determinant of union growth. 
The level of union density, lagged by one year, is included as an indicator of 
the "saturation effect" (expect a negative coefficient) and of an "enforcement 
effect" (expect a positive coefficient). The results show a negative coefficient, 
implying that the saturation effect dominates. Thus, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to recruit as the more readily unionised sectors and workers are 
organised first, and this outweighs the possibility that higher density, by 
increasing union bargaining power, may increase union growth by raising the 
benefits of joining. 
Following Burkitt and Bowers (1978), Elsheikh and Bain (1979) successfully 
add the rate of change of real profits to the above list of explanatory 
variables, finding a positive effect on the rate of union growth, which they 
attribute to a general "business prosperity" influence. They find, however, 
that the rate of change of labour productivity, Burkitt and Bowers' other 
suggested addition to the model, is not significant. 
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Several other studies provide similar results for the UK, including Hines 
(1964), Burkitt and Bowers (1978), Pedersen (1978), Elsheikh and Bain 
(1979), Smith (1980), Booth (1983) and Sapsford (1986). In addition, Hines 
(1969) and Bain and Elsheikh (1982) have estimated such models at the 
industry level. The studies vary in their exact specification, and also in the 
dependent variable used. Most follow Bain and Elsheikh (1976) in using the 
proportionate rate of change in membership, although Booth, for example, 
uses density. (See below for a discussion of these differences.) 
In a more recent study, Carruth and Disney (1988) provide an alternative 
specification of the business-cycle model for the period 1896-1984. Using 
the absolute annual change in the logarithm of membership as their 
dependent variable, they find that price inflation has a positive effect on union 
growth, but that wage inflation has a negative effect, in contrast to the 
findings of many earlier studies. When both the price and wage inflation 
variables were replaced by a real wage variable, the result was a significantly 
negative coefficient. This may perhaps be explained in terms of a lack of 
dissatisfaction during periods when real wage growth is favourable, thus 
undermining workers' propensity to seek union protection. Thus, even though 
Bain and Elsheikh prefer to include money rather than real wages in their 
original model, Bain and Price (1983: 16) note that slow and at times 
negative real wage growth may account for much of the rapid union growth 
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during the 1970s. Carruth and Disney's findings are consistent with the view 
that rising unemployment inhibits union growth, and that union density exerts 
a saturation effect on membership. They also find a positive relationship 
between employment and union growth. 
The Carruth and Disney (1988) equation performs better than either the Bain 
and Elsheikh (1976) or the Booth (1983) models, particularly in terms of its 
ability to predict the downturn in membership after 1979. They attribute this 
partly to the superior specification of their model, and also to their use of an 
alternative definition of union density, which excludes unemployment from the 
potential union membership figure. 
Table 3.2 presents a summary of the findings of this literature. This is 
intended to convey the spirit of the findings of the business-cycle research, 
rather than to provide the precise details of any particular specification. 
Clearly, there is strong support for a "business-cycle" explanation of short-
term variations in the rate of union growth, with evidence of a net saturation 
effect of union density. 
Within this literature, there has been some controversy over the contribution 
of political variables to union growth. In their original study, Bain and 
Elsheikh (1976) included several socio-political variables in their model, such 
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TABLE 3.2: What d© to® "Business-Cycle" M®d®Ds ©1? Union Grewto 
Tell Us? h Symmary SM@mni@inii 
(Dependent variable is usually annual proportionate growth in membership). 
Vsiiroalbi® Impaet on Umtotni Dmit(iirpir®1lsilli©ini1 
off Etffeot 
Raft© ©f Chsumg© ©If 
Prices Positive Threat" effect 
Money Wages } 
Real Wages } 
Positive or Negative2 Positive "credit" or 
negative "dissatisfaction" 
effect 
Real Profits Positive Effect Business Prosperity 
L®v@! ©ff: 
Unemploymenf Negative Lapsed membership 
and bargaining 
power effects 
Union Density Negative "Saturation" effect 
outweighs the 
"enforcement" effect 
M©t®§ : 
Based mainly on Bain and Elsheikh (1976) and Bain and Price (1983). 
Much of the literature finds a positive effect for money wage growth. 
However, Carruth and Disney (1988) find a negative impact for money 
wage and real wage growth, and for certain industries Bain and 
Elsheikh (1982) also find a negative impact for real wage growth. 
Changes in the level of unemployment also appear to influence union 
growth. 
as the percentage of "labour supporters" in the House of Commons, dummy 
variables for the war years (presumed to be more favourable to trade union 
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growth because of the climate of regulation and arbitration), and a measure 
of public attitudes to trade unions derived from the Gallup polls. In all cases, 
these variables gave unsatisfactory results (insignificant and/or unexpected 
signs). Whilst they admit that this does not necessarily imply that 
socio-economic variables are unimportant (there may be problems of 
multicollinearity, and the particular variables used may be poor proxies of 
underlying socio-economic conditions), nevertheless they conclude that it is 
not necessary to include socio-political variables in their model for the UK 
(1976: 86). 
Interestingly, this was not so when the model was applied to the United 
States and Australia, where dummy variables were necessary to take 
account of the impact of government action on union growth. Bain and 
Elsheikh attribute this to the strongly "voluntarist" tradition in British industrial 
relations, whereby, it is claimed, union growth has been determined by 
economic factors rather than by the law and government action (1976: 86). 
However, later studies have found that political variables are significant for 
the UK. Carruth and Disney (1988) find that the presence of a Conservative 
government tends to reduce union density (represented in their equations by 
a dummy variable), whilst Freeman and Pelletier (1990) suggest that changes 
in the framework of labour law appear to have had an impact on union 
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density in the UK. These later results may point to a growing government 
impact on the industrial relations climate in more recent years. In this 
respect it is perhaps significant that Bain and Elsheikh's original study 
contained no data for the period after 1970, and that in Bain's own later 
accounts of union growth, he places great emphasis on political 
developments in the 1970s and 1980s (Bain and Price, 1983: 18-22). 
Criticisms of the BMgs5n@ss-Cyell@ Rtodnfls 
The business-cycle models have been criticised on several grounds, and it 
has been claimed that they provide at best only a partial explanation of union 
growth and density. In this section, we briefly review these criticisms. 
There has been some debate as to what is the appropriate dependent 
variable in such models. Bain and Elsheikh (1976) use the proportionate rate 
of change of membership as their dependent variable, on the grounds that 
this reduces the likelihood of statistical problems arising out of having a time 
trend in the variable. They further argue that a proportionate rate of change 
is intuitively more appealing than an absolute rate of change, although Booth 
(1983) argues that there is no theoretical reason for the dependent variable 
to be a rate of change. 
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Bain and Elsheikh (1976: 58-60) reject union density as their dependent 
variable for three reasons. Firstly, they claim that to use density would be to 
constrain the relationship between membership and potential membership to 
be strictly proportional. In fact, this is not necessarily so if potential 
membership also enters the equation as an independent variable (Booth, 
1983: 388-9). Secondly, they argue that the measurement errors in the time 
series for potential membership, which has been pieced together from 
several different series, means that to use density as a variable runs a high 
risk of serious autocorrelation. Again, however, this argument may be 
questioned, since measurement errors are likely in all the variables used, so 
that this does not necessarily lead us to reject the use of density in particular 
(Booth, 1983: 389). Finally, they claim that to use density involves a risk of 
spurious correlation, since potential membership (the denominator of density) 
includes unemployment, which \s itself included as an independent variable. 
However, Booth (1983: 389) finds that the correlation is low and that no 
serious problem arose from the use of density. 
Thus, it is by no means clear that density is an inappropriate dependent 
variable, and Booth (1983: 380) argues that it is in fact preferable to 
membership, since it excludes the direct effect of the level of employment on 
the level of membership. What is clear from the above is that researchers 
have not yet reached agreement on what is an appropriate dependent 
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variable, and that many have not been convinced by Bain and Elsheikh's 
argument in favour of the annual proportionate of change of membership. 
Thus, Booth (1983) uses union density in a logistic transformation of the form 
ln[D/(1 -D)] in order to restrict possible values to lie between zero and one. 
In contrast, Carruth and Disney (1988) use the absolute annual change in the 
logarithm of membership. 
A second criticism of the business-cycle models is that there are severe 
theoretical shortcomings in much of the literature. Thus, Richardson (1977) 
criticises Bain and Elsheikh (1976) for what he sees as a lack of properly 
articulated theory, with an ad hoc approach to interpretation, and with no 
consistent model of union, worker or employer behaviour. 
Such studies could, however, be seen within the framework of a demand and 
supply of union services model, with the estimating equations being 
interpreted as reduced forms (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976; Hirsch and Addison, 
1986: 29-38). The independent variables would thus represent the various 
costs and benefits of unionisation from the point of view of the individual 
worker and of the union supplying the services. A complicating factor here, 
however, is that the variables may have some of their impact on membership 
because they influence the willingness of employers to resist unionisation, so 
that union growth is not determined by the behaviour of workers and unions 
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alone. Even those who accept that the variables in the model reflect the 
costs and benefits of unionisation make no attempt to estimate the structural 
demand and supply parameters, probably because many such variables are 
ambiguous proxies for both demand and supply-side factors (Hirsch and 
Addison, 1986: 35). 
A third area of criticism concerns the stability of the results. Whilst Bain and 
Elsheikh (1976) rejected structural shifts in their model, subsequent work has 
cast some doubt on the long-term structural stability of the models (see, in 
particular, Pedersen, 1978 for the UK and Moore and Pearce, 1976; Sheflin, 
Troy and Koeller, 1981 and Fiorito, 1982, for the USA). However, Carruth 
and Disney (1988: 9) find that the only year for which a Chow test is failed 
by their model is 1920, hardly surprising given the special circumstances 
surrounding an immediate post-war boom, whilst Pedersen's (1978) test of 
the Bain-Elsheikh model identifies shifts around 1922 and 1945, again 
suggesting structural breaks during periods of marked change. Thus, whilst 
such findings suggest that the models provide an incomplete explanation of 
union growth patterns over the long term, they are quite consistent with the 
view that short-run fluctuations in union growth are largely determined by 
cyclical factors, as captured in the models. 
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A final area of criticism is that the business-cycle models explain only short-
term fluctuations in union growth, and that those variables which have only 
a longer-term influence on membership trends are not explicitly included in 
such models (Richardson, 1977; Booth, 1983). Thus, whilst Disney (1990: 
170) shows that the sharp decline in union density during the 1980s was 
attributable largely to short-term business cycle factors, and that changes in 
the composition of employment seem not to have had a major effect on union 
density in this particular period, he admits that such structural change may 
be important in the longer term. Indeed, in an earlier paper, he calls for more 
work to be done on the effects of "underlying secular variables" (Carruth and 
Disney, 1988: 15), a view endorsed by Booth (1983: 386). 
Such secular variables may include the policies of government and 
employers as well as changes in the industrial and occupational structure. 
Thus, the growth of unions has been said to be associated with employer 
recognition and the development of collective bargaining (Bain, 1970; Clegg, 
1976; Gallie, 1989), whilst these have in turn been promoted with more or 
less enthusiasm by governments for much of the present century, at least 
until 1979. The development of employers' associations and national level 
bargaining have also been seen as important contributors to union 
recognition and growth over the longer term. Conversely, the move away 
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from multi-employer bargaining by the 1980s may facilitate a trend towards 
non-union companies (Beaumont, 1987a). 
Also, Neumann and Rissman (1984) find evidence of a "substitution effect" 
in the USA, whereby the development of state welfare provision and the 
protection of employees through the courts contributes towards declining 
union density, as the benefits of union membership are thus undermined. 
All this suggests that, as yet, the time-series models give only a partial 
answer to the question "what determines the level and density of trade union 
membership?" In particular, they do not reveal the effect of longer-term 
structural change. In this respect, cross-section studies of the determinants 
of union density and membership provide us with some useful insights. It is 
to these that we now turn. 
Orosg-SeetiQn Models 
Table 3.3 shows how union density differed between the sexes, between 
manual and non-manual workers, part-time and full-time workers, the 
employed and self-employed, and by industry and size of workplace. In 
addition the same Labour Force Survey evidence tells us that union density 
was higher amongst older workers and those with longer job tenure, and that 
it varied between ethnic groups, and by occupation. 
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TABLE 3.3: UraBoon PdsnsiSy Sim ©mat BirSSaiBH, Spiroimg 198 
% Union 
Males 44 
Females 33 
Non-Manual 35 
Manual 43 
Manufacturing (2-4) 41 
Non-Manufacturing (0,1,5-9) 37 
Full-time 1 43 
Part-time 22 
Size of Workplace: Under 6 employees 11 
6-24 employees 23 
25 or more employees 48 
All employees 39 
Self-employed 9 
All in employment2 34 
Soyirc©: 1989 LFS, Stevens and Wareing (1990). 
1 Definition of full-time and part-time based on respondent's own 
assessment. 
2 Includes those on government employment and training schemes and 
those who did not report their employment status. 
However, this simply gives us a descriptive picture of the incidence of 
membership amongst the various groups. In order to say something about 
67 
the independent effects of the various factors on union membership, it is 
necessary to utilise regression analysis. 
Several studies have attempted to explain the cross-section pattern of trade 
union density or membership in this way, using data at the industry (Bain and 
Elsheikh, 1979), establishment (Elsheikh and Bain, 1980) or individual (Bain 
and Elias, 1985; Booth, 1986) level. The dependent variable in such studies 
is either union density, where industry or establishment data are used, or 
individual union membership status, where individual-level data is used. 
Independent variables in these studies include characteristics of the 
establishment, enterprise, industry, region and individual, as appropriate. 
Table 3.4 presents a brief summary of the major findings of these studies. 
The studies suggest that the likelihood of union membership, and hence 
higher union density, is positively associated with the following industry or 
establishment characteristics: 
1. Larger establishments. The more impersonal and bureaucratic nature 
of larger establishments is said to lead to a greater propensity for 
workers to seek collective representation, as the sense of alienation 
may be greater under such conditions. Employers may also recognise 
a need to deal with workers collectively under such circumstances, 
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TABLE 3.4: Piromieipfil FMIinigs ®f Cross-SdetooD Stodoiis @tf 
UsiteiniosaltosT) In tb® Ucnotedl &lliragd@iffii 
Study Bain & Elshelkh 
(1979) 
Elsheikh ft Bain 
(1980) 
Bain & Ellas 
(1985) 
Booth 
(198S) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Union density by 
industry: 1951, 
1861, 1971, pooled 
Union density by 
establishment 
Union membership by 
individuals 
Union 
membership by 
individuals 
Data 
Source 
Official sources and 
trade unions 
1977-8 survey of 
manufacturing 
plants 
National Training 
Survey, 1975-6 
National Training 
Survey, 1975-6 
Size of 
Establishment 
+ + but at a 
decreasing rate 
+ but at a decreasing 
rate 
+ 
Labour as a % 
of Total Costs • 
+ 
Relative 
Wages 
+ 1961 and 1971 
only 
+ then - at higher 
levels 
+ then - for 
males, moderates 
for females 
Unemployment In 
Industry 
Market 
Concentration 
- 1971 only 
Not significant 
- Not significant 
Not significant + 
Union Recognition + 
Region Not significant + North and Wales + North and Wales - South and East 
Labour Turnover Not significant Not significant 
Sex (Female) 
Part-time 
Not significant 
Not significant 
- blue collar only -
- white collar only - females only - females (males 
not tested) 
Occupational Mix: 
Skill 
Managers/Prof 
White Collar 
Not significant 
- not 1961 
Not significant 
Not significant 
- females 
Age + + females 
Work Experience + but at a decreasing 
rate, not female white 
collar 
+ but at a 
decreasing rate, 
males only 
Self Employment - not female 
Level of Education - except teaching 
qualifications 
+ full-time 
females 
Notes: 
+ & - indicate a significant positive or negative relationship respectively between the variable and union 
membership/density. 
A blank cell indicates that the variable was not included in that particular study. 
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given the practical difficulties in communicating with and managing a 
larger workforce. Finally, unions find larger establishments easier and 
more economical to organise and service, given the scope for 
economies of scale and the spreading of overhead costs. 
2. A higher ratio of labour to total costs. Such labour-intensive industries 
are more likely to be highly competitive (due to lower capital 
requirements), so that employers may have more readily conceded 
industry-wide union recognition and collective bargaining. This takes 
labour costs out of competition, eliminates "sweating", and stabilises 
the industry. Employers' associations may have played a key role in 
this. 
3. Higher relative wages. This may reflect a greater "credit effect" in high 
wage cases. Booth (1986:44) notes that collectively-negotiated wage 
increases would not be expected to produce an individual incentive to 
unionise, if such gains are public goods and individuals decide to 
free-ride. She therefore suggests that the observed positive 
relationship between earnings and unionisation implies that free-rider 
behaviour is not the norm, and that the propensity of individuals to join 
the union is positively related to the size of the perceived wage impact 
of the union. However, Bain and Elsheikh recognise that the 
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causation may run in the reverse direction, with higher union density 
leading to higher relative wages, although they decline to construct the 
multiple-equation model that this would imply (1979: 139). !n those 
studies using individual-level data, the relationship tends to become 
negative beyond a certain level, perhaps reflecting the greater 
individualism of the very highly-paid. 
4. Lower unemployment in the industry. This may be explained in terms 
of the balance of power in the labour market concerned, with 
employers more likely to resist unionisation and employees less likely 
to push for it where their industry faces higher unemployment. 
5. Greater market concentration. This has a significant (positive) impact 
on union membership in only one of the studies (in the other two in 
which it was included there is the possibility that multicollinearity 
prevented a significant finding). This relationship may reflect a greater 
willingness to concede union recognition by employers in less 
competitive markets. 
6. Union recognition. This relationship is hardly surprising, and has often 
been remarked upon in the literature on union growth and recruitment 
(e.g. Bain, 1970). In the Elsheikh and Bain (1980) study, the apparent 
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positive effect on density of CBI affiliation and the negative effect of 
being an independent establishment disappear once the union 
recognition variable is included. 
Region has an independent effect, with the North of Britain and Wales being 
more favourable to unionisation, and the South and South East being less 
favourable. The fact that this relationship persists even when differences due 
to other factors are accounted for suggests that social and community 
influences may have an influence. These may have an impact at the level 
of the individual or the employer (i.e. it may influence the decision on 
recognition). 
Booth (1986) also includes industry dummies, and finds, not surprisingly, that 
individuals are more likely to be union members if they work in the 
nationalised industries and the public sector generally. 
The level of labour turnover perhaps surprisingly, is found to have no 
significant effect on union density in the two studies in which it is included. 
So far as the characteristics of the individual are concerned, the following are 
more likely to be union members: males, blue-collar and non-managerial 
workers. Part-time status reduced the chances of being a union member in 
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the case of females and white-collar workers. The lack of a similar finding 
for male manual workers may simply reflect the small numbers of such 
people in the samples analysed. Age and experience tend to have a positive 
effect on unionisation, although the effect of the latter tends to moderate at 
higher experience levels. Self employment seems to have a negative effect 
on union membership for males. As we have already noted, higher relative 
earnings tend to be consistent with unionisation up to a threshold level, 
beyond which the relationship becomes negative. 
The findings that both females and part-time workers are less likely to 
unionise, even when other factors have been accounted for, may be 
explained in at least two ways. Firstly, lower union membership may reflect 
a lower degree of attachment to the workforce on their part, which 
undermines the individual incentive to join a union. Secondly, it may be a 
reflection of trade union recruitment priorities and the image of unions as 
essentially "male" institutions. Clearly, these explanations are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and indeed unions may be able to influence the 
willingness of women and part-time workers to join by adapting their 
approach to such groups. 
Similar arguments may apply to the finding that union membership correlates 
with age and experience. Whilst there may be an exposure effect here, with 
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young people simply having had fewer opportunities of joining a union, the 
arguments on job attachment and union policies and image may apply, so 
that again there may be scope for unions to increase membership amongst 
younger people by adapting their policies. 
The finding that white-collar workers are less prone to join unions than are 
blue-collar workers may reflect different perceptions of status; differences in 
employer policies towards union recognition, and the fact that even in large 
establishments, white-collar workers are often found in relatively small 
numbers. 
The impact of education on union status is uncertain. Bain and Elias (1985) 
find a negative relationship between the level of education and the likelihood 
of union membership, whilst Booth (1986) finds no relationship for men and 
part-time women, and a positive relationship for full-time women. Hundley 
(1988), using American data, suggests that unionisation is less likely in jobs 
requiring higher levels of education, but that within a given job category 
higher levels of education are consistent with a greater likelihood of union 
membership. This result is intuitively plausible, and accounts for the mixed 
findings on the relationship between union membership and education in UK 
and US studies. 
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Several individual characteristics were found to have no significant impact on 
unionisation, according to the studies reviewed here. These include: race, 
marital status, number of dependent children, supervisory responsibility, 
amount of work-related training undergone, and number of discrete periods 
of employment. It seems that characteristics of the industry and of the job 
tend to be more significant determinants of the likelihood of union 
membership than are such individual characteristics, a finding highlighted by 
Booth (1986). This suggests that union membership tends to "go with the 
job", rather than being primarily a function of the individual's own 
characteristics (Payne, 1989; Deery and De Cieri, 1991). 
In general, the above cross-section studies give plausible results, which are 
broadly consistent with similar work carried out in the USA. As with the 
time-series studies, they may be criticised for their ad hoc approach and lack 
of rigorous theoretical justification. Again, however, the findings may be 
interpreted as reflecting the various costs and benefits of union membership. 
Trends and Frospeets: What do the Models Tell Us? 
The above studies obviously tell us something about the factors influencing 
the cyclical fluctuations of union growth (the business-cycle variables), and 
about the distribution of union membership and sectoral disparities in density 
(the cross-section studies). In addition, we may also infer something about 
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the likely long-run trends in union growth and density by applying the cross-
section results to projected changes in occupational, industrial, and 
demographic structures. 
Writing in the early 1980s, Price and Bain (1983) attempted such an analysis 
for the UK. They argue that much of the union growth in the 1970s took 
place in the existing union strongholds (public services and manufacturing), 
but that by 1979 there was only limited scope for further growth in these 
areas, because of a saturation effect. In contrast, the 1970s had witnessed 
only modest gains in private sector services, partly because existing 
membership levels were too low to secure recognition from employers. This 
leads them to talk of a "duality in the pattern of unionisation" (1983: 61). 
Unfortunately for the unions, expected changes in the structure of 
employment were not favourable. Public sector employment levels were 
expected to stagnate, whilst manufacturing employment would continue to 
decline, and private sector service employment would be the growth area. 
Thus, even if unions could recruit sufficient members to maintain density in 
each sector, overall union density was still likely to fall. 
However, Price and Bain admitted that union density levels were not likely to 
remain unchanged within each sub-group, so that the decline was expected 
to be more severe than would be implied by a pure compositional effect. 
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They expected that union membership growth would be adversely affected 
during the 1980s, and perhaps beyond, by lower inflation, a re-widening of 
pay differentials (including that between manual and non-manual workers), 
higher and at times increasing unemployment, the changed political and legal 
environment, and a possible tendency for employers to resist unionisation 
more determinedly. Thus, union decline would be the result of a combination 
of both long-term trends and more short-term business cycle factors. 
Price and Bain did not, however, envisage as steep a decline in union 
membership as occurred in the 1920s and 1930s (UK union membership fell 
from 8,348 thousand in 1920 to a low of 4,392 thousand in 1933). Rather, 
writing in 1983, they expected union density to continue to fall until 1984 or 
1985 and then, assuming that unemployment ceased to increase and inflation 
did not take off again, to fluctuate around a gently declining trend, similar to 
that of 1949-68 (Price and Bain, 1983: 63). 
To what extent were the predictions of Price and Bain borne out? Table 3.5 
presents data on the growth of union membership and employment for the 
UK. The severity of the recession, and its impact on union membership after 
1979 is clear from these figures. After 1983, employment was increasing 
again, but this did not feed through into an increase in union membership, 
although the rate of decline did slow in the mid-1980s. 
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TABLE 3.S: @ir®wtlft) ©if Union M®mnilb®iralhiop md Empl@ym®ni th® UK, 
1979-89 
Yew % <SlhaiK5j@ Sitae® D O S Y@E1F 
Umi@o 
(M@imilb(iirslh5p 
Emmpto i^nnidimlt 
1979 +1.3 +1.65 
1980 -2.6 -0.78 
1981 -6.5 -5.01 
1982 -4.2 -2.22 
1983 -3.1 -1.62 
1984 -2.2 +0.82 
1985 -1.6 +0.86 
1986 -2.6 -0.16 
1987 -0.6 +0.91 
1988 -0.9 +2.90 
1989 -2.1 +2.33 
;@yre<§: Employment Gazette, Historical Supplement No 2, November 
1989, and various issues. Employment figures refer to 
employees in employment. 
There has been a debate on the extent to which the decline in membership 
and density in the 1980s can be explained by the various models. It appears 
that much of the decline in collective bargaining coverage in the private 
sector between 1980 and 1984 may be attributed to a higher level of plant 
closures and job shedding amongst larger (unionised) establishments 
(Beaumont and Harris, 1991). However, Freeman and Pelletier (1990) show 
that structural shifts away from manufacturing industry, male, blue-collar and 
full-time employment account for rather less than 3.1 of the 8.6 percentage 
point fall in union density during 1980-86. Furthermore, they note that most 
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business-cycle models overpredict union density for the 1980s, so that there 
appears to be "something more" to the union decline of the 1980s, which is 
omitted from both the workforce-composition and the business-cycle 
explanations. Their econometric analysis incorporates an index of the extent 
to which labour law is hostile to trade unions, and leads them to conclude 
that: 
"...the vast bulk of the observed 1980's decline in union density 
in the UK is due to the changed legal environment for industrial 
relations." 
(Freeman and Pelletier, 1990: 156). 
Disney (1990), whilst agreeing that shifts in the composition of the workforce 
explain only a small part of union decline in the 1980s, questions Freeman 
and Pelletier's conclusion on the importance of legislation. He argues that 
the business-cycle (or "macroeconomic") model of Carruth and Disney 
(1988) is able to predict the decline in density during the 1980s very 
successfully, with economic factors, particularly real wage growth, explaining 
the greater part of the decline. Furthermore, he claims that the labour law 
index used in Freeman and Pelletier's analysis is likely to be severely 
correlated with macroeconomic variables, and that hostile legal changes may 
follow on from, rather than be a cause of, union weakness. 
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The Carruth-Disney model finds only a limited impact of unemployment on 
union membership, with real wage growth and inflation being more important. 
Thus, the fall in unemployment after 1986 would not necessarily be expected 
to halt the decline in union membership so long as real wage growth 
continued and inflation remained relatively low, whilst the continued presence 
of a Conservative government would also inhibit union growth (Disney, 1990: 
169). 
Thus, whilst there is some disagreement on the relative impact of economic 
factors and changes in the legal framework, the conclusions of most analysts 
are consistent with an explanation of union growth which differentiates 
between short-term factors (whether economic or political) and more long-
term structural factors. The former explain much of the union growth of the 
1970s and the sharp decline of the 1980s, with the latter contributing towards 
a more moderate gradual decline in density, and perhaps in membership, as 
the labour force shifts towards less heavily-unionised sectors over the longer 
term. 
The above analysis is, on the face of it, far from optimistic about the 
prospects for union growth. However, several commentators have warned 
against taking an overly-pessimistic view. Thus, Kelly (1988) challenges the 
notion that unions are locked into a process of secular decline: 
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"Those who believe in a crisis of the labour movement have 
made a series of analytical errors. They have mistaken 
short-term cyclical trends, such as the decline in union 
membership, strike frequency and bargaining power, for 
long-term, secular tends. All previous evidence suggests that 
these three indicators will rise again as the economy moves out 
of recession, and those who think otherwise have provided no 
convincing grounds for their beliefs". 
(1988: 289) 
Nevertheless, as we have shown, whilst cyclical factors were important, the 
unions would not be able to rely simply on an upturn in the economic cycle 
to maintain and improve their membership densities. From the above, it is 
evident that whilst most of the sharp union decline of the 1980s may be 
explained by the business cycle and by the presence of a hostile 
government, adverse structural shifts are likely to be important in the long 
term. Thus, a key factor in determining the fate of trade unions is the extent 
to which they are able to move into the hitherto largely unorganised sectors. 
Whilst the unions were likely to remain strong in their core areas, mainly the 
public sector and manufacturing industry, structural change would continue 
to bring relative, if not absolute, decline in employment in these areas. Add 
to this the relative shift away from male, blue-collar, full-time, permanent 
employment, and it becomes clear that unions needed to appeal to new 
groups if they were to avoid being marginalised in the longer term. The main 
aim of this thesis is to discuss the attempts by unions to develop new 
81 
strategies aimed at improving recruitment and retention in both new and 
existing areas. 
Implicat ions foe S t o t e w : Can to® Un5@ng Inffluenca Their Qwm Faite? 
Having suggested that unions need to develop new strategies, the obvious 
question is: can such strategies have a significant impact on union growth 
and density, independent of forces external to the unions? 
Undy et al (1981: 349) argue that trade union leaders may act as "change 
agents"; playing a key role in guiding the development and future direction 
of their organisations, and that the strategies of trade unions and their 
leaders are critical factors in determining union growth. 
In contrast, the econometric work examined earlier suggests a deterministic 
approach to union growth, with economic and structural factors dominating 
the analysis. Such factors as union leadership and strategy may affect the 
relative growth of individual unions, but they are not seen as significant 
determinants of aggregate union growth. As Bain argues in his study of 
white-collar unions: 
"...the most balanced conclusion would seem to be that unions 
are not much more than catalysts in the recruitment process. 
Before a group of workers can be successfully organised, there 
must be some irritating condition resulting in a widespread 
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feeling of dissatisfaction. Unions cannot create this condition. 
They can only discover where it exists, emphasise it, and try to 
convince the workers that it can be removed by unionization. 
Union recruitment by its very nature is largely a passive 
process". 
(1970: 99) 
According to this view, trade unions simply exploit the propensities of workers 
to join, and of employers to concede recognition. Which particular union gets 
the members may well reflect union leaders and strategies, but if the 
underlying economic, political, and structural factors are unfavourable, then 
the opportunities will not be available. Thus, leadership "is very much a 
secondary and derivative determinant of aggregate union growth" (Bain and 
Elsheikh, 1976; 23, quoted in Bain and Price, 1983: 31). 
Beaumont (1987b) attempts to shed some light on the Bain/Undy debate. He 
finds that the TGWU, by far the heaviest user of the ACAS provisions for 
union recognition claims in Scotland during 1976-85, did not enjoy a 
significantly higher success rate in such claims than did unions generally. He 
claims that this suggests that a high level of organising activity by a particular 
union is not sufficient in itself to guarantee a high level of organising success. 
However, this conclusion seems to us to be overstating the significance of 
the results. The acid test of organising success is surely the number of 
members gained, or perhaps the number of recognition agreements signed, 
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rather than the success rate. Indeed, a union pursuing an aggressive 
organising strategy might be expected to have a lower than average success 
rate in its recognition bids, since it might make bids which other unions would 
dismiss as having no chance of success. 
According to Undy et al (1981) the critical test of the importance of strategy 
is whether particular unions grew at the expense of other unions, or whether 
their growth reduced "continuing non-unionism". They claim that their case 
studies show evidence of the latter, with union policy playing an important 
role. For example, they cite the cases of NALGO and the POEU gaining 
members as a result of adopting policies of pressing for closed shop 
agreements. They also cite several cases of recruitment following industrial 
action. 
However, just because unions gained members at the expense of continuing 
non-unionism does not necessarily imply that union leaders and their 
strategies have an independent influence on aggregate union growth. Would 
such strategies have been successful if the economic and political 
circumstances had been different? As Undy et al themselves note earlier in 
their book (1981: 25), trade unions are constrained by the "logic of their 
situation", in the sense that the economic, social, political and industrial 
contexts shape what is feasible. 
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Nevertheless, the outright rejection of any role for union leaders and strategy 
in determining aggregate union growth seems on the face of it to be 
unjustified. Much of the time-series work of Bain and others focuses on 
cyclical variations in union growth, and would claim to account for around 70 
per cent of such variation. The cross-section work, which Bain and Price 
use as the basis for their discussion of the structural trends in union growth, 
explains anything from 15 to 70 per cent of the cross-section variation in 
union density, depending upon the unit of analysis. Furthermore, as 
Richardson (1977) points out, the union growth literature lacks a coherent 
theoretical analysis of why workers actually join unions. All this leaves room 
for factors not specified in the models to exert considerable influence on 
aggregate union growth. The question to be considered in this thesis is to 
what extent union strategy is one such factor. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, it appears that whilst business-cycle and political factors 
accounted for most of the sharp growth of the 1970s and the decline of the 
1980s, the key question in the long term was whether or not the unions could 
cope with structural change, by appealing to new groups and expanding into 
new sectors. The econometric studies leave at least some scope for factors 
not specified in the models to exert an influence on union membership and 
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density, so that a wholly deterministic view of future membership trends 
appears to be unjustified. 
There is some evidence of a latent demand for union representation amongst 
the hitherto unorganised groups. Thus, in 1990, the National Association of 
Citizens Advice Bureaux (NACAB, 1990) pointed to a marked increase in the 
number of employment-related enquiries being brought to Citizens Advice 
Bureaux (CABx) (see Table 3.6). Their report claimed that a high proportion 
of such enquiries came from part-time women working in the private-
services sector, the majority working in small establishments without trade 
union or staff association representation. Most enquiries involved poor pay 
or conditions, changes in conditions, or actual or threatened dismissal. The 
complainants typically lacked a written contract or statement of their terms of 
employment. 
T A B L E 3.6: Empl@yim@fTiS-[r<alla11@d Enqyoirites to OoSB2@n's Adlviie© B u r e a y x 
Y@air Wymfeeir ©If 
Enqylriles 
(OOO's) 
% of Total 
G A B K EoqySir5®s 
1987/88 642 8.0 
1988/89 673 9.6 
1989/90 709 10.2 
Soyire®: NACAB (1990). 
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Certainly there were factors limiting the ability of unions to convert this latent 
need for representation into efffective union organisation, including the 
possible hostility of employers, the example and policies of government, and 
the behaviour and attitudes of the workers themselves. However, as Bain, 
often seen as the arch-determinist, puts it: 
"... given the way that unionism started among the skilled and 
spread to groups of workers which were initially thought to be 
unorganisable - the semi-skilled and unskilled, public 
employees, white-collar employees, and women - it is as 
reasonable to predict, on the basis of past performance, that 
the basic parameters of the unionisation equation will shift in 
the future in such a way as to enable unionism to expand as to 
contract". 
(Bain, 1986: 158) 
It is here that union strategy can have its greatest impact, in shifting the 
"parameters of the unionisation equation"; by developing new approaches to 
deal with the challenges. In the following chapters, we seek to determine the 
extent to which unions were able to do this in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TIMBE UMdDN dDEMCMVE^ SUTMUEGW AMD EEMAW&dM 
In this chapter, we develop some of the themes in the literature on union 
objectives to provide an explanation for union behaviour in the 1980s and 
1990s. We adopt a satisficing or behavioural model of the union, whereby an 
external stimulus, such as adverse economic circumstances leading to falling 
membership, stimulates a search for viable responses. This is used to explain 
the apparent shift from a predominantly reactive approach to recruitment in 
the 1970s to a more proactive and innovative approach by the late 1980s, as 
union leaderships attempted to counter declining membership in order to 
preserve their organisations. We emphasise the notion that union leaders may 
pursue "organisational" goals, which may differ from those of the rank and file 
membership. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the strategic 
choices open to union leaders in this period. 
Thi@ Eeonomaes of Umon Qfoj@ettiv@s 
A logical starting point in any discussion of trade union behaviour is to 
consider the nature and origins of trade union objectives. The long-standing 
Ross-Dunlop debate focuses on whether union bargaining goals reflect 
maximising behaviour on the part of the leadership (Dunlop, 1944; Cartter, 
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1959) or, alternatively, emerge out of a political process within the union 
(Ross, 1948). 
Work in the former tradition sees the union as the sum of its members, in that 
there is no discussion of leadership or "organisational" goals. Thus, Oswald 
rather naively states: 
"Assume that the union cares mainly about its members' real 
wages and the level of employment in its industry." 
(1985: 162) 
But why should we, and what is meant by "the union"? If such an approach 
is to avoid reification then, as Faith and Reid (1983) note, we must assume 
that the union is the perfect agent of its principals, the members. This draws 
our attention to a key distinction between the Ross and Dunlop traditions. 
Ross does not assume perfect agency, but allows the union to develop 
organisational goals, as well as recognising that the membership themselves 
may be far from homogeneous in their preferences. Crouch emphasises that: 
"Organisations, whether of workers or of anybody else, are not 
the simple embodiment of their members' wishes; they are 
social institutions in their own right, and develop their own 
pattern of power, goal-seeking and conflict." 
(1982: 161) 
We develop this notion below in our discussion of union strategies. 
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A less well-developed literature has looked at union objectives and behaviour 
in terms of the internal allocation of resources; for example, between the 
organising of new members and the servicing of existing ones. Berkowitz 
(1953-54) saw the union not as a monopoly seller of labour to employers, but 
as a seller of services to members . Thus, the union was seen as more than 
the sum of its members. It was analogous to a "business enterprise", selling 
its services and running its affairs according to an "economic calculus". 
Block (1980), developed this approach a stage further, analysing the 
allocation of union resources between organising and servicing activity. He 
argued that as the union's density in its primary jurisdiction increases, so 
members and leaders tend to increasingly favour expenditure on servicing 
existing members in preference to organising new ones. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, organising expenditures yield a benefit to existing 
members in terms of increased bargaining power, but once a degree of 
security is achieved in the union's primary job territories, the marginal benefits 
from additional organising begin to decline. Secondly, once union density 
reaches a high level in a particular job territory, a saturation effect sets in and 
organising expenditures begin to reap diminishing returns in terms of 
members recruited. 
Block finds some empirical evidence in support of his hypothesis on the 
decline of union organising activity in the USA, and concludes that US unions 
are in a "contradiction of success and democracy" (1980: 112), as success 
90 
in the primary jurisdictions satisfies the membership and leaders, but then 
precludes aggressive organising in other areas. Others, however, have 
questioned the extent to which this accounts for the decline in union density 
in the USA in recent years (Freeman, 1988; Voos, 1983; 1984). 
Whilst the work of Berkowitz and Block looks at a different aspect of union 
behaviour to that examined in the bargaining objectives literature, 
nevertheless it shares with the Dunlop tradition the view that unions behave 
as maximisers of some kind of an objective function. 
We have already noted that Ross (1948) questioned this in respect of 
bargaining objectives. When we are looking at other aspects of union 
behaviour, the maximising approach is even less appropriate. Thus, Voos 
(1983) finds that US unions tend not to expand organising expenditures to the 
level where the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs of such activity, so 
that maximisation of net benefits does not occur. There are some problems 
with the way in which Voos estimates costs and benefits of organising, which 
she herself is aware of, but she concludes with the suggestion that perhaps: 
"unions are complex institutions with political as well as 
economic dimensions. If so, unions will not expand organising 
programs unless internal political pressure builds for such an 
expansion or unless union officers are convinced that such an 
expansion would be desirable." 
(1983; 591) 
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We suggest that it is more appropriate to see unions as satisficers, rather 
than maximisers; as adapting to environmental stimuli, on a problem-solving 
basis rather than pursuing an optimum set of objectives and use of resources. 
Cyert and March's (1963) "behavioural theory of the firm" provides a useful 
model. 
According to this view, the "organisational goals" pursued by union leaders 
are the outcome of the internal politics and decision-making processes of the 
organisation. There can be no single maximand appropriate to all 
circumstances, and strategies adopted by leaders will vary across unions and, 
possibly, over time. Union leaders preside over Ross-style organisations, 
with the imperfect resolution of conflicting interests, and with bounded 
rationality. They only search for new solutions in response to specific stimuli; 
a dissatisfaction due to environmental or organisational change. Search will 
then involve a limited range of alternatives. It will proceed on a sequential 
basis, examining the more familiar solutions first, and once a solution which 
satisfies current organisational goals is found the search will end. 
Organisational goals are themselves formed on the basis of past performance 
levels, and may be amended in the light of experience, for example when they 
prove to be unattainable under current circumstances. 
Whilst this assigns a key role to environmental stimuli in the development of 
union behaviour, we must guard against cruder notions of environmental 
determinism. Miles and Snow (1978) have shown how managerial ideology 
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may influence strategic decision-making in business firms, so that different 
firms would not necessarily react in the same way to a given stimulus. 
Similarly, trade union strategy may be influenced by the ideologies of leaders, 
activists and members. 
Orgigidicssiftfloiiigifl 
An important aspect of this behavioural view of unions is that there may be 
differences between the goals of rank and file members and union leaders. 
Unions are initially established to serve the direct goals of their members 
(terms and conditions of employment, job security, etc). Once established, 
however, organisational survival becomes a goal in itself, particularly for the 
leadership and full-time officials of the union, whose career prospects are 
related to organisational success. Furthermore, some individuals may also 
have ideological or political goals. 
Kelly and Heery (1989) find evidence to suggest that the goals of union 
leaders and rank and file members are significantly different. The former, at 
least in the 1980s, emphasise the need to recruit new members, whilst lay 
committees tend to emphasise job protection and pay rises. 
Hyman (1971) refers to the process of "goal displacement", whereby 
"worker-orientated provisions", such as terms and conditions of employment, 
may at times be sacrificed in favour of "union-orientated provisions", such as 
the winning of bargaining rights, recruitment facilities, and closed shop 
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agreements. Whilst it is possible that in many circumstances the latter can 
be seen as means to achieve the former, Hyman argues that on occasions 
there is likely to be genuine conflict between the two, such as where unions 
concede no-strike clauses in return for recognition, thus according to Hyman, 
possibly compromising workers' ability to protect their own interests in return 
for bargaining rights (1971: 197). 
Note that we do not reify the union. Along with Ross (1948) and Cyert and 
March (1963) we note that it is individuals, and not organisations, that have 
goals. Nevertheless, we see "organisational" goals as emerging from an 
ongoing bargaining process within the union. The leadership, with their 
particular personal interest in organisational viability, survival and prestige and 
often with a personal ideological commitment to the broader goals of the 
labour movement, are party to this bargaining process, and may be expected 
to give some priority to such union-orientated provisions. Our view thus 
differs from some of the work in the Dunlopian tradition, which assumes that 
members' preferences are perfectly reflected in the union's behavour, a 
variant of what Cyert and March (1963) term the "entrepreneurial solution" to 
organisational goal-formation. 
Development in Union SehaviQMr 
We may use the above notions of union decision making to try to account for 
developments in union behaviour during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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When membership is increasing, as in the 1970s, the union-orientated goals 
are not generally under threat. In most unions, rank and file initiatives have 
been centra! to such growth when the environment is favourable to 
unionisation, with shop stewards and other lay activists playing a key role, and 
the full-time union official only becoming involved once a recognition 
agreement is to be signed (Boraston et al, 1975). The "passive" nature of 
union recruitment activity during the late 1960s is illustrated by Bain's 
comments on the recruitment tactics of white-collar unions, most of which 
experienced fairly rapid growth during this period: 
"Whatever the nature of union recruitment strategies, they have 
generally not been pursued with much tactical aggressiveness. 
The recruitment process tends to be more passive than active 
in the sense that potential members generally have to contact 
a union before there is much attempt to recruit them. The 
comment of one AScW official is typical: 'Generally we wait for 
people to approach us before we try to recruit them. You might 
say that organisation occurs by accident.'" 
(Bain 1970: 92) 
However, when membership declines sharply, as in the 1980s, and the 
environment is more harsh, the situation is very different, and union leaders 
may feel compelled to take action to deal with the consequences of declining 
membership. Two questions then arise. Firstly, what are the likely 
consequences of membership decline, and secondly, how might unions 
respond to this? 
95 
One possible consequence is that falling membership may threaten the 
financial security of the organisation, thus challenging the union-orientated 
goals which are so dear to the leadership. In the 1980s, as in earlier periods, 
unions in Britain were highly vulnerable to declining membership, given that 
the greater part of their income came from members (Willman and Morris, 
1988a; Latta, 1972). As a union official put it to us: 
"At the end of the day, membership means security of job [for 
full-time officials], and membership also means security of the 
type of structure we have as an organisation. If our numbers 
start to dwindle, then our structure starts to crumble." 
(TGWU Regional Secretary) 
Moreover, trade unions are not business enterprises, and concern at declining 
membership may go beyond its immediate effect on the unions' finances. 
Falling membership may reduce the unions' bargaining power, especially if it 
involves a reduction in union density in particular establishments or job 
territories. The growth of a significant non-union sector would be a worrying 
development for trade unionists, since it could undercut them on terms and 
conditions and make it more difficult to secure improvements through 
collective bargaining. Thus, union density appears to influence the size of the 
union-non-union wage differential (Beenstock and Whitbread, 1988). 
Furthermore, a decline in aggregate union density may marginalise the union 
movement as a social and political force, undermining any claim to speak for 
the workforce as a whole. In sum, declining membership may ultimately 
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weaken the unions and undermine their ability to secure gains for their 
members. 
Faced with these challenges, the leadership searches for a way to halt the 
decline, or at least to come to terms with it. This would explain why, during 
the 1960s, a period of gently declining membership, there were debates on 
the future role of unions, with union leaders such as George Woodcock calling 
for a reassessment of union activities (see Flanders, 1970: 38). It explains the 
relative absence of such concerns during the growth years of the 1970s, and 
their re-emergence in the 1980s. 
Such action could take several forms. Firstly, the union may react to declining 
membership income by attempting to cut costs. There was clear evidence of 
this on the part of several unions during the 1980s. ASTMS were one of the 
first to introduce a cost-cutting programme as membership declined (Taylor 
1983), whilst the AEU's restructuring proposals involved cutting sixty full-time 
officials' jobs and reducing staff numbers by a third, freezing salaries, merging 
branches, selling off property, and reducing the size of union committees. 
Other unions taking similar action in response to falling membership included 
the Civil Service Union, the National Union of Journalists, the National Union 
of Mineworkers, the National Union of Seamen, the National Union of 
Teachers, the Society of Graphical and Allied Trades, and the TUC itself. 
However, whilst there may be some scope for the elimination of waste and for 
increased efficiency in the union's operations, and whilst cost cutting may be 
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necessary to deliver the union from an immediate financial crisis, such a 
strategy risks undermining the effectiveness of the organisation, and ultimately 
perhaps contributing to further decline. Thus, we suggest that cost cutting 
alone will not generally be a sufficient response. 
A second possibility is to increase membership contributions. Willman and 
Morris (1988a) show that, apart from some initial problems around 1980, and 
some particular problems associated with large scale industrial action, and 
particularily severe membership losses, in general unions avoided severe 
financial difficulties in the mid-1980s by increasing per capita contribution 
income sufficiently to compensate for declining membership. This seemed to 
be attributable to increased efficiency in the collection of contributions due 
from members, along with intermittent increases in contribution rates. 
However, unlike Willman and Morris (1988b), we doubt whether unions could 
rely on increased contributions to cope with a sustained long-term decline in 
membership. At some stage higher contributions may provoke internal protest 
and could even deter workers from joining (see chapter 7). Furthermore, 
whilst higher contributions may temporarily offset any financial consequences 
of falling membership, they do not deal with the consequences for bargaining 
power and influence. 
Thus, we suggest that many unions were likely to adopt strategies designed 
to halt or reverse the decline in membership. There are two options here. 
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Firstly, individual unions may attempt to increase membership through 
mergers with other unions. There is clear evidence of an increase in merger 
activity in this period, with declining membership as a key factor expaining this 
trend (Labour Research Department, 1990b). Union mergers have been the 
subject of a growing amount of research in recent years (Aston, 1987; 
Buchanan, 1974, 1981a, 1981b; Morris, 1986; Waddington, 1987, 1988a). 
Given the volume of this research, in this thesis we choose to focus on the 
other and perhaps less-researched option: that unions may react to declining 
membership through internal growth strategies. 
Recruitment campaigns may appear to be a less cost-effective means of 
achieving membership growth than mergers, since the latter usually involve 
acquiring an already organised membership, complete with recognition 
agreements (Aston, 1987). However, where membership has been declining 
fairly steadily and in aggregate terms, we suggest that unions are likely to 
launch initiatives aimed at achieving internal growth for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, to the extent that union leaders are concerned with the influence of the 
union movement as a whole, they may wish to confront the problem of 
declining aggregate membership. Mergers have no direct influence on this, 
whilst internal growth strategies may be aimed at extending the frontiers of the 
union movement as a whole. Secondly, where the decline in the union's 
membership has been particularly severe or sustained, the leadership may opt 
for as wide a range of responses as possible, including both mergers and the 
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pursuit of internal growth. In this case the two may be combined in a general 
growth strategy. 
Such internal growth strategies may involve major recruitment campaigns. 
However, we would also expect to see strategies aimed at increasing the 
union's ability to retain existing members. As has long been recognised (Bell, 
1954), and as Appendix 4 demonstrates, unions are likely to differ 
considerably in terms of membership turnover. This reflects the level of labour 
turnover and redundancy in the industries concerned, and also the extent to 
which those becoming unemployed allow their membership to lapse. In our 
interviews with BIFU officials, for example, we were quoted figures of around 
twenty thousand resignations per year from the union in the late 1980s, out 
of a total membership of over 160 thousand, a loss rate of about 12.5 per 
cent, compared to estimated rates of 14, 25 and 34 per cent for the AEU, the 
TGWU and USDAW respectively. 
Thus, coping with declining membership is not simply a matter of launching 
major recruitment drives. For some unions at least, there would be 
considerable payoff from strategies aimed at retaining existing members. 
Indeed, as we shall see, given the difficulties and costs associated with 
recruitment in new job territories, some unions might usefully concentrate 
more of their efforts on retention. 
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Oirfeinigs and Sttrateglc Ctene© 
Many of the debates amongst union leaders during the 1980s reflect a belief 
that unions needed to develop new approaches and new roles if they were to 
avoid representing a dwindling proportion of the workforce. We argue that this 
involved strategic thinking by union leaders. 
Kochan et al (1984) argue that insufficient attention has been given in the 
academic literature to the question of strategic choice by the parties involved 
in industrial relations. They argue for a shift of emphasis towards the analysis 
of strategic choice, particularly important given that marked environmental 
change in recent years has undermined the stability of established industrial 
relations practices. 
Johnson and Scholes (1984: 6-9) argue that strategic decisions tend to 
involve the following features (we have re-ordered their points for our present 
purpose): 
1. Strategic decisions are to do with "matching the activities of an 
organisation to the environment". Thus, as we argued above, changes 
in the labour market, in particular, contributed towards a perceived 
need to reassess the functions and activities of trade unions. 
2. Strategic decisions tend to effect the "long term direction of an 
organisation". This seemed likely in the case of some unions and, 
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perhaps, in the case of the union movement in general. The debates 
on union strategy suggested this and it was reflected in the recruitment 
campaigns and innovations in services, benefits and contributions 
launched by many unions. 
3. Strategic decisions are often concerned with the "scope of an 
organisation's activities". Thus, the unions were involved in proposals 
to develop their functions and to provide a broader range of services 
and benefits to members. This is reviewed in chapter 6. Also many 
unions were involved in attempts to extend their organisation to include 
new groups of members. This is the subject of part four of the thesis. 
4. "Strategic decisions often have major resource implications". Thus, any 
new functions, services or benefits must be paid for. This may be 
particularly significant if additional staff are required. This is also 
considered in chapter 6. 
5. Strategic decisions also involve "matching the organisation's activities 
to its resource capability". Chapter 7 considers whether unions were 
able to finance any developments in functions, services and benefits 
by increasing membership contribution rates. The chapter attempts to 
determine which factors restrain unions from increasing their 
contribution rates. 
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6. Strategic decisions tend to be "complex in nature". They may have 
implications for how the organisation is managed. This question is 
considered in chapters 9 and 10, in our discussion of the 
implementation of recruitment strategies, where a key consideration is 
the ability of unions to develop a "recruitment culture". 
7. Strategic decisions will be determined partly by "the values and 
expectations of those who influence strategy". In the concluding 
chapter, we discuss the view that strategic choice is dominated by the 
ideological and political views of the leadership. 
We thus consider that the debates, campaigns and innovations launched by 
union leaders in the 1980s constitute a reassessment of union strategy. In a 
time of marked environmental change and uncertainty, strategic choice is a 
key area, which cannot be ignored by industrial relations scholars. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TJMBE UNION STRATEGY ANJID THE 
IMMdDNAIL-CM&ICE TMEOMW BF CMIMtrmME ACTFEON 
The individual's decision on union membership can be seen within a 
rational-choice framework, being made on the basis of a subjective 
assessment of the costs and benefits of joining the union. These costs and 
benefits reflect the characteristics of the individual, of the job, and of the 
industry concerned, the policies of employers and of government, and union 
policy and practice on contributions, services and benefits, and recruitment. 
Thus, unions could attempt to attract additional members by adopting 
measures designed to increase the net benefits of union membership. 
However, it is insufficient simply to show that union membership offers net 
benefits to potential members. In order to induce workers to join, unions must 
be able to demonstrate that membership brings benefits which are not 
available to non-members. In this chapter, we develop a rational-choice 
approach to union membership, which includes a discussion of the free-rider 
problem and the ways in which it may be countered. 
Such a rational-choice approach to unionisation, with its emphasis on the 
individual's assessment of costs and benefits, may be criticised from a 
collectivist standpoint. The latter would argue that the individual is not an 
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island, and that unionisation must be seen in a social context, taking account 
of the influence of class and social group norms and pressures. However, as 
Goldfield (1987: 161) notes, the rational-choice approach could incorporate 
such influences within the individual cost-benefit framework, but in so doing 
the explanation becomes tautological, and so is incapable of being refuted. 
As Voos notes: 
"People who vote for unionization...always may be said to have 
done so because they had a higher subjective expected utility 
for the union than the nonunion situation." 
(1982: 134, quoted in Goldfield, 1987: 161) 
Thus, any observed behaviour can be explained simply by widening our 
definition of costs and benefits, and nothing can contradict our theory. 
It should be clear from the above that once we admit to a definition of costs 
and benefits that goes beyond the narrowest of financial definitions, we are 
unable to test the rational-choice framework as such. It should therefore not 
surprise the reader to learn that we do not intend to attempt such a test. 
Rather we accept the rational-choice framework as a heuristic device; as an 
aid to the clarification of concepts in the initial stages of our work. The only 
assumption that we make in adopting the framework is that individuals do not 
behave "irrationally", by which we mean that they would not knowingly choose 
a course of action which does them harm. 
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Having said all this, the rational-choice framework is by no means useless. 
As we shall demonstrate in the course of this chapter, it yields several 
interesting propositions which can be used to shed some light on union 
behaviour. 
Tiradl® Unions and the "F^-RM^" Profoltem 
Olson (1965) argues that the collective bargaining activities of a union yield 
benefits to workers which are "collective goods", in the sense that 
non-members also enjoy the union-negotiated terms and conditions. It is 
usually either non-feasible or uneconomic to exclude non-members from 
such benefits. This gives rise to the familiar "free-rider" problem, as 
individual workers have an incentive not to pay union contributions, but to 
enjoy the benefits free of charge. 
Thus, just because workers do not join a union this does not necessarily 
mean that they do not value the potential benefits of unionisation. Rather, 
their non-membership may represent a rational choice even if they value the 
benefits of unionisation (Pulsipher, 1966). 
Burton (1978) claims that this free-rider argument is incorrect. He notes 
Samuelson's (1954) definition of "public goods", in terms of technical 
impossibility of exclusion and non-rivalry in consumption, and argues that the 
collective bargaining and contract enforcement activities of unions satisfy 
neither of these criteria. Exclusion is held by Burton to be technically 
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possible, in that unions could negotiate terms and conditions to apply to 
members only, by demanding that employers deny bargained gains to non 
members. Furthermore, he claims that there is rivalry in consumption of such 
union benefits, in that the enjoyment of union benefits by one person restricts 
their availability to others.given that union bargaining power depends upon 
pressing sectional gains and restricting the supply of labour. 
This rejection of the free-rider argument is unconvincing. Olson's "collective 
good" differs from Samuelson's pure "public good" (see Table 5.1). For a 
collective good, exclusion may be feasible in purely technical terms, but it is 
not economically viable to exclude non-members from the good. Also, the 
collective good may involve rivalry in consumption (Olson, 1965: 14). In this 
sense, Olson's conditions for the existence of a collective good are less 
stringent than those for Samuelson's public good. The important point for our 
purposes, however, is that the free-rider problem applies to both public and 
collective goods, since exclusion is economically non-feasible in both cases. 
TABLE § .1 : Pubiie, Private and Cotleetive Goods: Definit ions 
Rival in 
Consumption 
Exclusion is 
Technically 
Possible 
Exclusion is 
Economic 
Public Good No No No 
Collective Good Yes or No Not Necessarily No 
Private Good Yes Yes Yes 
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What of Olson's claim that some union services yield collective goods; that it 
would not be economically viable to deny the benefits of collective bargaining 
to non-members? Technically, it would be possible for an employer to pay 
the bargained terms and conditions to union members only, since 
non-members could be easily identified under check-off, or if the union 
provided a membership list. More importantly, however, is this likely to 
happen? We suggest not. To have a two-tier system of pay and conditions, 
with union members on more favourable terms than non-members, implies 
that the employer is cooperating in encouraging workers to join the union. 
Under a closed-shop agreement the employer discriminates against 
non-unionists in terms of employment, whilst here the employer would be 
discriminating in terms of pay and conditions. In either case, the union is 
dependent upon the cooperation of the employer in avoiding the free-rider 
problem. It seems likely that such a pro-union employer would find it 
administratively simpler and socially more acceptable to adopt a closed shop 
than to provide non-unionists with inferior pay and conditions. 
An employer without such pro-union sentiments, even if pressed into 
accepting such a two-tier pay and conditions structure would surely employ 
a workforce composed wholly of non-unionists, if they were available at the 
lower rate. Even if total replacement by non-union labour were not possible 
in the short term, the existence of lower-paid workers would undermine union 
bargaining power and, in the longer term, restrict the union's ability to bargain 
for improved terms and conditions. The only way around this, for the union, 
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would be to force the employer not to employ such non-union labour. Thus, 
the closed shop represents a more realistic objective for the union than does 
discrimination in pay and conditions. 
There are also legal objections to placing non-unionists on inferior terms and 
conditions. In the USA, unions argued in favour of Section 9(a) of the 1935 
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, under which the terms of a collective 
agreement must by law apply to all workers in a designated bargaining unit, 
whether union members or not. In addition, the law also places on unions a 
duty of "fair representation", under which all members of a bargaining unit 
must be given equal representation by the union. This even precludes unions 
from providing attorney representation for union members without providing 
an equal facility for non-members in the same bargaining unit (Dunlop, 1990: 
116-7). 
Bennett and Johnson (1979: 161) argue that by pressing for the Wagner Act, 
US unions brought the free-rider problem on themselves by supporting 
legislation which prevented exclusion from the benefits of collective 
bargaining. However, the unions clearly realised that without such a 
provision, unions might be undermined by employers substituting cheaper 
non-union labour. 
In Britain, whilst there are no provisions similar to those in the US legislation, 
the Employment Protection Act of 1978 gave employees the right not to have 
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action short of dismissal taken against them by the employer to try to force 
them to join a union. It thus seems that the right to free ride is given at least 
some protection in law in both Britain and the USA. 
In sum, we suggest that Burton's objections to the collective-good nature of 
trade unions' bargaining gains are ill-founded. Apart from the legal position, 
it is unlikely in practical terms that the union would secure the exclusion of 
non-members from the benefits of collective bargaining. Even where the 
union is powerful enough to force the employer to concede exclusion, the 
closed shop represents a more realistic objective for the union. Thus, union 
gains from collective bargaining are collective goods according to Olson's 
definition, and he is therefore correct in referring to a potential free-rider 
problem in the absence of a closed shop. 
EKelygiiv© and Incluslva Q@llfi@eft5wa ©@@d§s 
Olson also introduces a distinction between what he calls "exclusive collective 
goods" and "inclusive collective goods" (1965: 38). In both cases, exclusion 
is economically non-feasible, but in the former there is rivalry in consumption, 
whilst in the latter there is a degree of non-rivalry. In terms of trade 
unionism, the higher wages of a craft, secured by limiting the supply of labour 
through union control of apprenticeship and entry to the craft, constitutes an 
exclusive collective good. There is rivalry in consumption of the benefits of 
unionisation here, in that there is a limit to the number of workers who can 
enjoy the higher craft wages, as expansion of the craft would eventually 
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undermine wages. Where a union presses for a statutory national minimum 
wage, however, there is a degree of non-rivalry , in the sense that all may 
enjoy the benefit without directly undermining it. In this case we have an 
inclusive collective good. 
It should be clear that the distinction between exclusive and inclusive 
collective goods has implications for trade union strategy. Those unions 
seeking to protect the interests and improve the terms and conditions of 
sectional groups, perhaps of more highly skilled or even professional workers, 
should follow a strategy of exclusive recruitment as part of an attempt to 
restrict the supply of labour. Those seeking broad objectives, including 
legislation for general employment rights, may pursue an inclusive approach, 
since the enjoyment of benefits is not impaired by the size of the organisation. 
Indeed, in the inclusive-good case, success in the pursuit of these objectives 
is more likely the broader the support, given the nature of the democratic 
political process. In other words, the degree of success in seeking inclusive 
collective goods may be positively related to the number of people in the 
organisation. We develop these points in our concluding chapter, when we 
discuss British trade union strategies. For the moment, we return to the 
question of the free-rider problem. 
Avoid ing the Free-Rider Problem 
The free-rider problem is of significance to trade unions in two ways. Firstly, 
a significant number of actual free riders reduces union density in sectors 
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where unions are organised. This is evidenced by the gap between collective 
bargaining coverage and union density. As Table 5.2 shows, union density 
was only two thirds to three quarters of collective bargaining coverage in 
Britain during the 1970s and 1980s. Bearing in mind that some union 
members are not covered by collective agreements, this clearly suggests that 
free-riding was widespread in Britain. 
TABLE §.2: Umtem) Demiso^ aimdl ttfo@ Q@wirag@ ©f e@l@e«ov@ 
Bargaining 'm Britain 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Collective Union (Sap = Gap as a 
Bargaining Density (1) - (2) % of 
Coverage (%) (%) Coverage 
(%) 
1973 72 46 26 36 
1978 69 53 16 23 
Unions 
pjecuynisisca 
at the 
Employees' 
(%) 
1983 66 49 17 26 
1984 66 47 19 29 
1985 63 47 16 25 
1986 62 46 16 26 
1987 63 46 17 27 
1989 57 39 18 32 
Sources: 1973 and 1978 Bailey and Kelly (1990) for British union density, and New 
Earnings Survey for British collective bargaining coverage (after Beaumont, 
1987a: 175). 
1983 to 1987 British Social Attitudes Survey. 
1989 NOP Random Omnibus Survey, Employment Gazette, November 1989. 
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Secondly, free-rider behaviour may undermine union organisation or even 
prevent it from developing at all in some sectors. This is the classic case of 
market failure, with each individual concealing their true preference for the 
good, in an attempt to avoid bearing the costs. 
Free-rider behaviour is more likely where the balance between costs and 
benefits of union membership appears to be less favourable to unionisation. 
Where union organisation is rudimentary, the expected costs to the individual 
are greater, not least in terms of possible victimisation. At the same time, the 
possible benefits of union membership are more uncertain and depend to a 
great extent upon the securing of recognition from the employer. Here, 
unionisation is locked into a vicious circle, inhibited by a relative lack of 
demonstrable benefits, but unable to demonstrate significant benefits until 
membership grows and recognition can be won. 
We may identify three ways in which unions may counter the free-rider 
problem: 
1. Pursue compulsory membership provisions. 
2. Rely upon "social custom" to provide an incentive for workers to join 
unions. 
3. Develop excludable "selective benefits". 
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We now deal with each of these at length, since they are clearly of 
importance in any discussion of union strategy and recruitment, and since any 
strategy must necessarily address itself to the free-rider problem. 
Cempj l to i r y M@innilbi§irall,ii5p 
Olson suggests that the union may counter the free-rider problem by pursuing 
some form of compulsory membership. He suggests that union growth in the 
USA has been related to the development of collective bargaining, which has 
provided the opportunity to seek compulsory membership arrangements. 
Olson (1965: 83) notes that the AFL, under Samuel Gompers, was the first 
US union centre to prosper and argues that this success is partly explained 
by its concentration on collective bargaining and "job control" issues, in 
contrast to the emphasis on political and Utopian reform of earlier unions. 
Similarly, Clegg (1976) has claimed that we can explain international and 
intersectoral differences in trade union density partly in terms of the extent 
and depth of collective bargaining. 
Why should the emergence of collective bargaining be so significant? Olson 
(1965: 84) argues that once unions deal with employers in a 
collective-bargaining relationship, they are in a position to request compulsory 
membership or union security provisions, which employers have the ability to 
deliver. Unions which emphasise mainly political methods, on the other hand, 
are not in a position to demand compulsory membership arrangements. It is 
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difficult to see who would enforce compulsory membership for the exclusively 
political union. Furthermore, it is likely that compulsory membership of an 
essentially "political" organisation would be socially unacceptable in a Western 
democracy. 
Thus, the purely "political" union would have no basis for compulsory 
membership, yet such benefits as it is able to achieve, in the form perhaps of 
legislative changes, would be collective or public goods. The free-rider 
problem would be unresolved, and organisational growth and survival would 
face serious difficulties. 
How significant is compulsory union membership in Britain? Table 5.3 shows 
that the number of workers covered by closed shops increased from the early 
1960s to the late 1970s. This largely reflected the extension of the closed 
shop from its traditional areas of printing, engineering and coalmining, into the 
public sector, particularly the nationalised industries (Gennard, 1987). During 
the 1980s, however, the closed shop declined, partly because job losses were 
heavily concentrated in those sectors where the closed shop was important 
(Millward and Stevens, 1986: 305-6), and also because of the gradual 
removal of legal support (Gennard, 1987). However, at no time during this 
period were a majority of members covered by a closed shop agreement. 
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TABLE 5.3: ©@mnipyl]g®n/ Umtom] Rfeiffiil&mMip Son BirtoBini, 1i)§2~Si) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Estomatedl No. 
off Workers Total Union % of M®mi3©[rs % off Workers 
C®y@ir(gdl by 
Closed Shops 
(millions) 
(millions) 
Covered) Covered 
1962 3.8 8.9 43 17 
1978 5.2 11.8 44 23 
1982 4.5 10.4 43 22 
1984 3.5 9.9 35 17 
1989 2.6 9.1 29 12 
Sources: 
(1) 1962 to 1984 from Gennard (1987: 351), after McCarthy (1964), Gennard, Dunn and 
Wright (1980), Dunn and Gennard (1984), Mill ward and Stevens (1986). 
1989 from Stevens, Millward and Smart (1989). 
(2) Department of Employment figures for union membership in the UK, deflated by 10 
per cent to give approximate employee membership for Great Britain (see Bailey and 
Kelly, 1990). 
(4) Closed shop as a % of GB employment. Employment data from Employment 
Gazette, Historical Supplement No.2, November 1989, and August 1990. 
It is interesting to note that the increase in union membership between 1962 
and 1978 (2.9 million) was greater than the increase in the coverage of the 
closed shop (1.4 million), suggesting that the growth of union membership 
during this period cannot be wholly attributed to the spread of the closed 
shop. Workers seem to have been joining unions even in the absence of 
compulsion. 
In sum, whilst compulsory membership has been significant in some sectors 
in Britain, the majority of union members have not been covered by such 
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arrangements. Furthermore, the closed shop was in decline and this seemed 
unlikely to be checked in the future. 
However, union membership may be supported by an employer by means 
other than the closed shop. A recommendation to join the union, the 
provision of a new starters list to union representatives, allowing a union input 
into employee induction courses, and the provision of check-off facilities for 
the collection of union contributions, may all be seen as evidence of the 
employer's endorsement of union membership, and employees may be 
influenced by this in deciding whether to join the union. Table 5.4 illustrates 
this by pointing to the widespread use of check-off, with over seventy per 
cent of union members paying their contributions by this method in 1989. 
Whilst check-off was more common under the closed shop, it was still used 
by the great majority even where no closed shop existed. 
Thus, whilst outright compulsory membership was likely to play a very limited 
role in the foreseeable future, less extreme forms of employer endorsement 
of union membership could continue to be important. However, there was 
evidence to suggest that even the non-closed shop forms of employer 
support were under attack from government by the early 1990s, with the 
Treasury advising government departments to end the practice of "strongly 
advising" new employees to join a trade union. In addition there were 
suggestions that future legislation might require workers on check-off to 
renew the instruction on a regular basis, thus possibly increasing membership 
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turnover and increasing the complexity of check-off administration. To the 
extent that such a shift in attitude was mirrored by employers generally, 
unions were likely to face increased problems in recruitment and retention 
even within areas of existing organisation. 
TABLE 5.4: Rflofhotil ©if Paying Union Confribirtlons 
% off Union Mm 
C!@s@d 
S t o p Shop 
Ai l 
IM®ml!3@ir@ 
Workplace representative 
collects it 
7 2 4 
Paid in person at local union 
office 
4 3 3 
Check-off by employer 80 68 72 
Straight from account by 
direct debit or standing order 
8 18 14 
Paid by post to union office - 2 2 
No answer 2 6 5 
100 100 100 
ioure©: Stevens, Millward and Smart (1989: 620). 
The "Social Custom" Approach 
Booth (1985) argues that Olson's (1965) emphasis on coercion in helping 
unions cope with the free rider problem simply does not fit the facts for Britain, 
with high levels of unionisation in areas without closed shops. Instead, she 
proposes a "social custom" model of union membership, whereby the 
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individual may be influenced by peer pressure and possible loss of 
"reputation". Thus, a community which values union membership may be 
capable of supporting high levels of voluntary union membership in spite of 
the financial pressures to free ride. 
Akerlof (1980) provides a similar "social custom" model and although he is 
concerned with the issue of unemployment rather than with the individual's 
decision on union membership, nevertheless his broad approach is of interest. 
By his definition: 
"A social custom is an act whose utility to the agent performing 
it in some way depends on the beliefs or actions of other 
members of the community." 
(1980: 749) 
He suggests that the obedience of a social custom may provide positive utility 
to those who hold the values underlying the custom. Furthermore, 
disobedience may involve the risk of loss of "reputation", resulting in ostracism 
by the community, so that even those who do not share the underlying values 
may decide to obey the custom. Thus, it is possible that the existence of a 
small group of "non-believers" will fail to progressively undermine a general 
belief in the relevant custom through increasing disobedience, since the 
non-believers will continue to obey for fear of loss of reputation. 
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Akerlof's approach is interesting, in that it discusses both the benefits and 
costs involved in social custom; it deals with those who hold the relevant 
underlying values and those who do not; and it goes beyond the narrowly 
individualistic approach by integrating community influences into the 
rational-choice framework. 
Olson (1965: 61) also considers the possibility of "social pressure" on 
individuals to join an organisation such as a trade union. He sees the social 
approval on joining as a form of private good, in the sense that those who do 
not join are automatically excluded from the social custom benefits of being 
a member. However, he claims that this is only important in the case of 
"small" organisations, for two reasons. Firstly, the large group would not 
bother punishing the individual recalcitrant, whose actions are hardly 
significant in terms of the group as a whole. Secondly, large groups are less 
likely to involve social and friendship ties, so that the sanction of social 
pressure and ostracism is less significant than in the small group case. Also, 
Messick (1973) suggests that small groups may avoid the free-rider problem, 
because here the gains from unionisation are more likely to be significantly 
affected by the individual's decision on membership, so that the optimal 
choice may be to join. 
In addition to accepting that social pressure may be significant in the small 
group case, Olson also suggests that it may also play a role in the case of a 
"federal" organisation: 
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"...a group divided into a number of small groups, each of which 
has a reason to join with the others to form a federation 
representing the large group as a whole. If the central or 
federated organisation provides some service to the small 
constituent organisations, they may be induced to use their 
social incentives to get individuals belonging to each small 
group to contribute toward the achievement of the collective 
goals of the whole group". 
(1965: 63) 
Olson argues, however, that US unions are large organisations. National 
unions are federations of local organisations, but the latter are in themselves 
often large, with over a thousand members, whilst the national union is 
increasingly taking over the functions formerly performed locally. He claims 
therefore, that the above social pressure arguments do not generally apply to 
modern unions in the US (1965: 75) 
Crouch questions Olson's assumption that unions appear as mass 
organisations to the individual worker. He claims that the worker's experience 
of the union takes the form of face to face contact with a local shop steward 
or representative, and involves interaction with colleagues in the workplace. 
Thus, each individual's contribution may appear to be significant, whilst the 
local workplace "culture" may influence the individual's decision whether or not 
to join (Crouch, 1982: 67). According to this view the national union is 
essentially a federation, providing workplace representatives with back-up 
services and legitimacy in the eyes of management (Batstone et al, 1977). 
Boraston et al (1975) find that workplace representatives may shoulder much 
of the burden of establishment-level bargaining, and that the formalisation of 
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such bargaining in the period after Donovan had not reduced this role. Thus, 
it is possible to argue that workers in some workplaces may feel an effective 
social custom incentive to unionise. 
But what of the workplace representatives themselves? Why do people take 
on the hard work and risk involved in performing such a role? Barry (1970: 
37-60) suggests that we can explain the participation of workplace 
representatives in terms of an "economic rationality", encountering no 
free-rider problem, in that they, unlike the members, receive significant 
non-collective good benefits in the form of personal status and power. 
Furthermore, he suggests that, once established, such "leaders" will set about 
getting support for their organisation by building an "ideology", in an attempt 
to give the union a significance to the members that goes beyond their own 
self interests (1970: 39). 
Messick (1973: 155) presents a different version of the social custom 
approach, based on the assumption that workers aim to maximise the net 
benefits for the whole group, rather than just for themselves as individuals. In 
the Booth/Akerlof version, the individual may have an incentive to free ride as 
net benefits to the individual are at a maximum where the benefits are 
enjoyed, but where no contribution is paid. In the Messick version, however, 
workers would join the union if it can achieve net benefits for the group, and 
where the individual feels that his membership is significant in terms of 
achieving these benefits (this is more likely to be the case in smaller groups, 
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of course). Here free riding is unlikely if such behaviour is felt to jeopardise 
union gains. 
This approach sees free riding as being countered by the individual's concern 
for the welfare of the group as a whole, rather than because of a fear of 
ostracism and social pressure, as in the Booth and Akerlof approach. As 
such, Messick presents a more philanthropic view of human nature, based on 
social concern rather than on individual self interest. We suggest, however, 
that such a motivation would depend very much on the social and community 
structures of the industries and occupations concerned, and that some groups 
may be less prone to such influences. 
To summarise, the social custom approach begins to offer a more credible 
counter to the free-rider problem once we recognise the significance of 
workplace trade unionism. This suggests, of course, that those unions with 
a structure which emphasises workplace activity and local representatives 
may, other things being equal, have greater success in generating a social 
custom incentive to unionise. This is due to the small group characteristics 
of workplace trade unionism, and because of the vested interests of 
workplace representatives in fostering social custom. This is important for 
trade union strategy and recruitment, in that it suggests that unionisation will 
prove more difficult in the absence of such workplace social custom, for 
example where the employer refuses to recognise workplace representatives, 
where the employer attempts to counter such social custom, where the 
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employment unit is too small or too fragmented for any group consciousness 
to develop, or where the workforce has apparently diverse interests or 
experiences limited group contact (for example, with part-time or temporary 
workers). 
As a final point on the social custom approach, we note that the 
heterogeneous nature of potential union members, particularly important in 
light of current trends towards greater differentiation in the workforce, may be 
reflected in differences in motivation in joining unions. 
Thus, in a review of trade unionism in the Netherlands, van Ham et al (1985: 
7-9) argue that unions are now aiming to recruit in relatively new areas, 
amongst professional and white collar workers, part-timers and women. As 
a result, it is increasingly important to distinguish between those who join out 
of "moral and ideological motives", the "members"; and the newer categories, 
who will tend to take more of a rational-choice approach and weigh-up the 
economic costs and benefits of joining. This latter group are the "clients". 
They suggest that clients, because of their more instrumental approach to the 
union, will often only join when they actually need the union's services, for 
example when they have an individual or collective grievance over pay and 
conditions, or when they feel threatened by dismissal or redundancy. Once 
this immediate need disappears, so clients may allow their membership to 
lapse. Van Ham et al suggest that unions may need to adapt to this by 
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offering reduced subscriptions and additional or cheaper benefits to longer-
standing members. 
Whilst one might question the sweeping generalisations of Van Ham et al on 
the motivation of these different groups, nevertheless it seems reasonable to 
note that not all sections of the workforce will be equally amenable to a social 
custom incentive to unionise, and that unions need to be sensitive to the 
increasing diversity of the labour force by differentiating their appeal 
accordingly. This is a theme to which we will return below. 
Selective Beneffiftgi 
Olson notes that unions provide other benefits or services in addition to acting 
as a collective bargaining agent over pay and conditions. These include cash 
benefits and friendly-society provisions, the processing of individual 
grievances, and the negotiation with employers of seniority rights from which 
non-members might be excluded. These "selective benefits" provide an 
economic incentive for the individual to join, since a non-member can be 
effectively excluded. They are not, in Olson's terms, collective goods. He 
argues, however, that in practice such selective benefits are not significant for 
most modern unions in the USA. 
Crouch (1982: 57) argues that such selective benefits are also limited 
amongst modern British unions, although he notes the then National Union of 
Agricultural Workers as an exception. This union provided a wide range of 
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advisory services not usually seen in trade unions. Crouch argues that this 
may partly reflect the relative weakness of this union's collective bargaining 
position, so that these secondary benefits were particularly important. We 
may also suggest that the structural characteristics of the industry, with small, 
scattered employment units, and the absence of closed shop agreements, 
make for a particularly acute free rider problem. 
However, whilst the selective benefits option may be of limited general 
importance at present, this does not mean that this must always be the case. 
Selective benefits were important in the early craft unions in Britain, which 
emphasised a friendly-society role (Pelling, 1987:24). Whilst the significance 
of these particular benefits has been undermined by the development of the 
modern welfare state, this does not necessarily rule out the possibility of 
unions developing new selective benefits to meet the different needs of the 
future. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, union growth in Britain has been critically 
dependent upon the winning of recognition from employers (Bain, 1970), and 
in the absence of such recognition, members have been difficult to recruit and 
retain. This means that when recognition becomes more difficult to secure, 
and if there is a trend towards de-recognition, then we would expect union 
membership to decline. 
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Under these circumstances, unions might respond by developing those 
benefits of membership which do not depend upon recognition from the 
employer, such as lobbying for statutory enforcement of employment terms 
and conditions, and the increased provision of certain selective benefits. The 
latter, as we have seen, have the added advantage of being excludable, and 
so are likely to represent an attractive option for unions. 
The development of selective benefits may also help unions to retain 
members who change job or who become unemployed. British unions have 
generally not been very successful in retaining unemployed members (Barker 
et al, 1984). Kelly and Bailey (1989) estimate that only 5.01 per cent of the 
unemployed were union members at the end of 1986, but they point out that 
those unions with higher proportions of unemployed members tended to be 
skilled manual or professional unions, which tend to offer more in the way of 
selective benefits. 
Goncllusiionig 
In this chapter, we have developed a rational-choice approach to union 
membership, based on Olson's analysis of the free-rider problem. Any union 
strategy must, as a basic requirement, come to terms with this problem. 
We have seen that the free-rider problem may be countered in three ways: 
by securing compulsory membership, by exploiting a social custom incentive 
to unionise, and by the provision of selective benefits. Compulsory 
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membership, seen by Olson as an important reason behind the adoption of 
collective bargaining as the key method by unions, had been of some 
importance in Britain, but this was undermined by the legislative reforms of 
the Conservative government in the 1980's, and was likely to be affected by 
developments in employer policies towards unions. Also, other forms of 
employer support for unions, such as the endorsement of union membership 
and the provision of check-off facilities, whilst important at the time of writing, 
could not necessarily be taken for granted in the future. 
We argue that Olson's rejection of a significant social custom incentive to 
unionise is unjustified, given the importance of workplace organisation in 
certain sectors in Britain, although we have noted that it might not be possible 
to generate such a social custom in all sectors. Certain categories of workers 
may be less prone to such an incentive to unionise, particularly those in 
smaller workplaces, part time and temporary workers, and those whose 
employers oppose unionisation. Significantly, these are the very groups who 
were accounting for a growing proportion of the workforce by the 1980s, so 
that union strategies would need to confront the lack of an effective social 
custom incentive if such people were to be organised. 
Selective benefits had in recent times tended to be of limited practical 
importance, although, as we shall see below, this option had been considered 
in the union strategy debates amongst union leaders and academics in the 
1980's and it promised to become increasingly important, particularly when 
128 
attempting to recruit where employer recognition was difficult to obtain and 
where the social custom incentives were weak. 
There are, however, two potential problems with a selective benefits approach 
to union strategy. Firstly, British unions had been seen as offering trade 
unionism "on the cheap" and, with income from members as by far the main 
source of income, it was unclear whether they would be able to increase 
contributions sufficient to finance an increase in the level of benefits and 
services offered to members. Secondly, even if services and benefits could 
be improved, it was by no means certain that this would provide an effective 
incentive for workers to join and to remain in membership, particularly in the 
face of possible employer hostility and a denial of recognition rights. We deal 
with these two questions in the next part of the thesis, before examining 
organising initiatives in part four. 
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PART THREE 
DEVELOPMENTS IN UNION 
BENEFITS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNION SERVICES AND BENEFITS 
Introduction 
The rational-choice analysis of chapter 5 suggested that selective benefits 
may provide an incentive to unionise and may offer a counter to the free-rider 
problem. Furthermore, this incentive is independent of any social custom 
incentive and the provision of such benefits is, unlike collective bargaining, not 
necessarily dependent on employer recognition of the union. Thus, it is to be 
expected that unions would place an increasing emphasis on such benefits 
in a period when the political and industrial climate is hostile to unions, when 
compulsory union membership is under attack and when employer recognition 
becomes more difficult to win and retain. 
In the USA, such an approach has been referred to as "associational 
unionism". It has been linked to the introduction of reduced-subscription 
"associate membership" status in several unions, along with the development 
of selective benefits through such schemes as the AFL-CIO's Union Privilege 
Benefit Program, launched in 1986 (Jarley and Fiorito, 1990). Heckscher 
(1988) claims that such developments represent a move towards a "new 
unionism", made necessary by structural change in the labour force. 
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However, Booth (1985: 254) has argued that such a selective benefits 
approach may only be feasible if the union has some kind of monopoly in the 
supply of the benefits in question. Where the benefits take the form of goods 
and services which could be provided by commercial organisations, such as 
with financial services, the latter may be able to provide them more cheaply, 
since they will not need to cross subsidise the collective goods provision. 
Similarly, Hanson and Mather note that the selective benefits approach: 
"...exposes trade unions to competition in all their activities, 
competition which they may find hard to surmount. Their 
weakness is that they have no unique selling proposition. They 
are on their own in a competitive market, and their competitors 
have a head start in terms of brand image, customer appeal and 
business efficiency, whether selling pensions or insurance or 
financial advice." 
(1988: 67) 
Whilst there will clearly be competition in the provision of many such benefits, 
Hanson and Mather surely overstate the difficulties faced. In particular, they 
assume that unions will themselves enter the market as providers of such 
services, whereas in fact the union's "unique selling proposition" may be to act 
as a collective organisation of consumers, contracting with an experienced 
and established third party to provide the goods or services. Here, the union 
may in effect offer the latter a marketing advantage, by providing direct and 
privileged access to union members, complete with a union endorsement. 
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The TUC Special Review Body Steering Group on Services pointed out that: 
"While services may be provided to the member as an 
individual, they benefit in various ways by being provided by or 
through a collective organisation. In particular, the ability of the 
unions to 'purchase collectively' on behalf of a large number of 
members can enable a better deal in terms of price, standards 
of service or other aspects to be obtained than is available to 
individuals." 
(TUC, 1988a: 1) 
In this chapter, we attempt to answer two basic questions. Firstly, to what 
extent did unions respond to the conditions of the 1980s by developing their 
selective benefits? Secondly, was there any evidence to support the view that 
such benefits help in the recruitment and retention of members? Table 6.1 
places our discussion in context by summarising the main types of benefits 
and services offered by unions. We refer back to these in the course of the 
chapter. 
In the following section, we describe and account for the decline of union cash 
benefits. It is the long-term move away from the traditional friendly-society 
role that has led many to conclude that selective benefits are no longer 
important for the modern union (Olsen, 1965). However, as we demonstrate 
in the subsequent section, the 1980s saw considerable interest in the 
development of new selective benefits, including group discount schemes and 
even individual representation and advisory services, with the express aim of 
improving union recruitment and retention. 
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TABLE 6.1: Trade Union Selective Benefits 
Type Union Role Examples 
Direct individual 
representation and 
advisory services 
Direct provision (either in-
house or through retained 
advisors at no extra cost to 
the member) 
Representation in 
grievance procedures, at 
industrial tribunals, etc 
Cash benefits Direct provision Dispute, sickness, 
accidence, unemployment 
benefits, etc. 
Superannuation 
Direct provision of services 
at a discount 
Direct provision (often at 
less than market prices at 
the point of use) 
Holiday centres, training 
facilities 
Group insurance policies Negotiation of cover and 
payment of group premium 
Personal accident, 
damage to personal 
possessions at work 
|| Group discount schemes Negotiation of the discount 
with third party supplier, 
promotion of scheme to 
members, monitoring of 
scheme 
Retail discounts, 
insurance, financial, legal 
and travel services, etc 
The Decline of Cash Benefits 
Many British unions have their origins as providers of welfare benefits (Pelling, 
1987). It is often argued, however, that this friendly-society role has declined 
over the years as unions have become preoccupied with collective bargaining, 
rather than with "mutual insurance" (Webb and Webb, 1897), and as state 
welfare provision has substituted for union provision (Latta and Lewis, 1974; 
Neumann and Rissman, 1984). 
In his study of union finances, Latta (1972: 401-2) notes that union 
expenditure on cash benefits as a proportion of total union expenditure 
declined sharply during the late 1930s and 1940s, subsequently stabilising at 
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this lower level. There then appears to have been a further decline in the 
1970s (see Table 6.2). 
TABLE 6.2: Union expenditure on cash benefits as a percentage of total 
union expenditure, 1936-89. 
I 1936 44 
1954 30 
1960 29 
1970 30 
1975 16 
1980 13 
1985 13 
1989 11 
Note: All cash benefits to members, including welfare and dispute 
benefits. 
Sources: 1936-70: Latta (1972). 
1975-89: Annual Reports of the Certification Officer, various 
years. 
Table 6.3 examines recent trends in more detail, this time looking at the real 
value of cash benefits per member (at 1985 prices). This suggests that the 
decline in the real value of benefits during the 1970s was followed by a 
modest recovery in the early 1980s, which was, however, insufficient to return 
the value of benefits to the levels of the 1960s. It is important to emphasise 
that, in spite of this recovery, there does not appear to have been a decisive 
shift towards a cash-benefits orientated union movement during the 1980s. 
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TABLE 6.3: Annual Expenditure on Cash Benefits Per Member, 1951-89 
(at 1985 prices) 
Welfare Dispute Ail 
Benefits Benefits Benefits 
1951-55 5.67 0.42 6.09 
1956-60 5.90 1.53 7.44 
1961-65 6.15 0.45 6.61 
1966-70 7.00 0.99 7.98 
1971-73 na na na 
1974 4.02 1.20 5.22 
1975 3.17 0.79 3.97 
1976-80 2.89 1.00 3.89 
1981-85 3.39 1.07 4.46 
1986 4.45 0.19 4.65 
1987 na na 5.30 
1988 na na 4.92 
1989 na na 4.67 
Jotes: "Welfare" includeTaircasFbenefits other than dispute benefit. "All" includes 
both welfare and dispute benefits. 
Figures show total expenditure on benefits divided by total union 
membership, at 1985 prices. Where refers to a five-year period, this is an 
annual average. 
na means not available. 
Sources: Expenditure on benefits and union membership: 
1948-70 Annual report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, various 
years. 
1974-89 Annual Report of the Certification Officer, various years. 
Retail price index: 
Economic Trends Annual Supplement, 1991. 
Given the above trend in cash benefits expenditure, one is tempted to suggest 
that the factors underlying it are peculiar to particular periods. Thus, the late 
1930s and early 1940s was a period of upheaval, given the war and the 
subsequent development of the welfare state. The 1970s saw a rapid growth 
in white collar unions, which tend to pay out fewer cash benefits, so that there 
may be a compositional effect here. Both periods, however, saw an 
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acceleration in the rate of inflation, and this may have contributed to the fall 
in real per capita benefits, as unions failed to increase cash benefits in line 
with rising prices. The modest recovery of the 1980s owes something to 
increased unemployment benefit payouts during the early part of the decade, 
to the tendency for some unions to increase benefits in an attempt to sweeten 
the pill of higher contributions, and perhaps also to the lower levels of inflation 
compared to the 1970s. 
The Development of Selective Benefits in the 1980s and 1990s 
The above refers to the provision of cash benefits. Rather less data is 
available on the provision of other types of selective benefits. Therefore, in 
1987, as part of the Special Review Bodies' work, the TUC carried out a 
survey of union services, which looked beyond the traditional cash benefits, 
to include the whole range of services outlined earlier in this chapter. The 
results showed that the provision of selective benefits was patchy, with some 
unions providing a near-comprehensive range of services, and with others 
providing almost none of the services referred to. The survey report 
concluded that there was considerable scope for the development of union 
services (TUC, 1988a). 
In this section, we describe how unions responded to the circumstances of the 
1980s and early 1990s by developing such selective benefits. Our aim is to 
describe these developments and to briefly compare the innovations of the 
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various unions. We concentrate mainly, though not exclusively, on our 
sample of unions. 
(a) Financial Services 
A major area of innovation in the latter half of the 1980s was in the provision 
of discounted financial services for members. Whilst several unions already 
had extensive provision in this area, including mortgages and loans by 
ASTMS and NALGO, the EETPU attracted considerable publicity with the 
launch of its financial services package in January 1986. The contents of the 
package (as at September 1988) are outlined in Table 6.4. 
TABLE 6.4: EETPU Financial Services for Members 
Mortgage Priority tor EETPU at Halifax Building Society. 
Endowment Linked Mortgages - a "low cost" endowment policy through 
West Common Financial Services. 
Contact with Local Solicitors, who would provide conveyancing "efficiently 
and at a competitive price". 
Household Insurance - 20% off Comhill Insurance premiums, plus £2 
reduction on first premium. 
Motor Insurance - 12.5% off General Accident premiums. 
Financial Advice - free advice on savings, investments, pensions and 
insurance from West Common Financial Services. 
Income Security - "Credit Guard" insurance policy offered by Financial 
Insurance Co Ltd. 
Accident Plan - accident insurance cover offered by CIGNA Insurance Co. 
Source: EETPU Moneywise brochure (as amended to September 1988). 
Note: The scheme was designed to be amended on a regular basis. 
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The launch was greeted with a great deal of interest by the media, being seen 
as a clear expression of the EETPU's "business unionism". As was said at 
the time: 
"The EETPU's overt move towards market-based trade 
unionism may be followed with varying degrees of reluctance by 
other unions; Mr Hammond clearly sees it as another precedent 
set by the electricians which others will have to follow." 
(Financial Times, 29 January 1986: 11) 
Within a month, the AEU had announced plans to follow suit, eventually 
launching its own similar package in April 1986. Within the next few months 
many other unions jumped on the bandwaggon, as shown in Table 6.5. 
In describing the contents of such packages, the first point to emphasise is 
that, unlike in the case of traditional cash benefits and representational 
services, the union itself did not directly provide the service, but simply 
negotiated the discount with the supplier. The union then normally took 
responsibility for circulating details of the services amongst members, who 
would then usually contact the companies direct, quoting their membership 
number to qualify for the agreed discount or priority treatment. 
It seems that unions were often reluctant to allow companies direct access to 
their membership lists, for fear of overwhelming members with publicity 
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material, and where direct access to members was allowed, companies 
sometimes agreed to limit the amount of such material. 
TABLE 6.5: The Financial Services Bandwaggon 
Union Launch Date of New Financial Services Package 
EETPU January 1986. 
AEU Plans announced February 1986; launched April 1986. 
IPCS July 1986. 
UCATT November 1986; extended June 1987. 
SOGAT December 1987. 
NUPE February 1988 announced preparation of package. 
Launched May 1988. (First Unity Trust package). 
STE November 1988. (Unity Trust). 
TSSA November 1988. (Unity Trust). 
USDAW January 1988 announced were considering a package. 
Launched April 1989. 
GMB Plans announced June 1988; pilot in Midlands late 1988; 
national launch early 1989. (Claimed to be first with an 
exclusive union credit card). 
MSF January 1989. (Claimed to be first to include credit card with 
lower interest rate). 
COHSE January 1989. 
AM MA September 1989. 
TUC Bank of Scotland/Unity Trust Bank credit card to be offered to 
TUC affiliates. Launched May 1990. Immediately taken up 
by 25 unions. 
Sources: Financial Times, union journals, union literature and interviews and 
correspondence with union officials. 
In choosing suppliers, the approach of the EETPU, the AEU and other unions 
was to shop around in order to locate the most competitive services. Thus, 
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the EEPTU package initially took four months to assemble, involving the 
union's Deputy Head of Research, an insurance broker and the union's 
stockbroker. This approach meant that the union was in a position to demand 
the most competitive service, and to cancel those deals which became 
uncompetitive. In some cases unions concluded a deal with a company with 
whom they already had a good relationship. 
The packages were designed to be flexible, so that the terms and even the 
range of services could be modified. Indeed there was an element of 
competition between unions in the services offered. Thus, whilst the GMB 
was relatively late in launching its financial services package, it claimed to be 
the first union in Britain to offer a credit card bearing the union's logo. A few 
months later, MSF claimed to be the first to offer a credit card with lower than 
normal interest charges. 
Another reason for flexibility, of course, was the dynamism of financial 
markets and products, with keen competition and innovation amongst the 
providers of such services in the newly-deregulated markets of the late 
1980s. In some cases, this led to particular discounts becoming obsolete, as 
happened for example in the case of the mortgage discounts negotiated by 
several unions prior to the slump in the housing market in 1989, which led to 
terms at least as favourable being offered to the general public in a bid by the 
lending institutions to offset the slowdown in lending (Industrial Relations 
Services, 1990: 12). 
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As pointed out by the EETPU's Deputy Head of Research (private 
correspondence, 25 August 1988) the services basically fall into two 
categories. Firstly, there are the "off the peg" packages, negotiated with 
companies, often at preferential rates. Secondly, there is the provision of 
professional financial advice on an individual basis, in many cases free of 
charge. Whilst it is the former that initially attracted much of the media 
attention, the latter may prove to be a particularly valuable benefit to 
members, given the rapid development and aggressive marketing in financial 
services markets. 
As we demonstrate below, whilst unions had generally been keen to develop 
the services provided to members, there was a feeling amongst some trade 
unionists that the unions must not become associated with the problem of 
consumer debt, and must avoid being seen as encouraging their members to 
get themselves into financial difficulties. This explains why some unions 
chose not to offer credit discounts, whilst others included warnings about the 
dangers of excessive debt in their promotional material (Industrial Relations 
Services, 1990: 12). 
(b) Legal Services 
By the 1980s, legal representation had long been established as a core 
benefit of union membership, and all unions provided members with 
representation and legal assistance with work-related matters such as 
industrial injuries, unfair dismissal, equal pay and so on. Industrial tribunal 
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cases tended to be dealt with by full-time officials, and most of the larger 
unions had a legal department with legally-qualified staff to provide advice, 
whilst all unions used outside solicitors when necessary. The issues most 
commonly dealt with were industrial injuries. According to a survey by the 
Labour Research Department (1990a), 36 of the largest unions between them 
recovered £165 millions in compensation during 1989, equal to £24.75 per 
member, or forty per cent of contributions income. This involved over a 
hundred thousand members; 1.6 per cent of the total membership of the 
unions concerned. 
An increasing number of unions were, however, beginning to provide legal 
assistance on personal and domestic issues not directly related to work. 
Some unions had for several years provided legal assistance for members 
injured whilst travelling to and from work, or whilst looking for work. By the 
late 1980s, unions were extending this to include purely domestic issues, 
often in response to a growing number of enquiries from members. This 
usually involved providing a first free consultation with the union's solicitors on 
any non-work related matter, followed by a quote for the likely cost to the 
member for any further assistance. The NGA even provided this service to 
members' families. 
In 1989 the TUC launched the "Unionlaw" scheme, in cooperation with the 
Law Society, whereby TUC affiliates could provide their members with access 
to a network of local participating solicitors (see below). 
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(c) Other Discounts 
By the late 1980s, many unions were offering travel and holiday discounts of 
around five to ten per cent off standard retail prices. Most unions offered this 
by negotiating with an ABTA travel agent. Only NALGO, with a long tradition 
of providing such benefits, had gone so far as to establish its own travel 
agency, which itself joined ABTA in January 1987. 
Motoring discounts became increasingly common, including reduced-rate 
membership of the RAC, AA and National Breakdown, discounts on car 
repairs and maintenance, and in a few cases on car hire and purchase. Many 
unions offered discounts on insurance, including holiday insurance, motor, 
household, and accident and life. 
Whilst some unions had long had a list of retailers and other businesses 
willing to offer a discount to members, this was in many cases extended in the 
late 1980s, as part of the bid to maximise membership services. Often this 
was handled at national level, but in some cases this was supplemented or 
even replaced by regional or area-level schemes. 
Some unions offered discounts which were specifically related to the jobs 
performed by members. For example, the IPMS provided professional 
indemnity insurance aimed at certain professional specialisms, the EETPU 
provided insurance aimed at self-employed plumbers and electricians, whilst 
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UCATT included a discount on mail order tools as part of its "Moneysavers" 
package. 
One area where unions were slow to provide discounts was for private health 
care. Thus, by 1990 in a survey of 17 unions, only the AEU, EETPU, FTAT 
and the non-TUC FUMPO had negotiated such a discount, with none of the 
large general or public-sector unions following suit (Industrial Relations 
Services, 1990). Clearly, this hesitance to offer what could prove to be a 
valuable benefit, with discounts of up to 33 per cent offered by the EETPU, 
reflects the reluctance of most unions and the TUC to be seen as 
undermining the National Health Service. 
(d) Training 
Almost all unions offered some form of training for lay officers or shop 
stewards. Topics covered typically included negotiating procedures and skills, 
employment law, employment issues and broader economic and political 
questions, as well as the structure of the union and its procedures. 
By the 1980s, however, a few unions were also beginning to help members 
with training in job-related skills. The prime example of this was the EETPU's 
skills training centre at Cudham Hall in Esher, offering courses in electronics 
and computing skills. The courses were offered free to unemployed 
members, whilst those in employment were encouraged to seek funding from 
their employer. The union also marketed the courses to employers, and could 
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provide them on site or at one of the union's regional training centres, set up 
in union offices around the country. British Steel and Rolls Royce were 
amongst those employers who had used the EETPU's facilities by 1989. 
In March 1988, the EETPU followed up its craftsmen training schemes with 
the launch of a management training course, to be offered to its managerial 
and professional members, and to those organisations affiliated to COM PS. 
This would appear to be partly designed to encourage white-collar staff 
associations and specialist unions to merge with the EETPU. 
The AEU became involved in job skills training in 1986, and subsequently 
launched its National Skills Training Centre in Birmingham in 1988, providing 
courses in robotics, CNC, CAD, electronics, pneumatics and hydraulics. The 
union also provided members with details of open learning courses available 
from local colleges, and set up a number of Training Access Points in AEU 
local offices, where members could get information about training 
opportunities from a computer database. The AEU also collaborated with 
employers and colleges in the provision of open learning courses for 
members. In addition, the union produced literature on training issues and on 
new technology. The range of measures was packaged and promoted by the 
AEU as its "Engineers 2000" programme, with the aim of projecting a modern, 
progressive image of the union. 
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NALGO had a long history of providing members with a full range of selective 
benefits, and this included access to a range of correspondence courses for 
vocational qualifications, including BTEC certificates and the Institute of 
Personnel Management examinations, amongst others. 
Several other unions, whilst not becoming directly involved in providing 
training themselves, attempted to bring training into the collective bargaining 
arena. Thus, in September 1987, following on from a campaign launched by 
ASTMS in the previous year, MSF launched its training initiative under the 
banner "Campaigning for Training". The activists' pack for the campaign 
included a policy document criticising the UK's poor training record, a briefing 
on training terminology for MSF representatives, and a model "Training and 
Staff Development Agreement". MSF negotiators were to be encouraged to 
press for training to be included on the negotiating agenda with employers. 
The ultimate aim was to sign training agreements providing for an agreed 
training budget, the monitoring of training expenditures, and the setting up of 
a joint union-management training committee to negotiate on these issues 
and to communicate with employees through regular training bulletins. At this 
stage, the union had no plans to become involved in providing training 
directly, the aim being to pressurise employers to provide better training 
opportunities (Tim Webb, National Officer, MSF, private correspondence, 15 
August 1988). 
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In June 1989, the TGWU launched a similar scheme, aimed at negotiating 
training agreements with employers. A model agreement was drawn up by 
the union, again providing for a joint training committee to discuss training 
needs, to draw up a training plan, and to monitor outcomes. The union also 
launched a quarterly training bulletin and issued a statement on national 
training policy. 
The MSF and TGWU approaches are based on the notion that employees 
accept the introduction of new technology in return for training opportunities 
and the enhanced job security that this might bring. In 1989 the two unions 
published a joint booklet "Making our future:manufacturing in the 1990s", 
which outlined the case for a major expansion of training in Britain, through 
a mix of state intervention and union negotiating power, designed to push 
employers to invest more. 
The above examples illustrate two distinct approaches to training. The first 
appears to accept that training provision is a shared responsibility, with the 
union providing some training directly and helping individual members secure 
access to training opportunities. Such union assistance may be designed to 
appeal as much to employers as to members, since in providing such a 
service the union was projecting an image as a progressive, cooperative 
organisation, so important in an era of union "beauty contests" for employer 
recognition. The second approach, epitomised by the TGWU and MSF, 
placed more emphasis on the responsibility of employers for training, with the 
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union acting to press employers to carry out training through collective 
bargaining. 
(e) Direct Representation and Advice 
We have already mentioned in our discussion of legal services that unions are 
involved in representing and advising individual members in grievance and 
disciplinary procedures, in industrial tribunals and in the courts. It appears 
that unions were becoming increasingly involved in providing such services 
to members by the late 1980s. 
Of the local full-time officials we spoke to, over a quarter said that dealing 
with members' casework had become more time-consuming over the 
previous three to five years. Officials told us that the increased workload 
came from medical appeals, social security and industrial tribunals, where the 
full-time official usually acted as the member's representative, as well as from 
dealing with members' problems in the workplace. Changes in legislation and 
the increased inability of shop stewards to deal with grievances domestically 
were cited as reasons for this increased workload. 
Similarly, the TUC survey of union officials, carried out in 1989, found that 48 
per cent of officials felt that dealing with members' queries and problems was 
becoming a more important aspect of the official's job, with only three per cent 
seeing it as becoming less important. This item was second only to 
recruitment on this question. However, only 22 per cent said that attendance 
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at legal/tribunal hearings was becoming more important (17 per cent seeing 
this as becoming less important), thus suggesting that much of the increase 
in individual representation took place at the workplace rather than through 
the tribunals or courts. This may reflect the restrictions placed on statutory 
employment rights by Conservative Governments during the 1980s. 
TBra mte off the TUP 
By the late 1980s, the TUC was beginning to play a role in assisting individual 
unions in developing their selective benefits. As part of the review exercise 
begun by the 1987 Congress, a "Steering Group on Services to Members" 
was set up to report to the Special Review Body. This was to examine 
proposals from Unity Trust on financial services and pensions, and to consider 
the whole area of services to members. The group carried out a survey of 
unions' provision of such services. This revealed a marked unevenness of 
provision between unions, and the Steering Group, writing in 1988, concluded 
that there was considerable scope for the extension and improvement of 
union services. They noted that there was considerable interest amongst 
members in extending services, and that several unions were already taking 
steps in that direction. They felt that the TUC had a role to play in assisting 
such developments (TUC, 1988a: 2). 
According to the Steering Group, the advantage of TUC involvement was that 
it could help to avoid a duplication of effort by unions, if pooled the expertise 
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of unions, and it provided greater scope for economies of scale and greater 
bargaining strength with the companies selling the services. 
In May 1988, Unity Financial Services launched a financial services package 
for NUPE, and the Steering Group decided to treat this as a pilot for a TUC-
wide scheme. It was proposed that UFS would make available to TUC unions 
a range of financial services for members, covering personal insurance, 
mortgages, investments, banking and travel services. The TUC would inform 
affiliates about the services, and if would then be up to individual unions to 
negotiate with UFS on the range of services, if any, to be offered to its 
members. Thus, the autonomy of individual unions was a key principle here. 
The TUC was to play a facilitating role, with unions being left to make their 
own arrangements with UFS or, indeed, with any other company. 
The Steering Group considered proposals from the Law Society for a 
TUC/Law Society scheme, which would provide legal services on non-
employment issues on preferential terms to union members. The scheme, 
known as "Unionlaw", was launched in 1989 with a national network of around 
two thousand participating local solicitors across England and Wales. Unions 
opting to join the scheme could recommend solicitors from the list to their 
members, who would then be entitled to a free initial interview of 15 to 20 
minutes on any non-employment related matter, with a free estimate of the 
cost of any further action, if recommended. In addition, solicitors were to 
provide a fixed-price service for house conveyancing and the drawing up of 
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wills, and they agreed to be bound by a special code, covering the conduct 
of interviews and the explanation of legal charges. Unionlaw was offered at 
no cost to the TUC or participating unions, beyond thai of publicising the 
scheme to members. By 1991, 41 TUC-affiliated unions had adopted the 
scheme, including the GMB, NALGO, USDAW and the CPSA, and in a survey 
carried out by Industrial Relations Services (1990), half of those unions which 
provided legal help on domestic issues were doing so through the Unionlaw 
scheme. By 1990, the TUC were looking to extend the scheme to Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. 
The steering Group recommended that the TUC should support the launch, 
in June 1988, of a personal pensions plan by Unity Pensions Services. The 
plan discouraged employees from leaving occupational schemes or from 
contracting out of SERPS where this was not advantageous to the individual, 
and thus accords with trade union policies on the issue. The TUC was to 
circulate information about the plan, but was to stop short of recommendation 
or endorsement, not wishing to fall foul of the restrictions imposed by the 
1986 Financial Services Act. 
The 1987 survey found that no union at that time provided a credit card for 
members, although the GMB became the first union to launch one in 1988. 
Following from the favourable experience of unions in the USA, the TUC in 
conjunction with Unity Trust and the Cooperative Bank pic, prepared a 
feasibility report for the 1988 Congress. The card was launched in May 1990, 
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initially offering an Annual Percentage Rate of interest up to three and a half 
per cent lower than its major competitors, with a minimum credit limit of £250 
compared to £750 for many credit cards. The card was immediately taken up 
by 25 affiliated unions, representing some six million members. The TGWU 
was amongst those deciding to adopt the card. By 1991, some 32 thousand 
cards had been issued to individuals, 70 per cent of which had been activated 
(TUC, 1991a). 
The Steering Group was also to consider several other initiatives, including 
banking facilities and travel services. 
Tb® Involvamcnt of Local Union Officials 
In general, the local union official had only a limited role in administering 
these new services. In some cases, promotional material was mailed directly 
to individual members' homes from the union's head office, whilst in others the 
material was distributed by lay officials via local offices. Even in the latter 
case, the local full-time official's role was usually limited to providing the 
promotional material. Most of the discount-type services were provided by 
third-party suppliers, so that an interested member would be referred directly 
to the company concerned. 
Most of the new services were initiated by the centre, although we found 
some examples of regional or district initiatives. For example, a UCATT 
Regional Officer told of his attempts to negotiate discounts with the local 
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cooperative retail society and with a local supplier of building tools. This was 
done on his own initiative, rather than in response to a central directive, but 
he felt that it was important to ensure that local firms were involved in the 
discount scheme. 
Similarly, NUPE officials described their own local initiatives, including 
discounts with local traders and the original extension of legal help to cover 
non-work related matters. 
It seems that local officials were often approached by companies offering 
discounts and incentives to purchase their goods and services. For example, 
a TGWU official told us that following the new legislation on pensions in 1986, 
officials were approached by a large number of companies offering 
commission in return for access to the membership. As a result, the union 
decided to take control at a national level, and that no local official was to 
become involved in such deals for fear of provoking accusations of lack of 
expertise or even corruption in such matters. 
Selective Benefits, Recruitment and Retention 
We have seen that in principle selective benefits offer a recruitment and 
retention incentive which avoids free-rider problems and which does not 
depend on recognition from the employer. The development of selective 
benefits has thus been seen as an attractive option for unions, particularly in 
a difficult period such as the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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Jarley and Fiorito (1990: 222) see such an approach as being aimed at three 
particular groups of workers. Firstly, it represents an attempt to retain those 
members who have in the past allowed their membership to lapse on moving 
from a job covered by collective bargaining to one which is not. Secondly, it 
attempts to recruit and retain those who have supported the union in an 
unsuccessful bid for recognition. Finally, it attempts to recruit free-riders in 
job territories covered by collective agreements. 
The selective benefits approach promises to make it easier to secure union 
recognition in the long run, in that membership may be maintained even 
where the employer initially refuses recognition, thus providing a nucleus for 
future organising efforts. Thus, in a study of US local government 
departments over the period 1977 to 1982, Ichniowski and Zax (1990) find 
that the presence of "association-style unionism" (ie membership in the 
absence of collective bargaining recognition) in 1977 made it more likely that 
full negotiating rights would have been secured by 1982. 
In this section, we examine the likely impact of the development of selective 
benefits on recruitment and retention in Britain, firstly by briefly reviewing the 
existing evidence and secondly by drawing on our interviews with local fu l l -
time officials. 
The British Social Attitudes Survey provides some evidence on the reasons 
why people join unions (Table 6.6). Whilst protection at work, better pay and 
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conditions, and a wish to help workmates are the three most important 
reasons, over 70 per cent said that "members' benefits like financial or health 
schemes" were "very" or "fairly" important as a reason for joining the union. 
The survey report notes that this may reflect the greater emphasis on such 
services by unions in the late 1980s (Millward, 1990: 35). 
T A B L E 6.6: Reasons for Belonging to a Trade Union: Evidence from the 
British Social Attitudes Survey, 1989. 
Very/Fairly 
Important 
Not Very/Not at All 
Important/Does Not Apply 
To Me 
To protect me if problems come up 93 6 
To get higher pay and better working 
conditions 
80 20 
To help other people I work with 76 23 
To get members' benefits like financial or 
health schemes 
71 29 
I believe in them in principle 67 33 
Most of my colleagues are members 55 45 
It is a condition of having my job 38 62 
It is a tradition in my family 15 
Source: Millward (1990). 
Table 6.7 suggests that, according to shop stewards, the provision of legal 
and accident cover was significant in persuading individuals to join a union, 
as was the provision of individual representation. Thus, whilst the collective 
bargaining and collective strength arguments were important, particularly it 
seems in the private sector, so were the selective benefits of representation 
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and legal cover. However, cash benefits and discount packages were not 
mentioned as significant incentives to join the union in this survey. 
T A B L E 6.7: Most Convincing Arguments Used by Union 
Representatives in Recruiting Members 
% of Union Representatives 
Mentioning as Most 
Convincing Argument 
Public Sector 
Union provides representation for 
members 
35 
Union negotiates improvements in pay 
and conditions 
25 
Union provides legal aid and accident 
cover 
24 
Government policies 18 
Collective strength of union organisation 14 
Private Sector 
Union negotates improvements in pay and 
conditions 
32 
Collective strength of union organisation 24 
Union provides legal aid and accident 
cover 
23 
Union provides representation for 
members 
21 
All or most are union members 14 
Source: Labour Research Department (1986b: 23). 
Based on a survey of 265 union representatives and shop stewards, who 
were asked for the most convincing arguments used in their workplace in 
favour of union membership. Multiple answers were allowed. 
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A survey of 1,249 NUPE members, carried out in early 1988, came up with 
the following conclusions on the motivation for joining the union: 
"Most members (61 per cent) joined a union to have 'someone 
to turn to if I had a problem at work'. Half say they joined 
because they thought it would help to get better pay and 
conditions at work, and only one in five joined 'because I 
believed in trade unions and wanted to be part of the 
movement1. Twenty seven per cent said they had to join as a 
condition of the job. Only five per cent joined because they 
were attracted by the benefits and services offered." 
(NUPE, 1989: 7) 
Furthermore, only five per cent said they had joined NUPE in particular 
because its benefits were more attractive than those of other unions. Thus, 
whilst individual representation was seen as being potentially very important, 
other selective benefits and services appeared not to be a major factor in 
encouraging individuals to join this particular union, although if must be 
pointed out that the survey predates the launch of the union's financial 
services package in May 1988. 
Kelly and Bailey tentatively suggest that selective benefits may help unions 
to retain those members who become unemployed, since the unions with 
higher proportions of unemployed members tend to be the skilled manual and 
professional unions, which often provide "labour market access and 
information" (1989: 61). Lewis (1989) also provides evidence of this effect, 
with almost 20 per cent of his sample of 123 unemployed union members 
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citing either "provision of benefits" or "protection or help while unemployed" 
as a reason for maintaining their membership on becoming unemployed. In 
addition, a further fifteen per cent gave "union membership necessary in order 
to obtain another job" as a reason for retaining their membership. 
In sum, the above evidence suggests that selective benefits, whilst probably 
rather less important than collective bargaining, were at least of some 
significance in the decision to join a union. Of the various selective benefits 
offered by unions, it appears that individual representation and legal 
assistance, and in some cases labour market access and information, may 
have been more important than cash benefits and discount packages in the 
decision to join a union, although the latter may well have become a more 
significant incentive following their development in the late 1980s. 
We saw earlier how unions were developing their services in the late 1980s, 
particularly in the area of discounts, financial and legal services and training. 
In the remainder of this section, we assess the importance of these new 
benefits by examining the experiences and views of our sample of union 
officials. We discuss their attitude to the development of such services and 
whether they feel that they could become an important aid to recruitment and 
retention. 
The development of some benefits was often associated with the "business 
unionism" of, for example, the EETPU, so that the provision of such benefits 
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had been controversial in some unions. Thus, some officials expressed 
serious doubts about the union offering a financial services package to 
members. We encountered this view in its most extreme form from a left-
wing official of the AEU: 
"I don't see my role as propping up capitalism...! don't see my 
role as assisting workers as to how they can get themselves 
more and more into debt...I see my role as demonstrating that 
unions are there to protect and defend their living standards, 
and the more we try to move away from that with clever-clever 
concepts, people get confused." 
(AEU District Secretary) 
Another view, from a different political perspective, but still expressing 
reservations about the development of discount packages, came from a BIFU 
official: 
"Some people within the union are concerned that we are going 
to end up just like a staff association, as a discount house. We 
don't want to lose our traditional values because that would 
effect our retention of members and possibly the potential for 
future members who may be a bit further thinking than the 
average recruit into a bank, and therefore say 'I want a union 
that's actually going to improve my lot with my employers, and 
not necessarily just offer me a discount', which, let's be honest, 
if anybody looks around closely enough they can probably get 
for themselves." 
(BIFU Area Organiser) 
This view was echoed by another BIFU official, who suggested that there was 
a "grudging acceptance" of the development of discount packages on the part 
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of BIFU activists. The point in this case is that whilst there was some 
recognition that such services could be attractive to members, the provision 
of discount services was traditionally a major feature of the staff associations, 
which were regarded with contempt by BIFU activists, who were anxious that 
their own union maintain its distinctive character. 
More representative of our sample of officials, however, was the following 
view from a NUPE official on the introduction of a financial services package: 
"There was considerable political resistance to getting involved 
at all...from full-time officials and lay activists, who saw it as 
'consumer unionism' or 'new unionism'; the EETPU type of 
thing. I've always favoured it so long as it was an addition to 
the services that we provided and not a change in emphasis. 
I don't see why our members shouldn't have all the benefits that 
size can bring, so long as that doesn't divert the union info 
providing that rather than union services." 
(NUPE Regional Secretary) 
Thus, whilst there was some opposition to the development of discount 
packages and other new benefits, the great majority of the officials we 
interviewed were in favour of them, so long as their introduction was seen as 
an addition to, rather than a substitute for, representational services. 
The next question, of course, is whether officials found such benefits helpful 
in the recruitment and retention of members. Only a very small minority felt 
that the new benefits were of no help whatsoever (see Table 6.8). However, 
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the usual view was that their impact, whilst probably positive, was at most 
marginal, whilst some officials specifically stated that they were more helpful 
in retention than in recruitment. 
T A B L E 6.8: Do The New Services and Benefits Help in the Recruitment 
and Retention of Members? 
========——— 
Response Number of Replies 
Yes 21 
Too early to say 2 
No 2 
Don't Know 2 
27 
Source: Interviews with local union officials, 1989-90. 
An interesting suggestion was made by one of our respondents: 
"I suspect that it is an intangible thing. It's simply an impression 
that the union is providing all of these things which you can 
make use of if you wish to. In practice, a lot of them don't make 
any use at all but they think that the union is doing this, that and 
the other for them, and therefore they're in the union." 
(BIFU Area Organiser) 
Thus, the actual take up of benefits may, according to this view, not be critical 
if individuals can be persuaded to join by the offer of potential benefits. 
A key feature of the selective benefits option is that such benefits may assist 
in the recruitment and retention of members even where the union is not 
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recognised by the employer, and so does not negotiate terms and conditions. 
This is catered for in many US unions, in their "associate membership" 
category (Jarley and Fiorito, 1990). Several officials were aware of this 
argument: 
"[Could the union ever recruit and retain members where there 
is no recognition?] I think that is the tack we have decided to 
go down. This is the challenge we've set ourselves as a 
union... We've always been able to hold onto members, without 
them being employed even, but not in the numbers that we'd 
like to." 
(TGWU District Secretary) 
However, the same official noted the long-term nature of such a strategy: 
"What is happening in our union now is going to take a decade 
before it shows whether it is going to bear fruit." 
(TGWU District Secretary) 
For the present, at least, officials felt that recognition was still critical if 
members were to be retained. In general, officials were rather pessimistic 
about the ability of selective benefits to retain members in the longer term. 
An interesting view was put forward by a BIFU official: 
"[Do the new discount services help you to recruit and retain 
members in the absence of recognition?] I think they are an 
advantage, but I don't think they'd stay just for that. I think if 
people stay it is simply because they believe in trade unions 
and want an independent trade union in there on their behalf. 
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I don't think they are going to stay for discount packages or 
anything like that...because if someone's prepared to stick it out 
under those circumstances, then it isn't about the cheap 
cosmetics or a cheap holiday." 
(BIFU Area Organiser) 
This argument was echoed by an USDAW official: 
"It's true that you might be able to recruit on the basis of this 
sort of thing [discounts etc.], but if you are dealing with an 
employer who is hell bent on keeping you out, and he's 
prepared to transgress the law in doing so, then people can be 
bullied out of trade unionism." 
(USDAW Deputy Divisional Organiser) 
Thus, to remain a union member in a hostile anti-union environment, with all 
that this may entail for the individual concerned, may require more than this 
type of discount benefit. 
We therefore suggest that such services may be more useful when trying to 
recruit individual non-members where the union is already recognised. Here 
the prospects of victimisation for union membership are remote, so that even 
marginal inducements to join may have a significant effect. 
This suggests that the development of selective benefits may have a greater 
impact where unions are attempting to consolidate their organisation than 
where they are attempting to expand into new job territories, and they will be 
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particularly useful where density levels are quite low due to adverse attitudinal 
or structural conditions. Thus, white-collar unions, unions seeking to organise 
women and unions organising in scattered workplaces, but which nevertheless 
have recognition agreements, would be particularly well-advised to develop 
their selective benefits. 
Regardless of whether unions recruit non-unionists by developing their 
selective benefits, individual unions may feel compelled to develop them in 
order to avoid losing members to rival unions. The improvement of union 
services may thus be driven by inter-union competition. The officials we 
interviewed were split fairly evenly on this question, with no clear pattern by 
union. Those officials who felt that failure to develop new services would 
result in membership loss tended to talk in terms of a "market place for trade 
unionism", with members becoming increasingly demanding in terms of 
services. 
Whilst in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was no major reversal of the 
long-term move away from traditional union cash benefits, there was a new 
emphasis on negotiated discounts on a wide range of products, such as 
financial services, travel and tourism, and motoring and other services. In 
addition, unions were keen to demonstrate their commitment to training, 
sometimes by attempting to negotiate on training with employers, and in a few 
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cases by extending the traditional union education service to include job -
related training. 
Many such services were clearly aimed to appeal to the member as a 
consumer, but union officials were often at pains to point out that whilst their 
union sought to provide as wide a range of services as possible, nevertheless 
such discount services were essentially of an ancillary nature, with negotiation 
and representation remaining as the core union purpose. 
Union-negotiated discounts were not new in the 1980s. In some unions they 
had existed for many years. What was new for many unions was the 
systematic attempt to revamp and to promote such benefits as an integrated 
package of members' services. There was a feeling amongst some officials 
that it was essential to match the developments of rival unions in order to 
avoid dissatisfaction amongst members, and even to safeguard the ability to 
recruit and retain members. According to this view, such developments were 
driven by the demands of the membership and by inter-union competition, 
and may be seen as a symptom of "market shares" trade unionism (Willman, 
1989), with a perceived need, to continually update the "product" in order to 
compete in the "market" for union membership. Also important was the fact 
that in this period, the suppliers of such goods and services were often 
particularly keen to offer discounts to union members as part of their approach 
to marketing their products. 
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In some respects the new services were as important symbolically as they 
were in practice. The EETPU, for example, was keen to project itself as a 
modern, progressive union, sensitive and responsive to the demands of its 
members. Even those unions which did not share the EETPU's vision of 
"business unionism" were nevertheless anxious to maximise their membership 
appeal by offering as much as possible to members. 
With a few exceptions, our sample of local full-time officials were in favour of 
the development of their unions' selective benefits along the lines described 
above. The majority claimed that such developments might assist in the 
recruitment and retention of members, but that this effect was likely to be only 
marginal. Some officials were aware of the thinking behind "associate 
membership" trade unionism, but they felt that at least in the immediate future 
employer recognition would continue to be vital if membership were to be 
retained for any length of time. It seemed unlikely that such benefits would 
provide an effective incentive to unionise in the face of employer hostility to 
unionisation, although they might have more of an effect where unions were 
attempting to consolidate membership under existing recognition agreements. 
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CHAPTER 7 
UNION STRATEGY AND THE LEVEL OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
Introduction 
The level of resources available to trade unions has long been an area for 
concern, and during the 1980s it attracted increasing attention as membership 
declined. Given that British unions derive the bulk of their income from 
membership contributions (Latta, 1972; Willman and Morris, 1988a), it was 
suggested that unions needed to increase contribution rates. This concern 
with resources and contributions arose for three reasons. 
Firstly, by the mid-1980s it was being argued that if they were to avoid being 
marginalised, unions needed to extend their recruitment activity to organise 
new sectors of the labour market. As Willman (1989) points out, however, 
such expansionary recruitment activity is highly resource-intensive, so that 
additional resources might be necessary if unions were to successfully extend 
their recruitment activities. 
Secondly, we suggested in chapter 6 that unions might attract additional 
members and improve their retention of existing ones by developing their 
services and benefits, but that there was a question as to whether or not the 
unions would be able to finance this. Whilst it may be possible to increase 
the provision of certain consumer discounts without incurring major additional 
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costs, this would not necessarily be true of all new benefits and services. 
Thus, it might be necessary to increase the level of membership contributions 
in order to provide the required finance. Edmonds, for example, sees this as 
essential in the bid to provide an attractive range of advisory and advocacy 
services, which would involve the development of specialist head office 
departments, and an improved network of local officers. He claims that: 
"These changes mean that the era of cheap, post-war trade 
unionism is fast coming to an end. More officials, more 
specialist advice and more information bulletins will have to be 
paid for by sharply increased union contributions." 
(1984: 21) 
The TUC itself has long recognised a need to increase contributions, if a 
proper level of services is to be maintained (see, for example, TUC Annual 
Report, 1961: 316). 
Thirdly, even if unions were to continue to provide existing members with the 
current level of services and benefits, it was likely that servicing costs would 
increase. Given the trend towards smaller workplaces, and away from 
industry-level bargaining, the scope for economies of scale in the servicing 
of members was likely to diminish. Thus, again, there seemed to be a need 
for higher contributions. 
The above arguments suggest, then, that higher contributions might be 
necessary if the unions were to maintain or increase membership and to 
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extend their field of organisation. We begin this chapter with a review of 
recent trends in union contributions and of the debates within the union 
movement. Our main aim, however, is to discuss to what extent unions were 
able to increase the level of contributions to meet the challenges outlined 
above. We approach this question in two ways: firstly through a time-series 
analysis of the relationship between union contributions and membership, and 
secondly through a cross-section analysis designed to identify those factors 
which appear to influence a union's contribution rate. Finally, we examine 
recent developments in union contributions policies, and show how these 
were often related to organising priorities. 
Union Contributions Bn Britain 
By the 1980s, union contributions in Britain were low, both by international 
and by historical standards. In 1988 British unions had contribution rates at 
about half the level of West German unions, and around two thirds those of 
French and Italian unions (Labour Research Department, 1988b). In 1984, 
TUC unions had an average individual contribution rate of 55 pence per week 
(£28.59 per year), equivalent to 0.36 per cent of the average male weekly 
wage. In 1938, by comparison, the average contribution was 1.5 per cent of 
the average male wage. Table 7.1 records the long term decline in union 
contributions relative to wages. 
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T A B L E 7.1: Union Contributions as a Percentage of the Average Male 
Gross Wage, 1938-74 
% 
1938 1.50 
1954 0.75 
1960 0.40 
1970 0.33 
1974 0.28 
Source: TUC internal papers. 
Table 7.2 shows, however, that by the 1980s union members were paying a 
higher percentage of average earnings in union contributions than they had 
during the mid to late-1970s, although real contribution rates remained at 
very low levels compared to earlier decades. Willman and Morris (1988a: 55) 
attribute this modest recovery to greater efficiency in the collection of 
contributions due, as check-off and direct debit became more widespread, 
and also to attempts by unions to restore their finances in a period of falling 
membership by increasing the level of contributions. 
Table 7.3 provides some additional insights into trends in contributions in 
recent decades, this time looking at the real value of contributions, deflated 
by prices rather than by wages or earnings. From this, we can identify three 
broad phases. Firstly, real contributions increased at a modest rate from the 
1950s up until the late 60s. Secondly, the 1970s saw real contributions 
fluctuating around the £24 to £25 level, with real contributions at the end of 
the decade at a similar level to the late 1960s. Finally, the 1980s saw a 
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marked increase in real contributions, at a much faster rate than had been 
seen in earlier years, so that by 1989 they had increased by over 40 per cent 
in real terms since 1979, 
TABLE 7=2: Umtoim ©©onfi&ilbytD©*! lmie@mni@ P®v \Mi®mh®v m si F@ir©@initgig® ©If 
Awsirag© Eamlmigs, 11975-89. 
% 
1975 0.320 
1976 0.334 
1977 0.338 
1978 0.330 
1979 0.334 
1980 0.330 
1981 0.371 
1982 0.370 
1983 0.373 
1984 0.357 
1985 0.373 
1986 0.377 
1987 0.376 
1988 0.364 
1989 0.354 
M©t@: The figures in this table are based on average earnings and are 
not comparable to those in Table 7.1, which are based on 
average male gross wages. 
S@ure@: Union membership and income from members from Certification 
Officer's annual reports. Average weekly earnings of full time 
employees on adult rates from New Earnings Survey. 
These phases appear to correlate with the phases of union growth identified 
by Price and Bain (1983), with modest membership growth and stagnating or 
gently declining density up to 1968, rapid growth and increasing density in the 
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1970s and sharp decline after 1979. As we have seen, Willman and Morris 
(1988a: 55) interpret the increase in contributions in the 1980s as a reaction 
by unions to falling membership. An alternative explanation, of course, would 
be that higher contributions contribute to lower membership through a "price 
elasticity" effect. 
TABLE 7.3: P<ar Capita !imc@inri@ from M@mb@irs sit 1985 Pr5©<§s, £ p@ir 
mmtnnilbtir p@r annoym 
Y@air £ 
1951-55 19.78 
1956-60 21.30 
1961-65 24.23 
1966-70 24.85 
1971-73 na 
1974 24.83 
1975 23.96 
1976-80 25.12 
1980-85 31.02 
1986 35.04 
1987 36.12 
1988 36.60 
1989 36.18 
M©t#s: Income from members divided by total membership, at 1985 
prices. 
Grouped years are annual averages. 
na means not available. 
i®ure©§: Income from members and total membership: 
1951-70 Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, 
various years. 
1974-89 Annual Report of the Certification Officer, various 
years. 
Retail price index: Economic Trends Annual Supplement, 1991. 
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Thus, whilst unions increased contributions to some extent in the 1980s, two 
questions remain. Firstly, to what extent did higher contributions adversely 
affect unions' ability to recruit and retain members? Secondly, given the 
alleged need for further increases to fund improved services and benefits and 
to finance organising campaigns, to what extent did unions appear able to 
pursue further increases, without encountering adverse consequences for 
recruitment and retention? Before presenting our empirical work on such 
questions, we review the debates on union contributions. 
Union Conftribiuitioinis: Th@ Retoftes 
The low level of contributions, and its effect on union finances, has long been 
an issue of concern to union leaders. Thus, a TUC survey of union finances, 
carried out in 1960, led the General Council to conclude that unions needed 
to improve their financial position (TUC Annual Report, 1962: 109). In 1961, 
the following motion was presented at the TUC: 
"This Congress urges the General Council to consider, with a 
view to making recommendations to a future Congress, means 
of promoting the adoption by affiliated organisations of a uniform 
minimum contribution for industrial services and greater' 
uniformity of industrial benefits such as strike and lock-out pay." 
(TUC Annual Report, 1961: 316) 
The mover of the motion, a delegate of the then National Union of General 
and Municipal Workers, argued that such a course of action would lay the 
basis for sounder union finances and improved inter-union relations by 
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removing competition over contributions and industrial benefits. The 
Congress debate revealed some reservations about the proposals. A National 
Union of Agricultural Workers delegate opposed uniform contributions on the 
grounds that unions differed greatly in the average earnings levels of their 
members, suggesting instead that unions might relate contributions to the 
minimum hourly adult pay rates of their members. A delegate from the 
Draughtsmen's and Allied Technicians' Association argued against the 
harmonisation of strike pay, claiming that his own union's members needed 
a higher level than most because of the isolation and lack of mass bargaining 
power of draughtsmen compared to manual workers. Nevertheless, the 
motion was carried, and the General Council presented a report to Congress 
the following year. 
Their survey of contribution levels for 33 unions revealed a very broad range. 
They concluded that the need was to increase contributions, rather than 
necessarily making them more uniform. However, they did suggest that 
unions might take steps to pursue greater uniformity in contributions and 
benefits within particular sectors, where there was apparently evidence of 
competition in contribution rates. Significantly, the TUC drew back from 
making specific proposals about contributions and benefits, even within these 
sectors, suggesting instead that the unions themselves might consult on these 
issues (TUC Annual Report, 1962: 106-109). 
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The issue of union finances and inadequate contribution rates was again 
raised during the TUC Development Programme, adopted by Congress in 
1981. The General Council issued a consultative document in November 
1982, seeking the views of individual unions on ways of increasing 
contribution income. Whilst unions said that they would welcome TUC 
guidance, they were aware of the difficulties involved in attempting a 
coordinated increase in contribution levels. In May 1983, the General Council 
recommended a target contribution rate of one per cent of gross earnings of 
a typical member. Unions were asked to move towards this target at their 
own pace, and the TUC was to monitor progress and to issue a regular 
progress report in its summary of the TUC annual returns (TUC Annual 
Report, 1983: 22-3). 
In 1991, the TUC Finance and General Purposes Committee recommended 
that unions with contribution rates between 11 Op and 125p per week should 
increase their rates by at least 10 per cent, whilst those with rates below 110p 
should increase theirs by a larger amount, the aim being: 
"... to improve the financial position of unions and the TUC by 
encouraging unions to take a co-ordinated approach to 
subscriptions." 
(TUC, 1991a: 8) 
Thus, there has been some agreement amongst union leaders on the need 
to increase the level of contributions. There are, however, difficulties with this. 
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Firstly, inter-union competition may restrain unions from increasing 
contributions for fear of losing members to other unions (Latta, 1972: 410). 
This point was raised by several unions during the TUC's consultative 
exercise of the early 1980s (TUC, 1981a: 6), and it appears regularly in 
debates at annual Congress (see for example, TUC Annual Report, 1961: 316 
and Annual Report, 1983: 393-4). 
Whilst this may only affect a small minority of individual membership 
decisions, nevertheless the relative level of contributions may be important at 
the margin. Thus, NUPE has often been cited as a union with low contribution 
rates. In a survey of 1,249 NUPE members, carried out during 1988, eight 
per cent claimed to have chosen NUPE over other unions because it had the 
lowest level of contributions of unions recruiting in the area. In our interviews 
with local full-time officials, a majority felt that inter-union competition kept 
contribution rates low. Those agreeing with this view tended to come from 
unions such as BIFU, GMB, NUPE, USDAWand UCATT; unions which faced 
keen competition in some areas. 
A second possible constraint on contribution rates is resistance from 
members. This may take the form of direct resistance to increases in 
contribution rates from within the union. Oram (1987) provides evidence of 
this in his discussion of membership ballots on special levies in the NGA and 
SOGAT, although these unions may be a-typical in that their contributions 
were already much higher than most unions. Willman and Morris (1988a: 74-
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5) show that the determination of contributions is often a matter for annual 
conference and/or the national executive committee, so that members may 
have ample opportunity to resist increases. 
In addition to such direct resistance, actual and potential members may exert 
an indirect influence over contributions in that significant increases may be a 
disincentive to join and to remain in membership. According to the 1989 
British Social Attitudes Survey, only six percent of non-members felt that the 
cost of membership was "important" or "fairly important" as a reason for not 
belonging to a union (Millward, 1990). In our interviews with full-time union 
officials, only a minority said that the level of contributions was generally a 
problem in recruiting and retaining members, although they did see this as 
more of a problem in the case of low-paid, part-time and women workers. 
In a survey of 265 union representatives and shop stewards, carried out by 
the Labour Research Department, 17 per cent said that the cost of union 
contributions was the main argument used against joining the union at their 
workplace. This, along with claims from workers that unions are "too political" 
(15 per cent), were the main arguments cited as deterring membership 
(Labour Research Department, 1986b: 23). 
In a survey of 671 ex-BIFU members carried out on behalf of the union in 
1988,15.4 per cent cited the level of contributions as their primary reason for 
leaving the union, including 10.6 per cent who said they were "not getting 
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value for money" and 4.8 per cent who said they "could not afford them" 
(BIFU internal document "Resignations Survey", 1988). Our own interviews 
with BIFU officials suggest that the union had around 20 thousand 
resignations per year during the late 1980s, which implies that BIFU lost about 
three thousand members per year (two per cent of 1988 membership) 
because of the level of contributions. Whilst at first sight a figure of two per 
cent may not appear particularly significant, this must be compared to an 
annual BIFU growth rate of around three per cent during the 1980s. 
Whilst we must be wary of the likelihood of post hoc rationalisation, 
particularly in an exit study such as the BIFU one, the above results suggest 
that contributions may influence the membership decisions of at least a 
minority of individuals, and particularly so for the lower paid. 
Bearing in mind the possible problems involved in increasing the level of 
contributions, union principal officers, meeting at a consultative conference 
organised as part of the "TUC Strategy" exercise in 1984, questioned the 
wisdom of the General Council's target contribution rate of one per cent of 
gross earnings and concluded that: 
"... contribution rates generally had to be competitive and moves 
to introduce a common rate at a percentage linked to the gross 
earnings of a typical member were premature given the 
incidence of competition and membership resistance." 
(TUC Annual Report, 1985: 19) 
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The question, then, is whether unions could increase the real level of 
contributions sufficient to provide the resources necessary to finance 
additional recruitment activity and a significant increase in the level of 
servicing and benefits provided to members. 
M©mlb®rglh5p S@mi@ift5w® T@ "Prfie®"? Th® Batnand for UnBon Senates 
A common theme in the above debates is that unions are prevented from 
increasing contribution rates for fear of deterring workers from joining. This 
is consistent with the rational-choice view outlined earlier in the thesis, and 
treats contributions as the "price" of union services. This suggests that the 
elasticity of demand for union services with respect to the contribution rate is 
a critical factor underlying the ability of unions to increase contributions. If 
demand is inelastic, then unions will be able to increase contributions with 
little effect on membership levels, and total revenue will increase. If, however, 
demand is elastic, then this suggests that unions will find if difficult to increase 
revenue from contributions. 
In the only study of its type known to us, Pencavel (1971) concludes that the 
demand for union services in the UK is price-inelastic, with a short-run 
elasticity of 0.173 and a long-run elasticity of between 0.364 and 0.466. He 
suggests that: 
"The relative inelasticity of the (own) price of union services 
provides empirical evidence to support the common belief that 
union finances could be strengthened by higher dues." 
(Pencavel, 1971: 187) 
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Following Pencavel, we set out to provide an updated estimate of the real 
price elasticity by modelling a simple demand for union services function (see 
Appendix 5). We used aggregate union density (UDEN) as our dependent 
variable, with real per capita membership income (RPCMIN) as our "price" 
variable, and real personal disposable income per head of population 
(RINCPC) as the income variable. 
In contrast to Pencavel, our initial results suggested that whilst the short-run 
elasticity was around 0.5, the demand for union services was price-elastic in 
the long run, with an elasticity of around three. This appeared to cast doubt 
on the extent to which unions could increase contributions as a means of 
raising income. 
However, we found some evidence to suggest that there was a causal effect 
running in reverse: from union membership and density to the level of 
contributions (see Appendix 6). What seems to happen is that when 
membership is falling unions increase contribution rates, perhaps with a lag 
of a year or more, in an attempt to maintain total income, whilst with 
increasing membership unions may allow real contribution rates to stagnate, 
or even to be eroded by inflation, since higher membership itself generates 
sufficient income growth. This is consistent with the observations made by 
many of the officials we interviewed, with the evidence of a lower level of real 
contribution rates during the 1970s and also with the interpretation of Willman 
and Morris (1988a: 55). The suggestion is, then, that unions follow a 
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satisficing approach to pricing, levying a contribution rate sufficient to finance 
the organisation as it exists and to provide the customary level of service to 
members. 
Nevertheless, we found evidence of at least some causal link running from 
real contributions to membership and density (see Appendix 6), so that whilst 
our initial estimates were likely to overstate the true price elasticity, we could 
not discount the possibility that higher real contributions impair membership 
growth, although we could not state with any degree of confidence that the 
elasticity was greater than one (Appendix 5). 
In fact, this time-series analysis may understate the difficulties faced by 
unions in attempting to increase contribution rates. We have already seen 
that inter-union competition is widely quoted as an explanation for low 
contributions. Thus, any individual union going it alone in increasing 
contributions risks losing members to other unions, so that the membership 
loss in this case is likely to be greater than that implied by an aggregate price 
elasticity. Also, the demand elasticity approach looks simply at membership 
exit (or non-joining) as a constraint on higher contributions, but we also need 
to allow for the possibility that union members may be able to resist increases 
in contributions by voicing their protests within the union. It may be that 
unions will be prevented from increasing contributions by members' resistance 
and protest, short of exit. Thus, by concentrating solely on exit behaviour the 
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above conclusions may again understate the difficulties faced by unions in 
attempting to increase the real level of contributions. 
Qmms> S@etfoini Analysis: A R@te®dl°F@i<TO Appraaelh 
The above suggests that it may be fruitful to look beyond the aggregate-level 
approach in order to provide a more detailed analysis of the problems faced 
in attempting to increase income from members. Below, we develop a 
cross-section analysis using data from the TUC's annual returns from unions, 
in an attempt to discover the factors which influence an individual union's 
contribution rate. This will allow us to suggest which types of unions or 
memberships are likely to be more resistant to higher contributions, and to 
explore the implications for union strategy. In particular, we attempt to test 
the following hypotheses: 
1. That resistance from (actual and potential) members acts as a 
constraint on contribution levels. This effect might lead to those unions 
recruiting in lower-paid and harder-to-organise sectors having to levy 
lower contribution rates in order to recruit effectively. 
2. That the degree of recruitment competition faced by a union acts as a 
significant constraint on its contribution rates. In other words, where 
recruitment rivalry between unions is more intense, contributions will 
be lower, other things being equal. 
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3. That unions which provide higher benefits to members are able to levy 
higher contributions. This assumes that in arriving at a decision on 
whether or not to join a union, the individual assesses both costs and 
benefits of being a member, so that higher benefits may justify higher 
costs. Also, existing members are less likely to resist higher 
contributions where this is accompanied by improved benefits and 
services. 
Acceptance of either or both of hypotheses (1) and (2) would not necessarily 
mean that the high benefit/high cost form of trade unionism is unworkable. 
Members may be recruited and retained and infernal protest defused in spite 
of higher contributions, so long as the benefits of membership are seen to be 
worthwhile. However, membership resistance to higher contributions would 
mean that any attempt to increase them would be that much more difficult and 
hazardous a strategy to pursue. Acceptance of hypothesis (3) would add 
weight to the high benefit/high cost strategy, since it suggests that 
contributions may be increased so long as benefits are increased accordingly. 
In addition, we will discuss the possibility that unions might opt to shift the 
burden of higher contributions onto less price-sensitive members. We 
suggest that such a policy may be necessary if unions are to increase 
resources on the one hand, and yet maintain their ability to recruit on the 
other. 
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Variables Used in the Analysis 
We now discuss in more detail, the variables which we use in our 
cross-section analysis. We divide the explanatory variables into three broad 
categories: those reflecting the nature of the union's environment, those 
representing the characteristics of the membership, and finally, the 
characteristics of the union itself. Table 7.4 summarises the dependent and 
independent variables. The precise definitions and data sources for these 
variables are discussed in Appendix 8. 
Dependent Variables 
We use two dependent variables, per capita membership income (PCMIN) 
and the main contribution rate (MCR). The former is available for most 
unions, and is calculated simply by dividing total membership income by total 
membership. Thus, it gives us the average actual contribution per member. 
The main contribution rate is the declared standard rate and/or the rate which 
is paid by more members than any other. This variable is obviously only 
available for those unions which declare specific contribution rates. Thus, it 
is not available for those unions which base contributions on a given 
percentage of an individual's pay. 
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T A B L E 7.4: Variables Used in the Cross-Section Analysis 
Variable Name Description Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variables: 
PCMIN 
MCR 
Per capita membership income 
Main contribution rate 
Independent Variables: 
a) Environmental 
Characteristics: 
COMP 1=over 0.002 disputes committee 
references per member (1980-85) 
0 =0.002 or fewer references per 
member 
Negative 
S E C T 1 - public sector 
0 = private sector ? 
IND 0 = union's primary job territories 
are high density (>50%) 
1 - union's primary job territories 
are low density (<50%) 
Negative 
WPAY Average gross weekly earnings of 
male manual workers in the 
primary SIC. 
Positive 
1 b) Membership 
Characteristics: 
C O L L 1 = white collar majority 
0 - blue collar majority 
? 
PFMR Female membership as proportion 
of total 
Negative 
c) Union Characteristics: 
PCOB Percapita other benefits (includes 
all cash benefits to members 
except for dispute benefit) 
Positive 
d) Price-discrimination 
variables: 
DISCP1 Contribution based on a given % 
of the individual's pay 0=No: 
1=Yes 
Positive 
DISCP2 Contributions vary according to pay 
scales or bands. 0 = No; 1 = Yes Positive 
NCR Number of contribution rates 
quoted (1 to 5) Positive 
= = = = = = = 
Note: SIC is Standard Industrial Classification 
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Independent Variables: 
(a) Environmental Characteristics 
As we have already noted, it is widely believed that union contributions are 
restrained by inter-union competition for members (Latta, 1972:410) Hence, 
we would expect that those unions facing more intense recruitment rivalry 
would, other things being equal, have lower contribution rates. 
In our analysis we attempt to proxy the intensity of competition by looking at 
the number of TUC disputes committee hearings in which each union was 
involved over the five-year period 1980 to 1985. We then divide this by the 
number of members (to compensate for any size bias in the number of 
disputes) and calculate a dichotomous competition variable (COMP), which 
takes the value zero for unions with 0.002 disputes per member or less, and 
one for unions with more than 0.002 disputes per member. We expect the 
coefficient on this variable to have a negative sign. Admittedly, this is a very 
crude proxy for the intensity of recruitment rivalry. For example, it takes no 
account of any inter-union disputes which fall short of a full Disputes 
Committee hearing. Nevertheless, it gives us some indication of the extent 
to which a union comes into competition with other unions. 
Whether the union recruits mainly in the private or public sector may influence 
the level of contributions. Public sector unions are generally 
better-established and more secure, due largely to the traditional 
pro-recognition stance of public sector employers, and to the more 
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bureaucratic nature of public sector employment, which tend to encourage 
union membership (Clegg, 1976; Winchester, 1983). Public sector employees 
are likely to be encouraged to join trade unions, so that there may be less of 
a need to maintain low contribution rates to attract members. However, public 
sector employment tends to be in larger units, with centralised bargaining 
arrangements, so that per capita recruitment and servicing costs may be 
reduced, allowing them to have lower contribution rates. Thus, we cannot be 
sure whether public sector status (SECT) will lead to higher or lower 
contribution rates. 
We expect that those unions which recruit primarily in sectors which are more 
difficult to organise would have lower contribution rates, as they attempt to 
overcome their recruitment difficulties by minimising the costs of union 
membership. Also, workers in low density sectors may find that the benefits 
of unionisation are slight, in that recognition from employers may be lacking 
and union bargaining power may be limited. Thus, we include a dummy 
variable to represent the union's primary job territory (IND). This took a value 
of zero where union density in the union's primary SIC industry was more than 
fifty per cent, and one where this was less than fifty per cent. We expect a 
negative coefficient. 
We expect that those unions which recruit in industries with higher pay levels 
will generally be able to levy higher contribution rates, since members will be 
less resistant. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between the average 
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earnings in the union's primary job territory and the union's contribution level, 
(n.b. We take average gross weekly earnings of male manual workers 
(WPAY) to proxy the earnings level. Any pay differences attributable to a 
concentration of white collar or female workers will be reflected in the COLL 
and PFMR variables, as explained below). 
(b) Membership Characteristics 
In order to test the effect of white-collar status on contributions, we use a 
dichotomous variable (COLL) with a value of zero for those unions with a 
majority of blue-collar workers, and one for those with a majority of 
white-collar workers. In so far as white-collar workers tend to earn more, we 
would expect a positive coefficient on this variable. However, white-collar 
workers may have a lower propensity to unionise (Elsheikh and Bain, 1980; 
Bain and Elias, 1985; Booth, 1986), so that we may expect white-collar 
unions to have lower contribution rates, in an attempt to overcome recruitment 
resistance. Thus, we cannot be clear about the expected coefficient on this 
variable. 
As we saw earlier, females are less prone to unionise than are males (e.g. 
Bain and Elias, 1985; Booth, 1986) and they also tend to be less highly-paid. 
Thus, we expect unions with a higher percentage of female members (PFMR) 
to have lower contribution rates, as unions attempt to attract them into 
membership, and because they are likely to be more resistant to higher rates 
than are males. 
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(c) Union Characteristics 
We consider the possibility that those unions which provide higher cash 
welfare benefits may be able to levy higher contribution rates. This argument 
is based on the assumption that individuals base their unionisation decisions 
on an appraisal of costs and benefits, so that higher benefits may reduce 
resistance to higher contributions. We use per capita welfare benefits 
expenditure (PCOB) in our analysis. This includes all cash benefits with the 
exception of dispute benefit, the latter being excluded because it tends to be 
an erratic item of expenditure, its distribution across unions in any one year 
being dependent upon the incidence of industrial action in that year. 
We decided not to include a proxy for the collective-bargaining gains of 
unions. Whilst these certainly represent benefits gained by the union, by and 
large they are available to members and non-members alike, and so they do 
not represent additional gains to the individual on joining. Hence, they would 
not enter into the individual's cost-benefit analysis, so that higher bargained 
gains would not necessarily justify higher contributions. 
(d) Price-Discrimination Variables 
We consider the possibility that unions may be able to increase their per 
capita membership income, but not necessarily their single main contribution 
rate, by adopting a policy of price discrimination. This may allow unions to 
raise additional income from those groups of members who are relatively able 
and willing to pay higher contributions, without discouraging lower paid or 
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more price-sensitive groups from joining. The union may thus be able to 
avoid some of the membership resistance to higher per capita membership 
income. We therefore expect a positive coefficient on the price discrimination 
variable when per capita membership income (PCMIN) is the dependent 
variable, although there may be no such relationship when the main 
contribution rate (MCR) is the dependent variable, since price discrimination 
may occur without affecting this. 
We tried three different variables. The DISCP1 and DISCP2 variables were 
included together in the regression equations, in an attempt to capture the 
effect of basing contributions on a given percentage of pay or on pay scales 
or bands respectively. The second approach was to use NCR, the number 
of different contribution rates quoted by the union in the TUC return (this 
varied from one up to a maximum of five). (Note that the latter, whilst 
involving different contribution rates for different categories of member, does 
not necessarily involve what economists would understand by the term "price 
discrimination", since the levels of service provided often differs between such 
membership categories. Where a union provides various levels of service at 
different prices, we might more accurately refer to this as "differential pricing".) 
Empirical Results 
We now present the results of our analysis of the above variables. Note that 
this cross-section analysis takes a reduced-form approach. An endogenous 
price variable is regressed on a number of environmental, membership and 
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union characteristics, which we are assuming to be exogenous. Thus, we 
envisage no simultaneity problems, and the equations reported below are 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. 
In the results reported, we exclude several of the variables identified earlier, 
since they persistently failed to produce statistically significant results. These 
variables are: 
COMP 
SECT 
IND 
NCR 
We excluded one outlying case from our estimation. This was the British Air 
Line Pilots' Association (BALPA), which has a per capita membership income 
far higher than any other union in the sample. 
The regression results are presented in Table 7.5. We present results for 
both dependent variables (PCMIN and MCR). Sample sizes vary between the 
two dependent variables, since MCR was not available for all unions. The 
variable DISCP1 is not included in the MCR equation, because unions which 
related contributions to pay by a fixed percentage do not, of course, quote a 
given contribution level in their return. 
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The variables WPAY, PFMR and PCOB are significant in both the PCMIN and 
MCR equations, suggesting that unions with more highly-paid members, with 
a lower percentage of female members, and paying out higher levels of cash 
benefits, tend to have higher contribution rates. 
TABLE 7.S: IR@g)ir<isso®in) IR@©yfltts: Cc@as S®©W©m) AonaDysSs 
I 
PercopDttii 
SO 
KMim Qsumtirolbytoin) 
M®mlb®irs!hiip Imxeom© Rate 
(PCRHIN) (RflCR) 
WPAY 0.01495** 0.03947*** 
(2.382) (3.302) 
COLL 15.79215*** 30.62601*** 
(4.838) (5.069) 
PFMR -14.13014** -33.39728** 
(-2.071) (-2.623) 
PCOB 1.17082** 2.37191** 
(2.038) (2.233) 
DISCP1 19.56085*** — 
(3.616) 
DISCP2 -2.56317 -12.04408 
(-0.520) (-1.105) 
Constant 6.24849 14.69295 
(0.567) (0.710) 
R2 0.48356 0.50814 
F 10.14354*** 11.36387*** 
n 72 61 
Significant at: 1 % level *** 
5% level ** 
10% level * 
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The variable representing whether the union is predominantly blue- or 
white-collar (COLL) was significant in both the PCMIN and MCR equations. 
The coefficient is positive, suggesting that white-collar unions have higher 
contributions (both PCMIN and MCR) than do blue-collar unions. However, 
our specification, with COLL included as a simple dummy variable, constrains 
this effect to shifting the intercept term, and does not allow for any possible 
interactive effects between COLL and the other independent variables. We 
tested for such effects by estimating separate equations for the blue-collar 
and white-collar sub-samples. However, a Chow test led us to accept the 
pooled equation as superior, suggesting that there are no significant 
interactive effects. Thus our simple shift dummy is sufficient in both the 
PCMIN and MCR equations (See Appendix 9 for details of this test). 
Of the price discrimination variables, NCR and DISCP2 were never significant, 
whilst DISCP1 was significant in the PCMIN equation, but not in the MCR 
equation. Thus, unions which base contributions on a given percentage of the 
individual's pay tend to raise higher levels of per capita membership income 
than do other unions, although they do not necessarily have higher main 
contribution rates. This suggests that such price discrimination has a positive 
effect on union revenues, although we cannot rule out the possibility that we 
are picking up the effect of some other factor not included in the model. 
(Most of the unions involved organise highly-paid managerial and professional 
staff, and it may be that we are picking up a further pay effect in our DISCP1 
variable.) 
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These results suggest a number of important conclusions. Firstly, members' 
pay levels seem to act as a constraint on the level of contributions. This is 
reflected in the findings on the pay (WPAY), white/blue collar status (COLL) 
and female membership (PFMR) variables. The suggestion here is that 
unions whose members are lower paid encounter greater resistance to higher 
contributions. 
Such resistance might take the form of direct protest or greater difficulties in 
recruiting and retaining members. 
Secondly, there is evidence that some unions have increased their per capita 
membership income (PCMIN), but not their main contribution rate (MCR), by 
basing contributions on pay, through a given percentage formula (DISCP1). 
However, of the seventy two unions included in our sample, only seven (plus 
the excluded outlying case) related contributions to pay in this way. 
Furthermore, our other measures of price discrimination and differential pricing 
(DISCP2 and NCR) were not statistically significant. Thus, price 
discrimination may have been used by some unions, but it was not the 
general practice amongst unions in 1985. 
Thirdly, there is evidence that some unions have been able to levy higher 
contribution rates as a result of their having higher per capita cash benefits 
(PCOB). This suggests that resistance to higher contributions may be 
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overcome if members feel that they are getting value for money, in terms of 
the selective benefits offered by the union. 
Fourthly, we failed to find the expected relationships between contributions 
and inter-union competition (COMP), sector (SECT), and industry density 
(IND). This may be attributable to a degree of multicollinearity amongst the 
independent variables, or it may reflect limitations in the proxy variables used. 
Thus, whilst we find no evidence of a general constraint on contributions due 
to inter-union competition, we would not wish to dismiss the possibility that 
alternative proxies of competition could produce more positive results, nor to 
deny that in certain specific cases competition might be an important factor. 
(A particular case that comes to mind is BIFU, competing for members with 
the non-TUC banking staff associations, which are not included in our 
competition variable). 
Implications For Union Strategy 
Both the time-series and cross-section results have implications for union 
strategy. We could not necessarily conclude from our time-series analysis 
that the level of union membership was highly price-elastic at the aggregate 
level, thus suggesting that the relatively modest contributions increases of the 
1980s may not have significantly damaged the ability of the union movement 
to recruit and retain members. Furthermore, this suggests that it might have 
been feasible to raise additional finance by further increasing the level of 
contributions, although we must wary here because we could not rule out at 
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least some price elasticity effect and major increases could result in a greater 
price-sensitivity as we move beyond the hitherto-experienced levels of 
contributions. 
Some union strategists had seen a need to extend organisation amongst the 
peripheral labour force, which included a high proportion of low-paid workers 
and women. Our cross-section findings show that such features were 
already associated with lower union contributions, and yet these same 
strategists also emphasised a need to mount organising campaigns and to 
develop union services and benefits if such groups were to be successfully 
recruited and retained. This in turn might require higher contributions to 
provide the necessary finance. 
Thus, unions which seek to recruit amongst the peripheral workforce may be 
caught in a contradiction, unless they can demonstrate clearly that their 
services and benefits represent good value for money. On this latter point, 
the cross-section results appeared to offer some comfort for unions, in that 
those which already had higher cash benefits seem to have been able to levy 
higher contribution rates. Unfortunately, we lacked the data to perform a 
similar test on other types of selective benefits. 
Another way out of this apparent contradiction might be to adopt a policy of 
price discrimination based on the individual members' income. This would 
involve reduced contributions for some, but higher contributions for others, so 
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that the overall level of income would be maintained or increased. The aim 
here is to increase revenue without deterring more price-sensitive individuals 
from joining. 
Our findings suggest that whilst there was some evidence of this, and whilst 
it may have enabled some unions to increase the level of income collected 
from members, such a practice was not widely used. Of our interview sample 
of nine unions, only NALGO had a policy of basing contributions on the 
individual's pay, with a sliding scale of contribution rates for different salary 
bands. Furthermore, our interviews with full-time officials revealed some 
reservations about linking contributions to the individual's pay, on the grounds 
of administrative difficulty, particularly in multi-industry unions, in terms of not 
wishing to create a category of "second class citizens" within the union, and 
because of possible membership resistance. 
Nevertheless, this could well be a viable policy option for at least some 
unions. Such a policy has been adopted by West German unions, for 
example, which usually link contributions to the individual's pay, either on a 
fixed percentage or banded basis. As a result, West German unions tend to 
be more financially secure than their British counterparts, with better 
education and publications services, higher strike pay, and with a better-
financed national union centre (Labour Research Department, 1988b). 
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In addition to adopting price discrimination, unions might also relate 
contributions to the level of services or benefits enjoyed by the individual 
member. For example, several unions offered members a choice of cash 
benefits, with different contribution rates to match. Thus, as from April 1990, 
the TGWU had a basic rate (Scale 1) of 102 pence per week, with a voluntary 
higher rate (Scale 2) of 112 pence open only to members under the age of 
fifty, and giving additional entitlement to sickness benefit. In addition, lorry 
drivers could pay an additional 16 pence per week and become entitled to 
"Distress Benefit". Similarly, AEU members could opt to contribute at a higher 
rate and gain additional benefit entitlements, for example in 1990 a section 
one (skilled) member could pay an extra 31 pence per week over and above 
the standard £1-15, and so gain entitlement to superannuation, sickness and 
unemployment benefits. 
Apparently more widespread than allowing members to opt for different 
contribution rates was the practice of allocating different rates of contributions 
to different groups of members. Our cross-section analysis produced no 
evidence that such a practice had enabled unions to increase the level of 
membership income raised (the NCR variable was not significant), although 
the apparent resistance of lower-paid and women workers to higher 
contributions might mean that such a policy could assist in recruiting and 
retaining such groups. Part-timers, apprentices and younger workers, those 
on government-funded training schemes, and those becoming unemployed, 
might be charged a lower rate, although entitlement to cash benefits was 
199 
often reduced accordingly. Thus, in USDAW full-time adult workers paid 71 
pence in 1990, whilst part-time workers and the under 16's paid only 56 
pence, but were not entitled to unemployment or sickness benefit. In the 
EETPU, "skilled, technical and supervisory" members paid £1-10, whilst 
"auxiliary, clerical and administrative" members paid 85 pence, but were 
entitled to cash benefits at around 70 to 80 per cent of the skilled worker 
level. 
The advantage in relating contributions to the level of benefits and services 
received is that the balance between the costs and benefits of joining the 
union may be made more favourable for particular categories of individual. 
A similar effect would be achieved if unions were to fund particular services 
or benefits either partly or entirely out of supplementary charges levied at the 
time of use. Such a policy of differential pricing is not, of course, strictly a 
form of price discrimination, since the latter involves levying different rates for 
the same level of services. Nevertheless, the broad aims are similar, in that, 
by offering a more flexible menu of costs and benefits, union membership 
may be made more attractive to hitherto little-unionised groups. 
A particular form of such a differential pricing approach is the offer of cut-
price "associate membership" for those in workplaces not covered by 
collective bargaining, offering access to the union's cash benefits, advisory 
and representational services. The Engineers' and Managers' Association, for 
example offered a reduced-rate contribution to those for whom the union did 
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not have negotiating rights. Such an approach was suggested by Cairns 
(1985, 1988) as a means of recruiting in the difficult to organise small-firm 
sector. Jarley and Fiorito (1990) describe the development of such schemes 
by unions in the USA, and Ichniowski and Zax (1990) suggest that the 
recruitment of associate members in a workplace may subsequently help the 
union to win full recognition. 
Innovations in Contribution Rates 
In this section, we briefly review the kinds of innovations being introduced by 
the unions in the 1980s. Our aim is not to present an exhaustive survey of 
developments, but to illustrate the way in which some unions were adapting 
their contributions policy in line with their organising strategies. 
In our interviews with union officials and in our other research, we 
encountered several examples of unions having recently adjusted their 
contribution rates to increase their ability to recruit and retain. In some cases, 
such adjustments were aimed specifically at the union's target groups, such 
as women, part-timers, temporary workers and young people. We have 
already seen that by the 1980s, many unions were already offering lower 
contribution rates to such groups, and there appeared to be a move towards 
both price discrimination and differential pricing. 
For example, in December 1985, the EETPU extended its offer of free 
membership for YTS trainees to include all apprentices and trainees at skills 
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centres aged under 18 years old. The aim here was to maintain and even 
increase the union's recruitment of apprentices, particularly in the engineering 
industry, where moves to multi-skilling meant that traditional demarcations 
and union affiliations were breaking down. 
Both the GMB and the TGWU were amongst those unions introducing 
reduced-rate contributions for part-time workers during the 1980s, and in a 
report to the 1987 Congress, the TUC urged other unions to follow suit. 
Again this was seen as part of an attempt to recruit such workers in greater 
numbers, and was accompanied by recruitment campaigns and attempts to 
introduce issues of particular concern to part-timers onto the collective 
bargaining agenda. 
As of April 1990 the TGWU reduced the membership qualification period for 
obtaining remission from 39 to 13 weeks. This made it easier for temporary 
workers to maintain continuous membership, since they could now retain their 
membership at a reduced rate when out of a job, and so avoid having to 
serve the qualifying period for union benefits each time they restarted work. 
At the same time, the union finally abolished membership entrance fees, 
previously set at a minimum level of 25 pence for adults and 15 pence for the 
under 18s. 
Beyond our sample of nine unions, there were other notable examples of 
unions adjusting their contributions policy in an attempt to increase their ability 
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to recruit amongst targeted groups. In 1987, the NCU announced its intention 
to offer reduced-rate contributions as part of its recruitment drive in British 
Telecom's new subsidiary companies, established following privatisation. The 
NGA's 1988 Delegate Meeting approved a reduced contribution rate for new 
members in areas where the union lacked recognition, of £1 per week (50 
pence for part-time workers) for the first two years, compared to the full rate 
of £1 -90 at the time. Critics of the NGA's high contribution rates had long 
seen them as a source of recruitment difficulties, and the reform was 
designed to assist in the organising of new areas such as desk-top publishing 
and in-house printing, which threatened to undermine employment in the 
union's traditional job territories (Gennard, 1990:184). In 1989, MSF offered 
free membership to unpaid volunteers working alongside paid MSF members 
in the voluntary sector, on condition that they move onto the normal 
contribution rate on securing paid employment. This was designed not only 
to assist recruitment, but also to strengthen MSF bargaining power in such 
organisations. 
However, proposals for the reform of contribution rates occasionally met with 
resistance from within the union. Thus, in 1986 the GMB executive rejected 
a proposal to allow the unemployed to join as new members at reduced 
contribution rates, partly it appears because of concern within the union about 
the possible effects on the political balance within branches, and also because 
at that time existing members who became unemployed were required to 
continue paying the full contribution. 
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By 1987, leaders of several unions, including both the GMB and the TGWU 
were expressing interest in the "associate membership" schemes of unions 
in the USA (TUC, 1989b: 7). The GMB leadership was proposing a flexible 
menu of contribution rates for different sectors and groups, depending on the 
demands placed on the union's services and the degree of difficulty 
experienced in recruitment. Similarly, in its 1989 consultative document 
"Forward with the T&G", the TGWU proposed associate, junior and family 
membership categories. However, by the end of 1990, neither union had yet 
implemented such radical proposals. 
In this chapter, we have seen that unions did increase contributions to some 
extent, as part of their attempts to restore their finances in the 1980s, 
although British unions still had rather lower contribution rates than in other 
countries and in earlier periods. Whilst there was some evidence of a price-
elasticity effect, we could not conclude with any degree of certainty that 
membership was highly price-elastic, and the contributions increases of the 
1980s appear to be more a consequence than a cause of declining 
membership. Further increases in contributions mught have been feasible, 
although this was likely to have at least some effect on membership, and 
price-sensitivity might increase as contributions rose beyond previously-
experienced levels. Furthermore, there was evidence in our cross-section 
analysis to suggest that unions seeking to recruit amongst the typically low-
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paid peripheral workforce, might face particular problems increasing 
contributions. 
Willman and Morris (1988b) suggest that increases in contributions 
represented an alternative to recruitment strategies in the unions' bid to 
restore their financial stability in the 1980s. Indeed, Willman (1990) argues 
that unions might opt out of major recruitment activity, since membership 
growth does not necessarily imply an improvement in the finances of unions, 
and that the 1970s were a period of "cost-ineffective growth" for the unions. 
However, the poor financial performance of the 1970s may reflect the 
"satisficing" nature of union pricing strategy, with unions simply not finding it 
necessary to raise contributions when increasing membership provides 
income growth. Clearly, this does not imply that the growth of the 1970s was 
in itself financially damaging, nor that falling membership does no damage to 
union finances. It is likely that whatever financial recovery had been possible 
in the 1980s would have been equally, if not more easily, achievable during 
a period of growth, had the willingness been there. 
Whilst we agree with Willman that union finances would probably benefit if 
new recruits came from the more highly-paid groups, who are able to pay 
higher contributions, we question whether the primary aim of trade unions is 
to achieve financial stability. Furthermore, we would not necessarily agree 
with his suggestion that: 
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"The experience of cost-ineffective growth during the 1970s 
may cause trade unions to discriminate in their choice of new 
members and thus to affect the aggregate membership level." 
(Willman, 1990: 325) 
What we have suggested is that wider recruitment may be important if unions 
are to survive as a social and political force in the longer term, and that price 
discrimination and/or differential pricing offer an opportunity for unions to 
combine improved financial performance with a contribution rate which does 
not necessarily deter the lower paid. As we have seen in this chapter, there 
is some evidence that British unions were realising this in the 1980s, with an 
increased general level of contributions alongside a move to offer lower rates 
on a selective basis. We show in subsequent chapters that in the case of at 
least some unions, this was in line with an increasing emphasis on organising 
the peripheral labour force. 
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PART FOUR 
UNION ORGANISING STRATEGIES 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE NATUME OF UMON MECHUFFMENT ACUWETY 
Infflroriiueftllon 
In the next four chapters, we examine union organising strategies in detail. 
Our overall aims are threefold: to describe such strategies and their 
implementation at local level, to assess them in terms of their contribution to 
union growth, and to explore their limitations. 
In this chapter, we describe four types of union recruitment, and we calculate 
the scope for each type in Britain during the mid-1980s. We suggest that 
unions are likely to differ in their approach to recruitment, and that a union's 
size, the degree of organisation of its core job territories, and the union's own 
internal characteristics are likely to influence the extent and type of recruitment 
activity undertaken. We test these hypotheses in subsequent chapters. We 
conclude the present chapter with a review of the evidence on the trends in 
union recruitment activity, and with a description of the main types of 
recruitment campaign being launched in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
In subsequent chapters, we discuss the implementation of such recruitment 
campaigns, and we present a detailed examination of the difficulties faced by 
union recruiters during this period. 
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It is important at the outset to be aware of the diversity of recruitment activity. 
Kelly and Heery (1989) provide a useful typology, as shown in Table 8.1. 
TABLE 8.1: A Typ@l®giy @tf ^©©rafiftmnidiriit 
Coverage by 
Recognition Agreements 
Proximity of Job Territories | 
Close Distant | 
Yes, Consolidation a. Non-members in 
organised establishments 
covered by recognition 
agreements 
b. Non-members covered 
by company/national 
recognition agreements I 
but in weakly or non-
organised establishments 
No, Expansion c. Non-members in 
organised establishments 
not themselves covered by 
recognition agreements 
d. Non-members in 
unorganised 
establishments without 
recognition agreements 
Source: Kelly & Heery (1989: 198). 
This typology categorises recruitment activity along two dimensions: whether 
or not the target groups are covered by a union recognition agreement, and 
according to the proximity of the groups to already-organised workers. Kelly 
and Heery suggest that: 
"As we move through each of these four areas of recruitment it -
can be seen that unions face progressively greater difficulties, 
and that to overcome them requires the mobilisation of both 
greater quantities and different types of resources." 
(1989: 198) 
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They suggest that close consolidation, in well organised workplaces, tends to 
be carried out by lay representatives. Distant consolidation, however, requires 
the direct involvement of the union's full-time officials, since less weli-
organised workplaces tend to lack a self-sufficient network of lay 
representatives. This is also true of expansionary recruitment, particularly 
distant expansion, where by definition effective workplace organisation is 
absent. Thus, as Kelly and Heery (1989) argue, full-time officials would have 
a key role to play in distant expansion if unions were to successfully extend 
their organisation into new job territories. 
The S©@|p@ for Unton UmmUmmi 
What scope existed for each of our four types of recruitment? Table 8.2 is 
a crude attempt to answer this question for those establishments employing 
25 or more people. Using figures from the 1984 Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey on union density (58 per cent), collective bargaining 
coverage (69 per cent) and the proportion of establishments where trade 
unions were present (79 per cent), we estimate the number of unorganised 
workers falling into the consolidation, close expansion and distant expansion 
categories. (Unfortunately, WIRS does not include establishments employing 
fewer than 25 employees, so that we cannot use these figures to perform a 
similarly detailed calculation for smaller workplaces.) 
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TABLE 8.2: The Scope for Union Recruitment in Great Britain: Estimates 
for 1984. 
Millions 
Employees in Employment (1) 
Trade Union Members (2) 
Non-Members (3) 
14.9 
8.7 
6.3 
Of which: 
Covered by Collective Bargaining (4) 1.6 
Not covered, but work in 
establishments where some unions 
recognised (5) 
1.5 
Work in establishments where no 
unions recognised (6) 
3.1 
Notes: 
(1) The WIRS 1984 population: employees working in establishments 
employing 25 people or more (Millward and Stevens, 1986: 332). WIRS 
also excluded agriculture, forestry and fishing, and coal extraction, 
which between them employed half a million people in 1984. 
(2) Equals [(1) x 0.58]. Union density figure of 0.58 from 1984 Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey (Millward and Stevens, 1986: 54). 
(3) Equals (1) minus (2). 
(4) Calculated from [(1) x 0.69] minus (2). Collective bargaining coverage 
figure from 1984 WIRS from Millward and Stevens (1988). 
(5) Calculated from [(1) x 0.79] minus [(1) x 0.69]. 
Recognition figure from 1984 WIRS (see note (4)). 
(6) Calculated from [(1) x (1-0.79)]. 
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Our calculations suggest that there were over one and a half million workers 
who were not union members but who were covered by collective bargaining, 
representing considerable scope for recruitment by consolidation. If anything, 
this is likely to be an underestimate of the true number of "free-riders", to the 
extent that some of the union members will be in establishments not covered 
by collective bargaining, so that the number of covered non-members will be 
correspondingly greater. A further 1.5 million workers worked in 
establishments where a union or unions were recognised, but who were not 
themselves covered by collective bargaining. This represents an opportunity 
for close expansion. Finally, over three million worked where no unions were 
recognised, representing an opportunity for distant expansion. 
To these WIRS-based estimates we must add those working in 
establishments employing fewer than 25 people, where union density and 
collective bargaining coverage are much lower. Whilst we have no precise 
estimate of union density in such establishments for 1984, we have a figure 
of 19 per cent from the 1989 Labour Force Survey (Stevens and Wareing, 
1990). Whilst density was probably somewhat higher in 1984, this suggests 
that there were over four million non-members employed in small 
establishments. 
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Finally, the WIRS figures also exclude agriculture, forestry and fishing, 
employing 320 thousand workers in 1984, and coal extraction, employing 234 
thousand. Again taking the 1989 Labour Force Survey union densities of 13 
and 90 per cent respectively (Bird et al, 1991), this suggests over a quarter of 
a million unorganised workers in agriculture, forestry and fishing, and a further 
20 thousand in coal extraction. 
Thus, there appeared to be considerable scope for each of the types of 
recruitment in the mid-1980s. Whilst the largest number of non-members 
appeared to fall into the distant expansion and small-firm categories, even if 
unions had been able to recruit half the "free riders" in 1984 this would have 
brought an additional 800 thousand members, increasing membership by over 
seven per cent. 
Union Cnaraeteristies and Recruitment 
Given that distant expansion was likely to require the commitment of 
considerable full-time official resources with no guarantee of short term 
success, along with the fact that unions with weakly-organised core job 
territories will need to focus their efforts on distant consolidation in order to 
survive, we expected that the dominant type of recruitment undertaken by a 
particular union would be influenced by the unions' size and by its 
organisational base, as summarised in Figure 8.3. 
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FIGURE 8.3: Union Characteristics and Recruitment 
O R G A N I S A T I O N A L B A S E 
Weakly-Organised Well-Organised 
Core Job Territories Core Job Territories 
U 
Consolidation 
POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT 
TARGETS MAY BECOME 
MORE REMOTE 
\ 
Distant 
Expansion 
We expected that those unions with a weak organisational base would tend 
to concentrate more of their efforts on consolidation, whilst those unions with 
stronger and self- sustaining organisation in their core job territories would feel 
more able to devote attention to expansion. We also expected that the union's 
size would have an effect, with a larger union having more resources 
available, due possibly to economies of scale, and being more visible to 
potential members, due to its having a better network of local offices. A larger 
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union would thus be more able to undertake a sustained recruitment effort 
outside its primary job territories. 
In addition, Kelly and Heery (1989) have suggested that the internal 
characteristics of the union influence the extent and type of recruitment activity 
undertaken, and in particular the extent to which full-time officials are willing 
and able to become heavily involved in recruitment. They argue that greater 
involvement of full-time officials in policy making, for example through 
conference and executive and other committees, is likely to increase their level 
of commitment to the policy decisions which emerge, whilst the degree of 
centralisation will affect the ability of the union to lead campaigns from the 
centre. 
Earlier work has shown that lay members have different priorities from national 
leaderships, being more likely to emphasise immediate substantive gains in 
pay, conditions and job security, whilst the latter tend to emphasise the need 
for recruitment and organisational security (Hyman, 1971; Moran, 1974; Kelly 
and Heery, 1989). In a sense, the local full-time official is caught between 
these often-competing demands, and the extent to which he favours one or 
the other is likely to depend partly on the organisational context. Thus, more 
highly-centralised unions in which local officials are appointed by the centre 
and where the influence of lay activists is relatively limited, are more likely to 
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be able to mobilise their full-time officials behind a centrally-driven recruitment 
campaign. Conversely, decentralisation of decision making and the election 
of officials is likely to make such a mobilisation more difficult. 
In sum, even though many unions may place a greater emphasis on 
recruitment in a period of declining membership, we would not necessarily 
expect them all to prioritise recruitment to the same extent, to emphasise the 
same type of recruitment, nor indeed to have the same degree of success in 
mobilising their officials behind a campaign. Of course, the above analysis is 
a simplification in that it ignores the many other factors which might influence 
a union's recruitment strategy, such as changes in employment structure, the 
policies of government and employers, economic conditions, inter-union 
rivalry, and the policies of the union itself. Nevertheless, we suggest that, 
subject to these qualifications our framework offers a useful starting point in 
our explanation of differing union recruitment strategies, which we test in 
subsequent chapters. In the remainder of the present chapter, we review the 
evidence on trends in recruitment activity, and describe the main types of 
campaign being launched in the late 1980s. 
Union Recruitment Some Aggregate Evidence 
There is little hard evidence to suggest that unions placed a great deal of 
emphasis on attempting to recruit in non-unionised workplaces during the 
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early 1980s. The 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey revealed that, 
according to management respondents, amongst workplaces where there was 
no union presence, only fifteen per cent had been the subject of any union 
recruitment activity in respect of manual workers during the previous five 
years. The corresponding figure for non-manual workers was ten per cent. 
Requests for union recognition very rarely occurred without a prior attempt to 
recruit members (Millward and Stevens, 1986: 70). 
A survey of shop stewards and union representatives, carried out by the 
Labour Research Department (1986b), suggests, not surprisingly, that 
recruitment effort was more intense in workplaces where unions were already 
present. This survey included only unionised workplaces, and suggests that 
thirty three per cent of workplaces surveyed had been the subject of a 
concerted recruitment campaign during the previous two years. Also, fifty 
seven per cent of those surveyed said that the unions had access to lists of 
new entrants and leavers, twenty eight per cent took part in induction courses 
for new employees, and twenty per cent had a union newsletter at the 
workplace. Whilst we must take care in comparing the results of two studies 
with different methodologies and types of respondent, the above suggests that 
there was a greater intensity of recruitment activity in already-unionised 
workplaces (the LRD survey) than in non-unionised workplaces (the WIRS 
data). 
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Is there any evidence that unions in general were placing an increasing 
emphasis on recruitment during the 1980s? Mason and Bain (1990) suggest 
that unions were increasingly launching recruitment campaigns as the decade 
progressed, largely it seems because of a concern about falling membership. 
Their survey of 45 TUC and 11 non-TUC unions carried out during 1990 found 
that 79 per cent of unions claimed to have initiated a recruitment campaign 
during the period 1985 to 1989, compared to only 39 per cent claiming to have 
launched a campaign during 1980-84. Only 19 per cent had not launched any 
campaigns at all during the decade, the usual reason for this being that the 
union had "stable or naturally growing membership". Furthermore, Beaumont 
and Harris (1990) find some evidence that even in the early 1980s, unions 
were focusing their recruitment efforts on establishments with a high proportion 
of female and part-time workers and on low density sectors such as hotel and 
catering, although large and UK-owned establishments were still a priority. 
However, in spite of this apparant increase in targeted recruitment effort, the 
number of recognition claims handled by ACAS declined from the late 1970s 
to the late 1980s (Table 8.4). Rather than attempting to offset falling 
membership by submitting more claims for recognition, it seems that unions 
had been submitting fewer claims. The official ACAS view was that this was 
not attributable simply to the repeal of the statutory recognition procedures: 
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"This decline, which is both relative and absolute, seems to be 
part of a longer term trend unrelated to the existence or 
otherwise of statutory recognition provisions. Economic factors 
have undoubtedly played a part..." 
(ACAS Annual Report, 1983: 27-8) 
TABLE 8.4: Union Recognition Disputes: Completed ACAS Conciliation 
Cases, 1975-90 
Number % of all 
Conciliations 
References Under Section 11, 
EPA, 1975, received during 
year 
1975 416 20.6 
1976 697* 24.4 461 (11 months) 
1977 635* 22.0 576 
1978 451* 16.7 279 
1979 392* 17.1 227 
1980 329* 17.2 70 (7 months) 
1981 247 14.4 
1982 232 14.2 
1983 216 13.3 
1984 221 15.3 
1985 211 15.8 
1986 179 13.5 
1987 140 12.2 
1988 165 15.6 
1989 136 12.7 
1990 159 14.0 
Source: ACAS Annual Reports. 
Excludes recognition references made under the statutory provisions of Section 11, 
Employment Protection Act, 1975 (Effective 1 February 1976. Repealed 15 August, 
1980). 
The decline in recognition cases probably reflects the reduced chances of 
success in the hostile environment of the 1980s. Thus, as Table 8.5 shows, 
by the late 1980s unions were winning full recognition rights in less than 20 
per cent of ACAS conciliations, compared to over 30 per cent in the late 
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1970s. ACAS had noted an increased tendency to bid for recognition from a 
weaker membership base (ACAS Annual Report, 1986:26), perhaps reflecting 
growing desperation on the part of the unions concerned. 
TABLE 8.5: Proportion of ACAS Conciliation Cases Leading to the 
Granting of Union Recognition, 1976-89 
No. of 
Recognition 
Cases 1 
Full 
Recognition 
Granted (%)2 
Limited 
Recognition 
Granted (%)3 
February 1976 to 
August 1980 
2,292 32 11 
1987 140 18 7 
1988 165 18 15 
1989 136 16 
7 
Source: ACAS Annual Reports. 
Notes: 
1 Recognition cases completed through voluntary conciliation. 
2 Full collective bargaining. 
3 Individual representation rights, access to members, or check-off only. 
Beaumont's (1985) study of recognition claims made through the Scottish 
region of ACAS for the period 1976 to 1984 also suggests that unions were 
finding it increasingly difficult to win recognition in the 1980s. He found a fall 
in the number of claims per year, with a declining union win rate (i.e. full 
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recognition), and with post-1980 claims being significantly less likely to result 
in full recognition than were pre-1980 claims. 
By the late 1980s, there had been a few cases of managements withdrawing 
union recognition (ACAS, Annual Report, 1987; 1990; Labour Research 
Department, 1988a; Towers, 1988), and although such cases remained 
comparatively rare, there was some evidence that the frequency of 
derecognition was increasing (Claydon, 1989:214; Financial Times, 8/3/91:6). 
However, derecognition tended to be limited to where union density was low 
and organisation was weak, and was often concentrated upon particular 
grades of managerial, professional or technical employees. Even here unions 
often retained individual representation or consultation rights (Claydon, 1989; 
Snape and Bamber, 1989). 
To summarise the aggregate evidence: Not surprisingly, at least in the early 
1980s, unions were less likely to attempt to recruit individuals in 
establishments where they lacked employer recognition than in establishments 
where recognition existed. During the 1980s, there was some evidence of an 
increasing emphasis on recruitment campaigns as concern over declining 
membership grew. Whilst unions took fewer recognition disputes to ACAS as 
the decade wore on, this reflected the fact that recognition became more 
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difficult to win, and ACAS noted an increasing tendency for unions to bid for 
recognition from a weaker position, perhaps a sign of growing desperation. 
However, in spite of the greater difficulty in winning new recognition 
agreements, by the end of the decade derecognition was still the exception. 
Union Recruitment Initiatives 
We have shown that unions were likely to place a greater emphasis on the 
need to actively recruit during the 1980s. Our interviews with full-time officials 
reflected this. As a TUC official put it to us: 
"... in terms of the drive to have growth in the union, that is 
something being initiated by the general secretaries and the 
national executive committees, because they are keenly aware 
that it has become a very competitive world. It is being led down 
from the centre, and I hope the Special Review Body will add to 
that". 
(TUC Official) 
In this section, we review some of the organising campaigns launched by 
unions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In what follows, we discuss such 
campaigns in terms of the recruitment typology, outlining the features of the 
main types of campaign and discussing some examples. Our aim is to give 
a flavour of the types of recruitment activity being launched by the leadership 
of various unions, prior to our discussion of their implementation in the 
following chapters. 
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(a) Consolidation 
We discuss consolidation as a single category, since the close/distant 
distinction is a matter of degree, and whilst distant consolidation tends to 
involve full-time officials to a greater extent, many of the problems and issues 
apply to both types. 
From our survey of union initiatives, it seems that there were two basic 
approaches to consolidation in the new campaigns. Firstly, some unions 
sought to increase membership density amongst formerly-neglected groups, 
such as women, young people, part-time, self employed, temporary and 
casual workers, for whom the union may already have recognition. Secondly, 
some unions sought to consolidate their membership generally, without 
necessarily targeting particular groups of workers. 
So far as the first approach is concerned there were many areas where such 
groups were already implicitly covered by collective agreements but where 
they had been less likely to join the union than had permanent, full-time male 
workers. Given the lower levels of density amongst such groups, and the 
rapid growth in these categories of employment during the 1980s, it is hardly 
surprising that many unions should begin to target their recruitment efforts 
here. Such recruitment campaigns were usually accompanied by placing 
issues of particular interest to such groups on the collective bargaining 
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agenda, often for the first time, setting up committees to represent their 
interests within the union, and appointing specialist full-time officials (see, for 
example, Labour Research Department, 1986a; 1991b; Lee, 1987; TUC, 
1989b: 10-12). The TUC assisted by producing charters on equal 
opportunities. The aim was thus to counter the middle-aged, white, male 
image of unions, and to make themselves more attractive to a wider range of 
people. 
Thus, by the mid-1980s, NUPE was re-emphasising its commitment to 
securing improved terms and conditions for part-time workers in public 
services (NUPE, no date). Around forty per cent of the union's members 
worked part-time, and part-time employment seemed likely to remain a major 
feature of the public services. In 1985, NUPE submitted a resolution to the 
TUC, calling on the latter to: 
"... launch a campaign for a better deal for part-timers and to 
press the Labour Party for action in this field by the next Labour 
Government". 
(TUC Annual Report, 1985) 
During 1986 and 1987, NUPE itself produced campaign and recruitment 
material aimed at part-timers. This set out their employment rights and put 
forward the case for "NUPE - The Union for Part-Time Workers" (NUPE 
recruitment leaflet, 1986). The union claimed to have fought for the rights of 
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part-time workers, and pointed to its recent gains in superannuation, unsocial 
hours payments and maternity rights. In 1987, the union issued a "Ten-Point 
Charter for a Fair Deal for Part-Timers", calling on the government and 
employers to provide equal pay, benefits and employment rights for part-time 
workers. 
The early stages of the TGWU's "Link-Up" campaign were primarily concerned 
with the recruitment of temporary and part-time workers (although the 
campaign's scope was subsequently widened to include all types of worker, 
see chapter 10). The union published a draft agreement, to be used by its 
negotiators in an attempt to win pro-rata terms and conditions for part-timers, 
to regulate their use and to guarantee terms and conditions to temporary 
workers and sub-contractors "no less favourable than those of equivalent 
permanent full-time employees" and "no less than those agreed in appropriate 
company, NJIC, national or regional agreements" (Temporary and Part-Time 
Workers TGWU Model Agreement). Thus, the aim was not only to recruit 
these workers, but also to regulate their use, terms and conditions so as to 
ensure that existing members were not undercut. (Note that in some cases 
the union did not already have recognition for such groups, so that the 
campaign involved close expansion rather than consolidation. This was often 
the case with contractors.) 
225 
In addition, the TGWU sought to underline its commitment to the recruitment 
and representation of women and ethnic minorities by setting up national and 
regional advisory committees on race, women's and youth issues, and by 
appointing a national equaliies officer and a national women's secretary. 
John Edmonds, General Secretary of the GMB, was a strong proponent of the 
idea that unions had to organise previously-neglected groups (Edmonds, 
1986a; 1986b), and this union had several initiatives of this type. The GMB 
launched its "Winning a Fair Deal for Women" programme in 1987, based on 
a thirteen-point collective bargaining agenda (GMBATU, no date; Incomes 
Data Services, 1987b). Again, the aim was to prioritise issues of particular 
concern to women. The union also produced a guide for GMB negotiators on 
temporary workers, with the aim of restricting employers' use of such staff, and 
ensuring that any temporary workers were employed on terms and conditions 
comparable to permanent employees. In June 1989, the union announced its 
intention to launch a recruitment effort aimed specifically at young people, as 
a follow-up to its earlier efforts to make itself more attractive to women. The 
campaign was budgeted at £250,000 and the plan was to establish a unit with 
special responsibility for developing a network of young people in each region, 
who could be used as recruiters. 
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Such attempts to consolidate previously-neglected groups can in some cases 
be seen as a defensive reaction by the union, particularly where such groups 
are growing, perhaps at the expense of more traditional groups. This was 
clearly the case with the attempts by the EETPU and UCATT to organise 
self-employed workers in electrical contracting and construction respectively. 
Neither union had actively sought to recruit self-employed workers in the past. 
Indeed, particularly in the case of UCATT, there had been considerable 
hostility towards self-employed labour on the part of the union. However, the 
rapid growth of self-employment threatened in both cases to undermine 
collective agreements and training so that a change in union policy was called 
for. 
UCATT eventually changed its policy in 1988, after the Building Employer's 
Confederation proposed that the industry agreement be amended to set up a 
voluntary register for those companies seeking to use self-employed workers. 
This would allow for self-employed workers to receive terms and conditions 
comparable to those of directly-employed workers and in particular would 
provide them with sick pay and holiday pay. Thus, self-employed workers 
were to be brought under the coverage of the national agreement. The union 
subsequently identified the self employed as a priority recruitment target, and 
developed a package of benefits specifically designed for the self-employed, 
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offering specialised advice, representation and accountancy services for the 
self-employed member in addition to the standard services and benefits. 
A similar case arose in the case of milkmen. In May 1989, USDAW 
announced its intention to review its policy of opposing the franchising of milk 
rounds. Again, this threatened to undermine membership, and many were 
opting for franchises and subsequently allowing their membership to lapse 
once they became self-employed. 
The second approach to consolidation involves seeking to increase the general 
level of density in areas already covered by recognition. This time there are 
no particular target groups involved. Rather, the union leadership exhorts lay 
representatives and full-time officials to place greater emphasis on recruitment 
in general. Thus, whilst USDAW launched recruitment drives aimed 
particularly at part-timers (in 1986) and at young workers (in 1988), it had 
been campaigning to recruit all workers, using lay recruitment teams and 
publicity buses in its attempt to consolidate its existing membership in retailing. 
For much of the 1980s, NALGO escaped the falling membership which had 
affected most other unions, but in 1988 the union recorded a 1 per cent fall in 
membership and reacted by launching its "Build a Better Union" campaign in 
March 1989. Again, the emphasis was on consolidation. The union estimated 
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that in local government, some branches achieved only 30 to 40 per cent 
membership, so that there was felt to be considerable scope for further 
recruitment. The aim of the campaign was to recruit more stewards, and to 
encourage all members to actively recruit their fellow workers. 
"... On the bottom line each new member will only be recruited 
when someone talks to them and asks them to join. 
If you're in the union, but your workmate isn't, then you are both 
weaker, tell them why you are in a trade union, and ask them to 
join NALGO today" 
(Public Service, March 1989: 7) 
Here then, the emphasis was on iay involvement in the campaign, and a key 
aim was to build an effective stewards' system as a means of strengthening 
organisation from the bottom up. 
(b) Close Expansion 
Several unions launched campaigns aimed at organising and securing 
recognition for groups working alongside their existing membership. Again, we 
may identify two basic approaches, which we will refer to as the "defensive" 
and the "offensive" approaches. 
229 
In some cases, unions saw the development of the flexible workforce, and 
particularly un-unionised contractors, as an attempt by the employer to 
undermine their strength. We have already seen that consolidation campaigns 
often involved seeking to regulate the use of the flexible workforce, but where 
the union lacked recognition for such groups, it was all the more urgent to 
recruit them into the union and win recognition. 
A clear example of this type of defensive behaviour was seen in the case of 
the public sector unions. They faced the threat of privatisation and the influx 
of private-sector contractors into government and the public services. The 
unions feared that this would undermine collectively-bargained terms and 
conditions. As a defensive reaction to this, NALGO changed its rules in 1984 
to allow it to recruit in the private sector, and again in 1988 to allow it to recruit 
manual workers. This was specifically designed to provide the union with 
sufficient flexibility to sign recognition agreements with private-sector 
contractors. NALGO saw this purely as a defensive reaction to privatisation, 
rather than as an aggressive move to organise in the private sector. As a 
NALGO official put it to us: 
"... part of our task is to follow these people [into the private 
sector], and our rules have been amended accordingly... Our 
argument would be that they are still providing a public service 
from a private sector base". 
(NALGO District Organisation Officer) 
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Similarly, by the late 1980s, NUPE was attempting to organise amongst 
sub-contractors and private nursing homes, again as a defence against their 
encroachment on its traditional job territories. 
Other examples of defensive expansion occurred where employers acquired 
or set up new subsidiaries, and subsequently attempted to secure their 
non-union status in spite of union organisation in the parent business. BIFU 
faced this when the major clearing banks established merchant banking 
subsidiaries during the period of the 'Big Bang' in financial markets. 
A more offensive approach to close expansion occurred where unions sought 
to use their established job territories as a base from which to expand into new 
but adjacent areas. The examples here involve a more pro-active approach 
than those examined above. Where employers grant single-union recognition 
on established sites, this may involve close expansion for the union winning 
the deal, although other unions may lose recognition and members as a result, 
as in the case of several of the EETPU deals, for example (Incomes Data 
Services, 1987a; 1987c). 
(c) Distant Expansion 
This form of campaign tended to be the most high-profile, with the union 
attempting to recruit and win recognition in hitherto unorganised areas. Such 
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a strategy could involve either attempting to recruit members before 
approaching the employer or making a direct approach for recognition, referred 
to by Willman (1989) as the "membership market" and the "employer market" 
for trade unionism respectively. 
Several unions launched campaigns of the first type. Whilst the TGWU's Link 
Up campaign began as an attempt to recruit part-time and temporary workers, 
it developed into a general campaign, involving a concerted attempt to 
organise non-union firms. Similarly, the GMB launched campaigns aimed at 
organising in the private services sector, including un-organised hotel and 
catering firms and the private security industry. Such campaigns were aimed 
essentially at employees, with special literature and recruitment drives, often 
involving factory-gate activity. We examine Link Up in chapter 10. 
However, at least one campaign recognised the unlikelihood of effectively 
organising the non-unionised sectors in the immediate future. Thus, the 
GMB's Fair Rights and Laws in Employment (FLARE) initiative sought to win 
and enforce individual employment rights, particularly on behalf of the 
unorganised peripheral and. service-sector workers, for whom effective 
protection through collective bargaining was a remote possibility in the 1980s 
(Edmonds, 1986a; 1986b). 
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The selling of the union to employers was epitomised by the EETPU's 
single-union, no-strike deals. The union adopted the "hard-sell" approach to 
securing such deals. Following its pioneering agreement with Toshiba, at 
Plymouth in 1981, the union developed the deal into a marketable package 
(Taylor, 1985; Bassett, 1986). In October 1984 Roy Sanderson, the official 
then in charge of the union's white-collar section, EESA, visited Tokyo to meet 
Japanese companies considering setting up in Britain. The union published 
a glossy brochure, "EETPU: The Union for Your Future", for distribution to 
employers, along with a video film outlining the virtues of the union and the 
Toshiba deal. The union's brochure summarised the EETPU approach as 
follows: 
"We cooperate readily with fair employers. They and our 
members alike, gain immensely from the enlightened 
self-interest involved in doing so, and from the presence of our 
genuinely representative independent and trustworthy 
organisation at their workplace. Many managements have good 
cause to be grateful for our efficiency, expertise and effort. We 
provide work study, productivity, job evaluation and training 
services. Our organisation is equipped to help meet the critical 
needs of Britain's growth industries. 
Our union combines moderation and responsibility with 
determination. We are hard bargainers. But we honour our 
bargains." 
(EETPU: The Union for Your Future, no date) 
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This approach was at certain times targeted at particular areas on an intensive 
basis, for example in the "sunrise" industries setting up in the West and 
Central Scotland, and in London's Docklands. The latter campaign was 
launched in mid-1987, and involved a special project team, a recruitment 
caravan and a publicity package and promotional video. 
The EETPU adopted an aggressive, competitive approach to recruitment. The 
union declared an "open market for trade unionism" (Financial Times, 5/1/87: 
6), and aimed to "follow the electron" by recruiting in all industries which 
involve electronic technology. This argument was used, for example, to justify 
the union's attempts to extend its influence in the printing industry at the 
expense of the more traditional print unions (Lloyd, 1986: 14). Not 
surprisingly, this brought the EETPU into conflict with other unions (Incomes 
Data Services, 1987a; 1987c), culminating in its expulsion from the TUC in 
1988, following its refusal to follow the instructions of TUC Disputes 
Committees to withdraw from single-union agreements at Christian Salveson 
and Orion Electric (TUC: 1988b). 
However, the EETPU was not alone in approaching employers with a view to 
securing single union recognition. Officials from several unions were keen to 
contact new employers with such an offer, whilst most unions had signed 
single union recognition agreements in the past. The AEU had a similar 
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approach to the EETPU, again producing a glossy brochure designed to sell 
the union to employers. The brochure declared that: 
"The adversarial relationship of unions and employers is an 
outdated concept. 
In our rapidly changing world, industrial progress can only be 
achieved through consensus. The employers and workforce 
share, in the final analysis, the same objectives: the 
maintenance and increase of prosperity." 
(Creating the union of your future, AEU brochure, no date) 
Such an approach was not confined to so-called right wing unions, nor to the 
traditional craft unions. In June 1986 the GMB launched a publicity package 
not unlike that of the EETPU, again with the intention of approaching 
employers directly. The campaign was operated through the union's 
white-collar section, MATSA, and the union's brochure "Into 2000" again 
presented the union as modern, progressive, flexible and cooperative. The 
emphasis was on how the union could help the employer, on issues such as 
advice on health and safety, pensions and financial services, and assistance 
with industrial relations training. The brochure also contained a draft 
recognition and procedure agreement, covering single-union recognition, 
single status and a detailed grievance/disputes procedure. Unlike the EETPU, 
however, the MATSA package did not include compulsory binding arbitration, 
the so-called "no-strike" clause. 
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In May 1989, John Edmonds announced the launch of a model single-union 
agreement for the GMB as a whole with an updated brochure ("Towards 
2000') and a promotional video ("Welcome to the Future'), all aimed at 
employers. This was seen as a development from the MATSA package, and 
again, the GMB was careful not to conflict with the TUC's code of practice, 
which ruled out compulsory binding arbitration. 
By 1990, even the TGWU, for long amongst the severest critics of the EETPU 
approach to single-union deals, launched a brochure aimed at "selling" the 
union to employers (see chapter 10), following growing concern within the 
union that it was losing out on recognition bids due to its poor image with 
employers. 
Tfa® T U C mnd Reerualtmerrt 
Thus, individual unions were increasingly launching their own recruitment 
initiatives during this period, and many have pointed to the intense recruitment 
competition in some sectors (see, for example, Willman, 1989). However, the 
TUC also became increasingly interested in the question of recruitment, 
particularly of the distant expansion form, since the organisation of new job 
territories was seen as vital to the future of the union movement as a whole. 
Thus, in July 1987 Norman Willis, the TUC General Secretary, put forward 
proposals for an increased TUC role in coordinating recruitment activity, with 
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the aim of reducing wasteful competition and making best use of scarce 
resources. 
He proposed that "Designated Organising Areas" be established, whereby 
individual unions would be allocated a free run at particular target companies 
for a specified period, and that a TUC organising fund be set up, financed from 
affiliation income, to fund TUC and individual union recruitment activity. 
However, in spite of some initial support from the GMB, the Willis proposals 
were widely criticised by union leaders, largely because of concern over any 
"carve-up" of recruitment territories, and the feeling of some leaders that the 
smaller unions might lose out in such an exercise. 
In the event, the detailed proposals were submerged in the deliberations of the 
TUC Special Review Body, set up as a result of the 1987 Congress. An early 
aim of the SRB was to assist unions in the use and pooling of local labour 
market information, with the aim of better targeting recruitment efforts (TUC, 
1988c; 1989b). This developed into TUC coordinated recruitment drives in 
Trafford Park, Manchester and London's Docklands during the Spring of 1990. 
Based on the "Union Yes" campaigns of the AFL-CIO, the campaigns involved 
a concentrated effort over three weeks, for which unions were allocated target 
companies from a list of non-union firms by a local joint committee. In 
addition, trade union fairs were organised by local trades councils and by TUC 
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regions, in an attempt to raise the general profile of trade unions in the local 
community, whilst in some areas unions collaborated in targeted recruitment 
drives. (We review the outcome of the TUC recruitment campaigns in the 
following chapter.) 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we identified four types of recruitment activity, and we showed 
that there was considerable numerical potential for each of these. It was 
suggested that the four types each had quite different resource implications, 
but that attempts to expand union organisation to completely new job territories 
were likely to depend on the effective mobilisation of the union's full-time 
officials. 
It seems from the aggregate evidence that recognition had become more 
difficult to win during the 1980s. However, it appears that unions were placing 
an increasing emphasis on recruitment campaigns as the decade wore on, and 
there was some evidence of a growing desperation on the part of unions in 
their attempts to win recognition. 
Our survey of union recruitment campaigns demonstrates quite clearly their 
diversity, both in terms of their target job territories and their methods. Whilst 
many unions reacted to declining membership by placing a greater emphasis 
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on recruitment, the form that this took ranged from exhorting lay 
representatives and members to recruit their workmates, to far-reaching, 
resource-intensive campaigns, involving a major commitment of resources, 
with a long time horizon. Whilst some unions may have adopted several 
different approaches simultaneously, we suggested that the response of 
individual unions would vary according to the size of the union, the degree of 
organisation of its core job territories, and the internal characteristics of the 
union. We return to this in the next chapter, where we discuss the choice of 
recruitment targets and the implementation of such campaigns in more detail. 
In addition to the initiatives of individual unions, by the late-1980s the TUC 
was attempting to play a greater role in assisting union organisation. Whilst 
unions were suspicious of any notion of a "carving up" of recruitment territory, 
there appeared to be some support for a TUC role in promoting trade unionism 
and in coordinating union recruitment efforts. It appears that where the TUC 
became involved in promoting inter-union cooperation in recruitment, the 
emphasis was mainly on distant expansion. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
UNION RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we look in more detail at the issues involved in implementing 
the new recruitment initiatives. As one study of union recruitment campaigns 
concluded: 
"What we are suggesting is that if individual unions are to 
translate recruitment potential into actual membership, then 
identifying and dismantling internal attitudinal and organisational 
barriers should constitute the starting point." 
(Mason and Bain, 1991: 44) 
We discuss whether unions were in fact dealing with such barriers. We begin 
by examining the difficulties involved in getting full-time officials to prioritise 
recruitment activity. We then focus on four key areas: communicating the 
prioritisation of recruitment within the union, the allocation of resources to 
recruitment, the effective targeting of recruitment activity, and the monitoring 
of outcomes. We examine the extent to which unions had been successful in 
getting their full-time officials to spend more time on recruitment. Finally, we 
briefly assess the effectiveness of such campaigns, although a more detailed 
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evaluation is provided in the following chapter, which examines one particular 
campaign. 
The chapter is based mainly on empirical material drawn from our interviews 
with a sample of local full-time union officials, carried out during 1989-90. 
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In this section, we explain why, at least up to the late 1980s, many officials did 
not devote a great deal of their time to recruitment, and we examine the 
difficulties faced by unions in getting their officials to spend more time on such 
activity. 
It might be expected that any new priority given to recruitment by union 
principal officers would be communicated to full-time officials and that their 
recruitment effort could be carefully targeted and monitored, so as to ensure 
that the recruitment aims were realised. However, whilst the critical role of the 
full-time official has been recognised, it is not a simple matter to change their 
priorities and shift their workload towards recruitment, especially given the 
demands of their existing membership. 
A major problem facing full-time officials is finding sufficient time to devote to 
recruitment. Past research has shown that negotiation and routine office work 
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tended to be their most time-consuming activities, with preparing for 
negotiations, dealing with lay representatives and branches, dealing with 
individual members' casework, and travelling all placing major demands on the 
official's time, and contributing to what is typically a very heavy workload 
(Clegg et.al., 1961; HMSO, 1968; Brown and Lawson, 1973; Robertson and 
Sams, 1976; Watson, 1988; Kelly and Heery, 1989). ATUC survey of union 
officials carried out in 1987 was broadly consistent with these findings, and 
suggested that forty one percent of union officers spent less than two hours 
per week on recruitment, with one in five spending a day or more per week 
(TUC, 1989a). 
Thus, recruitment is only one in a range of tasks, and one which may at times 
be displaced by more pressing demands. This was reflected in the views of 
the officials we interviewed: 
"Unfortunately, with the amount of members, ten and a half 
thousand, and having to deal with all the negotiations, there just 
isn't the time to deal with the recruitment." 
(AEU District Secretary) 
"The union at a higher level are pushing for recruitment more 
than we have time to fulfil... . They would like us to spend more 
time on recruitment, but unfortunately we just don't have the time 
for it." 
(AEU District Secretary) 
242 
"My priority is determined by my Executive Council in London, 
and they say recruitment. ... With the second breath they say 
'Mind.but you've got to retain your membership. But recruitment 
is the most important.' Well, you know, while you're out recruiting 
you can't be servicing members and the members who you've 
actually got the money from, they start to say 'What the hell's the 
point being in a union if we're not going to see you?' It's a very 
difficult situation." 
(UCATT Regional Officer) 
"There's always the balancing act. We cover an area from ... to 
.... with getting on for fifty thousand members in various 
services. So obviously, there's got to be some direction from 
national level downwards on what the priorities are going to be 
for the next twelve months. They become numerous in 
themselves, and you find yourself with ten top priorities, which 
might include recruitment, and then during the year you'll get 
specific priorities that arrive unheralded ... It's a balancing act." 
(NALGO Divisional Organizing Officer) 
Two themes emerge from the above views. Firstly, it seems that by the late 
1980s, union leaders were signalling to their local full-time officials that 
recruitment must be prioritised. We return to this point below. Secondly, time 
was short partly because officials had large numbers of members to service. 
Thus, the 1987 TUC survey of union officials found that the modal range of 
members serviced was between three thousand and six thousand, whilst the 
modal range of employers dealt with was twenty to forty nine (TUC, 1989a). 
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One might expect that the fall in membership during the 1980s would have 
reduced the workload on full-time officials. However: 
"People say because you've lost a lot of members that means 
you automatically lose workload; but that isn't the case. You can 
have a factory which has quite a number of members, where the 
input isn't as great as one with a small number, which requires 
your time more." 
(TGWU District Secretary) 
Thus, the loss of members did not automatically lead to a reduced workload 
for officials. Indeed, in the context of the 1980s, workloads might be expected 
to increase. We show below that many officials claimed that they were coming 
under an increasing burden from members' casework, and some felt that shop 
stewards were making greater demands on the full-time official: 
"When I was convenor at [...], they had seven and a half 
thousand shop-floor workers ... now there's just over two 
thousand. The shop steward organisation has remained intact, 
but the instances of the convenor's asking for advice from 
District Secretaries, and requesting their involvement has 
increased because they feel more vulnerable. That's the top and 
tail of it all." 
(AEU District Secretary) 
Also: 
"In smaller factories, of course, where you have smaller 
numbers, then very often District Secretaries are involved..." 
(AEU District Secretary) 
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This suggests that shop stewards might become increasingly dependent on 
the full-time official in difficult times, and also that a trend towards smaller 
establishments increases the burden on full-time officials. 
Furthermore, whilst full-time officials may have been dissuaded from spending 
more time on recruitment by the demands of their existing membership, it may 
be that such demands were consistent with the priorities of the full-time 
officials themselves. Thus, in some unions officials often saw recruitment as 
a relatively low-prestige activity. For example, BIFU Area Organisers had 
relatively little involvement in collective negotiations, reflecting the 
predominance of centralised negotiations in the finance sector. A BIFU official 
was unequivocal about his preferred kind of work: 
"Negotiations with employers ... You get an awful lot of 
satisfaction out of it, personal satisfaction. Although you do out 
of casework as well, if it goes right... A lot of unions already 
have site negotiations anyway, so they already have that 
element of 'quality' in their workload." 
(BIFU Area Organiser) 
To some extent, this identification of negotiating as "quality" work reflected the 
fact that negotiations were usually carried out by National Secretaries and 
Negotiating Officers, a relatively senior grade of official, whilst recruitment and 
casework were carried out by Area Organisers and lay representatives. 
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In sum, the heavy workloads and competing pressures militated against 
increasing the recruitment activity of full-time officials, and such pressures 
could not be expected to ease due to falling membership in the 1980s. 
Indeed, if anything the workloads of officials could be expected to increase. 
Add to this the possible identification of recruitment as low-prestige work, and 
it seems that unions would find it difficult to increase the recruitment activity 
of their officials. 
However, there are at least three reasons why such a view would be over 
pessimistic. Firstly, one must be wary of making too sharp a distinction 
between "recruitment" and "servicing" activity. Thus, when a BIFU Area 
Organiser visits a bank branch, the initial reason may be to meet a particular 
member or a representative to discuss a piece of casework. Having arrived 
at the branch, however, the official may take an opportunity to meet any non-
members in an attempt to recruit them. Also, where the problem is resolved 
to the member's satisfaction, this may in itself encourage others to join the 
union (and vice versa). Similarly, membership may increase in an 
establishment or enterprise once the union is able to demonstrate its 
effectiveness in dealing with an issue. In other words, recruitment and 
servicing are not necessarily mutually exclusive activities. Rather, the one 
may assist the other. Where there is a conflict, of course, is in the case of 
distant expansion, where the official is required to spend time attempting to 
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recruit in completely new job territories, thus reducing the time available for 
servicing and recruiting in existing areas of organisation. 
Secondly, earlier studies have noted that officials' work patterns vary 
significantly between unions, with some unions spending much more time on 
recruitment (Clegg, 1961; Brown and Lawson, 1973). Given that a prioritising 
of recruitment appeared to be possible in some unions, this suggests that it 
might have been feasible for other unions to follow suit. It tended to be in 
unions with relatively weakly-organised core job territories that officials spent 
more time on recruitment (Brown and Lawson, 1973: 437). Thus, distant 
consolidation appeared to carry with it an imperative for more intense 
recruitment activity by full-time officials which may be absent where core job 
territories were better organised. The challenge facing unions was to 
encourage full-time officials to do more on recruitment even in the absence 
of the distant consolidation imperative. 
Finally, Kelly and Heery (1989) find that whilst most officials did not rank 
recruitment amongst their three most time-consuming activities, nevertheless 
over a fifth rated recruitment as the task they would most like to spend more 
time on. Thus, there was at least some recognition of the importance of 
recruitment amongst officials. 
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Whilst there were undoubtedly competing demands on the official's time, with 
a tendency for recruitment to be crowded-out by other activities, nevertheless 
it at least seems possible that full-time officials could be encouraged to devote 
more time to recruitment. The question then is: how were unions to achieve 
this? 
Developing the Recruitment Culture 
A theme in many of our interviews with national and local union officials was 
that the 1980s appeared to demand what amounted to a change in the 
"culture" of their organisations, towards a greater emphasis on recruitment and 
organising. This was stated very clearly by John Edmonds, early in his term 
as General Secretary of the GMB. Speaking to the union's 1987 Congress he 
said: 
"We have to alter the priorities of the organisation - change, in 
effect, the habits of a generation. This union has always prided 
itself on having officers and activists who could negotiate a good 
settlement. But in future the prizes will not go to the negotiator, 
but to the person who can organise a new group of workers, and 
give them basic trade union protection. Of course, there will 
always be a place in the GMB for someone with good 
negotiating skills. But make no mistake - the future lies not with 
the negotiator, but with the recruiter, and the organiser." 
(New Directions For the Year Ahead, 
GMB internal document, 1987) 
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As his Head of Research put it to us during an interview: 
"There was a sense in which the union went to sleep in the 
1970s. Check-off kept members coming in. Recruitment was 
a rather dirty activity compared to sitting in snug negotiating 
rooms." 
"What needs to be changed is the whole way in which the union 
behaves as an organisation. ...It is really about changing the 
culture of the union, and also changing the rewards system 
accordingly. At the moment we reward people for activities 
which we no longer are saying should be a high priority. We 
reward them for progressively sitting on more and more 
negotiating bodies. We reward them for sitting on large, fairly 
inert branches of well-settled membership. We don't so far, 
though we are beginning to change, reward people for bringing 
new groups of workers into the union and keeping them there." 
(GMB Head of Research) 
We suggest that any attempt by the central leadership to achieve such a 
culture change and to get full-time officials to devote more time to recruitment 
would consist of four elements. Firstly, the prioritisation of recruitment must 
be effectively communicated to officials. Secondly, there is likely to be a need 
for a clear policy for allocating time and resources to recruitment. Thirdly, the 
union will need some way of choosing recruitment targets so as to try to make 
best use of available resources. Finally, the union will need to monitor and 
evaluate the exercise in some way, so as to ensure its implementation, and 
also to collate information on achievements and difficulties so that further effort 
can be planned and targeted effectively. As suggested above, the evaluation 
of recruitment performance might be used to link rewards to the organising 
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priorities of the union in some way. In this section, we discuss the experience 
of our sample of unions in each of these key areas. 
(a) Communicating Recruitment Priorities 
Our interviews show quite clearly that local full-time officials in the unions we 
looked at had been made aware of any prioritisation of recruitment by their 
union's leadership. Thus, from a BIFU official: 
"The emphasis on recruitment means that we are meant to be 
spending more and more time on it. In a union like BIFU, 
recruitment has always been pretty important... [but] recruitment 
is without doubt what we are under pressure to spend more and 
more time on." 
From a UCATT official: 
"We've got a commitment from general office, a very harsh 
commitment, and we've got to get our fingers out [on 
recruitment]." 
From a EETPU official: 
"We are all under pressure on recruitment. That's got to be high 
on our agenda." 
From a NUPE official: 
"I would say that in the present climate in the union it 
[recruitment] is probably the key area if we are to survive at 
all...It has always been a major priority with me, I've never seen 
it differently, but certainly from head office level now that is being 
signalled up as a priority." 
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From a TGWU official: 
"If there's one credit given to an officer, it's recruitment. All the 
rest doesn't matter now." 
And even from the AEU: 
"Traditionally, we didn't give it [recruitment] all that much 
prominance, because we had a steady supply of recruits through 
the apprenticeship system. But like all other unions, 
membership has fallen, and we are trying to put that right." 
(b) Allocating Resources 
On the question of allocating resources to recruitment, we found evidence that 
at least some of our unions were making an attempt to devote an increasing 
amount of officials' time to recruitment. The aim was usually to get officials to 
put the demands of servicing existing members to one side and concentrate 
solely on recruitment activity for a given period. 
For example, in USDAW, full-time officials were required to devote the 
equivalent of one week per month solely to recruitment visits, with some 
divisions demanding even more. The time was usually spent visiting retail 
establishments, according to a schedule of visits coordinated and monitored 
on a Divisional basis by the Deputy Divisional Officer. During this time, the 
official was deemed to be unavailable for other duties, except in cases of 
extreme emergency which could not be handled by another official. As might 
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be expected, such an arrangement led to some difficulties, especially in the 
early stages: 
"The membership started to complain. They could never get 
hold of anyone because the administration for the week built up, 
and if you happened to be at the back of the queue it might be 
three weeks before you contacted the official. 
"After trying one week a month for a period, we then switched to 
two days a week, and we have found that that is beneficial and 
worthwhile, and it works. The membership accept it. They know 
that if they have an emergency, they can get them. If it's a 
question of a routine enquiry, they can get an answer, because 
there's always someone in the building. If it's a question that 
they want to see the official to discuss something, they know 
they can get them on Monday." 
(USDAW Divisional Officer) 
BIFU Area Organisers were urged by their General Secretary wherever 
possible to refer members' casework to the union's lay seconded 
representatives, and to focus their own efforts on recruitment. Whilst 
Organisers retained a significant amount of casework, and the trend towards 
regionalising personnel management in the major banks made an increased 
servicing workload likely, it is clear that the union's leadership was signalling 
the critical role of Organisers in recruitment. 
In addition to their day to day recruitment work, BIFU organisers were taken 
away from their normal workload for a specified period to undertake an 
intensive recruitment campaign. In several successive years, BIFU held a 
month-long recruitment campaign in the City of London during October, and 
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organisers would each participate for two weeks, setting aside their normal 
area responsibilities for that period. Similar campaigns, though on a more 
limited scale and involving organisers from a smaller number of areas were 
also held in the provinces. 
In one GMB region, the union had up to three of its thirty officials working 
largely on seeking to organise new sites, having been relieved of most of their 
servicing responsibilities for this reason. Initially on an experimental basis, the 
aim was to prioritise the winning of recognition at greenfield sites, with the 
officials concerned, all volunteers, reporting directly to the Regional Secretary. 
In another GMB region, we were told of attempts to "re-educate" lay activists 
to take on a greater responsibility for recruitment within their own 
establishments, thus releasing the full-time official. Also: 
"What we are saying now, to some extent, is that we've over-
serviced in the past. There's an emphasis to come off that a 
little bit where we can, so that we've got more time and more 
resources to spend on the priority area greenfield sites, dealing 
with companies... letting the employer know what the GMB is all 
about." 
(GMB Regional Industrial Officer) 
The GMB reallocated the responsibilities of full-time officials at national and 
regional levels to reflect its recruitment priorities. For example: 
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"Hotel and catering [a priority recruitment target for the late 
1980s] stopped being the drossy one you gave to the new John, 
who came in and was told to do that for a while before being 
given a 'proper job'. It became one to give to an experienced 
officer." 
(GMB Head of Research) 
The aim here was to ensure that these jobs were performed by officials with 
the necessary skills to do them well, and also to signal the union's priorities to 
officials. 
Full-time officials in the TGWU were not generally required to devote a 
specified amount of time to recruitment each week. One Regional Organiser 
explained that TGWU officials were, given the nature of the union's job 
territories, involved in more local-level bargaining than in some other unions, 
so that this would be unrealistic. However, they were expected to participate 
in intensive recruitment campaigns, where, barring emergencies, officials were 
required to devote themselves exclusively to recruitment. The union attempted 
to coordinate the latter, through it's National Action Weeks implemented as 
part of the Link Up campaign (see Chapter 10). 
(c) Targeting Recruitment Activity 
How did unions set about targeting their recruitment activity? Was there 
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evidence that unions were attempting to make best use of their scarce 
resources in this respect? 
BIFU had established clear procedures for the targeting of recruitment activity, 
which tended to focus on consolidation. The union produced accurate 
membership figures, with regular printouts of membership broken down by 
section and employer, enabling committees and officials to monitor 
membership trends very closely. There was a National Membership 
Committee, which monitored membership on a national basis, selected targets, 
and controlled a national budget for recruitment campaigns. In addition, Area 
Councils each had an Organisational Sub-Committee responsible for 
monitoring membership and recruitment activity in their area. 
Recruitment targets were chosen and campaigns organised at both national 
and area levels. Area organisers also played a role in selecting their own 
targets on a day to day basis, although they were often asked to focus their 
routine recruitment efforts on particular targets, for example part-time workers 
or the branches of a particular clearer. Each organiser submitted his eight-
weekly recruitment plan to the area Organisational Sub-Committee for 
approval. Local campaigns occasionally involved bringing in resources and 
officials from outside the area, with the approval of the National Membership 
Committee, where it was felt that a concentrated intensive effort would be 
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helpful in a particular locality. Whilst there might be occasional strategy 
disagreements between the National Membership Committee and area 
Organisational Sub-Committees on specific targets, there was clear 
agreement at both national and local levels of the union on the need to 
prioritise recruitment. 
In several successive years, BIFU held month-long recruitment campaigns in 
the City of London during October, and all the union's organisers would each 
participate for two weeks, setting aside their normal area responsibilities for 
that period. Similar campaigns, though usually on a smaller scale, were also 
held at large labour centres in the provinces. 
Our interviews suggested that systematic criteria were applied by BIFU in 
selecting targets. Effort tended to focus on centres with large concentrations 
of potential members, often where BIFU density levels were comparatively low. 
The latter included areas with comparatively high labour turnover, where there 
was competition from staff associations and where the employer was less 
supportive of BIFU membership. Significantly, officials were instructed to 
spend more time recruiting in the clearing banks, rather than in the TSB, the 
Cooperative and Yorkshire Banks, where membership density was higher 
because of the legacy of union membership agreements and the absence of 
staff association competition. 
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Thus, the union sought to maximise economies of scale, and to target 
resources where the potential was greatest. In addition, there was also a 
belief amongst some in the union that better results came from concentrated 
or repeated campaigns, which raised the profile of the union in a particular 
area or institution. Thus, one official explained that a one-off campaign aimed 
at the Midland Bank complex in Sheffield had been less successful than the 
large sustained drives in central London because: 
"It's an area that needs to be constantly bombarded if it's going 
to be successful. Unless you are prepared to put the resources 
into areas like that, then you are not going to get the results in 
a short sharp campaign." 
(BIFU Area Organiser) 
This suggests that it may be unwise to spread resources too thinly. 
The main part of USDAW's recruitment effort was devoted to consolidating 
membership in retail stores. The union concentrated on those stores where 
it already had recognition, but where the employer tended not to be strongly 
supportive of union membership, so that density would fall in the absence of 
union recruitment activity. Thus, full-time officials spent less time recruiting 
in Tesco Stores and cooperative retail societies, where the employer 
encouraged individuals to join the union and supported the development of a 
system of shop stewards, than in companies such as Argyle Stores and 
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Morrisons, where whilst the union was recognised, the employer was less 
supportive. As one official explained: 
"Argyll give us any kind of facility that we like, but insist on 
strictly voluntary membership. We always have to put Argyll at 
the top of our list when we are considering membership, 
because that's where our biggest potential lies. I always say to 
organisers when we are starting our twelve months recruitment 
activity 'Argyll first, and every store'." 
(USDAW Deputy Divisional Officer) 
The Divisional Officer and his deputy could use organisers' weekly recruitment 
reports to monitor visits made and recruitment outcomes by company (see 
below). This information was then used in the systematic targeting of 
recruitment effort. Thus: 
"If there's a lot of visits being made and no results, we say Well 
what the hell was all that about? What the hell are we bothering 
with that for, and wasting resources."' 
(USDAW Divisional Officer) 
Given the pressing need to consolidate existing areas, USDAW had limited 
resources to devote to expansion into new companies, in spite of the fact that 
distribution had a lot of unorganised territory. Thus: 
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"It takes us all our time, to be quite honest, to deal with 
companies where we are already welcomed. And whilst we 
continuously try to break down the unreasonable opposition that 
won't give us access... we can't afford to devote nearly as much 
time to it as where we already have facilities". 
(USDAW Deputy Divisional Officer) 
Whilst full-time officials were expected to constantly be on the look-out for 
new recruitment oppportunities, there was a keen awareness of the need to 
avoid spending excessive time to little effect. Occasional campaigns might be 
aimed at non-union companies such as Marks and Spencer and Dickens, but 
this often amounted to little more than a gesture, designed to raise the profile 
of the union but with little realistic prospect of success at least in the short 
term. A Divisional Officer we spoke to even went so far as to declare his 
opposition to one such campaign: 
"We've had a limited campaign at Marks and Spencer, but I have 
to tell you I've opposed that because Marks and Spencer are 
hostile, and there is no possibility of retaining people who've 
joined...I said I didn't want my officials deployed on what I know 
from my own experience is a useless exercise. But sometimes 
the organisation at national level will see a need to have a high 
profile in targeting a major high street company like Marks and 
Spencer. So politically there might be reasons for doing 
something when strategically, sensibly, you wouldn't give it 
house room." 
(USDAW Divisional Officer) 
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Thus, USDAW found itself in a difficult industry which effectively imposed 
recruitment priorities on the union in terms of distant consolidation. Resources 
were concentrated on existing agreements, where there was more chance of 
retaining those recruited. This left only limited scope for other targeted 
campaigns, which were given a lower priority apart from the occasional high-
profile recruitment drive. 
Similar arguments applied in the case of UCATT, which shared with BIFU and 
USDAW the need to continually consolidate its core membership territories, 
due in this case to the transitory nature of most construction industry 
workplaces. This effectively precluded UCATT from launching major 
recruitment drives outside the construction industry, and the officials we 
interviewed suggested that this had not been seriously considered. Even 
within construction there was a tendency to concentrate on larger sites, partly 
to exploit economies of scale in organising, but mainly because the larger 
employers were party to the national agreements, so that the union was 
afforded organising and bargaining rights. 
Two of our other unions, NALGO and NUPE, chose not to move beyond their 
traditional job territories, seeing themselves as essentially public services 
unions. At the time of our interviews they were, however, preoccupied with 
major changes in the public sector, including wholesale privatisation and 
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encroachment by private contractors. This meant that both unions spent much 
of their time and resources campaigning on issues relating to service quality 
and the terms and conditions of their members, although they sought to link 
this in with recruitment in existing areas of organisation. 
Also, both unions were faced with large pockets of non-members within their 
core job territories, so that there was considerable scope for recruitment 
through consolidation. As a NALGO official put it to us: 
"We took the decision that there were too many areas of non-
members in existing employer institutions, where we've got 
recognition, for us to be able to justify moving out to greenfield 
sites. ...It takes a lot of work to secure recognition and to build 
up a membership base, and then to organise new branches...But 
that isn't to say that we would turn away from new areas. If new 
opportunities come along, then we take them. But we've got so 
much to tackle at the moment..." 
(NALGO Regional Officer) 
There was also recognition of the dangers of placing too much emphasis on 
organising new job territories if this meant having to neglect existing members: 
"If I were to take [officers] out and put them into new areas of 
work where we didnt already have a membership base, then I'd 
be neglecting the membership base that we've currently got, and 
the gains that we were making in the new areas would be offset 
by losses in the traditional areas." 
(NALGO Regional Officer) 
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The large general unions had also identified local authorities as an area with 
great recruitment potential, and NALGO and NUPE faced competition from the 
TGWU and GMB in this area. Such competition may have brought added 
urgency to the former unions' recruitment efforts. 
Whilst recruitment in NALGO was the responsibility of branches and district 
committees, and there was a lot of emphasis on branch autonomy, the union 
had established a National Recruitment Working Party to determine national 
recruitment priorities. Targets for recruitment campaigns were chosen at 
national level and communicated to District Service Committees, who were 
responsible for organising recruitment campaigns in their own localities and 
sectors. Major campaigns had included such areas as schools staff, social 
services, electricity staffs, universities and police civilians. District service 
committees and branches, however, had autonomy in the sense that they 
could decide whether or not to implement a particular campaign, given their 
own local priorities and membership levels. 
Where they were unsuccessful in resisting privatisation, both NALGO and 
NUPE had a policy of staying with their membership in the private sector, and 
of attempting to organise any new contractors encroaching into their traditional 
job territories. In this sense NUPE, for example, had come to see itself as a 
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public services union, regardless of whether those services were provided from 
a public or private sector base. 
However, even in cases where NUPE recruited in the expanding voluntary 
sector, the union's preoccupation with consolidating its traditional membership 
base, with campaign work and (in 1989) with industrial action meant that: 
"It is often more demand-led, rather than us going out and specifically 
targeting an area." 
(NUPE Regional Secretary) 
The unions in our sample which appeared to be most likely to adopt a pro-
active targeting approach to recruitment were the big general unions, the 
TGWU and the GMB. They had the potential for economies of scale in their 
operations, and the benefit of some reasonably stable core areas of 
membership to provide the necessary organisational and financial stability, but 
at the same time avoided the inward-looking character of some of the other 
unions because of their broad membership base. 
Our expectations were confirmed, with both the TGWU and the GMB adopting 
a targeted approach aimed at a number of sectors, with a mix of consolidation 
and expansion. There did appear to be an advantage in size here, in terms 
of being able to free up resources to devote to recruitment campaigns. 
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The GMB identified seven target areas at national level as early as 1986. 
These were: 
Local Authorities 
Health 
Food Manufacture and Distribution 
Hotel and Catering 
Private Sector White-Collar Workers 
Construction and Building Materials 
Workers on Government-Funded Training Schemes 
Individual regions of the union would select specific target areas to reflect local 
circumstances, but the aim was for the General Secretary and the executive 
committee to monitor recruitment figures for these areas on a quarterly basis 
at national level. 
Similarly, the TGWU targeted particular sectors at national and local level, and 
placed a particular emphasis on temporary workers, part-timers, women, the 
ethnic minorities and young people, groups which the union felt had been 
neglected in the past (see the Link Up case study below). 
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In both cases, the targets were chosen on the basis of perceived recruitment 
potential, involving either consolidation, as in the case of local authorities, or 
sectors of very low density, possibly with expanding employment opportunities. 
In some cases, the union would deliberately select a combination of harder 
and less difficult targets, in order to avoid too much disillusionment amongst 
recruiters. 
The EETPU leadership had recently signalled recruitment as a priority for 
officials. White-collar workers and technicians had been identified as a 
particular priority. National campaigns had been held, for example aimed at 
Visionhire and Radio Rentals technicians, with full-time officials being asked 
to take time out to visit local shops and service centres. The union was a 
leading player in attempts to win recognition from employers, and, particularly 
following its expulsion from the TUC in 1988, it put a great deal of effort into 
trying to attract transfers of engagements from staff associations and small 
specialist unions, where it's moderate image was felt to give it an advantage 
over its rivals in the TUC. 
Of our sample of unions, the AEU appeared to be the least advanced in terms 
of targeted recruitment campaigns. Our respondents told us that the union 
had no nationally-coordinated recruitment campaigns as such. Aside from 
attempts to win recognition deals from employers on greenfield sites, the 
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union's approach was, by and large, a traditional one, with little evidence of 
any systematic attempt to target non-union plants. AEU officials insisted on 
the futility of cold-calling more strongly than those in the general unions, for 
example, and emphasised that they relied either on approaching new 
employers or on building a membership from within the workplace. This was 
feasible, they claimed, because skilled AEU members were much more likely 
than members of most other unions to retain their membership on moving to 
a new job, whether or not it was in a unionised plant. 
Table 9.1 summarises the above discussion by outlining the main recruitment 
targets quoted by our interviewees. There is broad support for the hypotheses 
outlined in the previous chapter, that recruitment targets are likely to reflect the 
size of a union, the level of organisation of its core job territories, and the 
internal characteristics of the union. 
Thus, the TGWU and the GMB were the most active in terms of expansionary 
recruitment campaigns, including a strong emphasis on targeting private-
sector services and the peripheral labour force. BIFU, UCATT, and USDAW 
concentrated mainly on consolidation within their existing job territories, with 
some targeting of particular groups and workplaces. The motivation here was 
essentially defensive, aimed at maintaining existing areas of organisation. 
These unions launched the occasional expansionary campaign, usually in 
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TABLE 9.1: Specified Recruitment Targets 
Recruitment Target 
Officials could cite no particular targets, beyond attempting to secure recognition in new plants 
Consolidation in clearing banks, including concentrated campaigns in London and selected areas 
Part-time workers 
Women 
} in banking and finance 
} 
Large complexes: Barclaycard, Northampton; Midland Bank, Sheffield; Guardian Royal 
Exchange, Lytham 
International banks; Subsidiaries of clearing banks; Building societies (mainly by mergers with 
staff associations) 
Managerial, professional and technical staff (often through mergers) 
Technicians (eg Visionhire, Radio Rentals) 
Local Authorities; Health; Food Manufacture and Distribution; Hotel and Catering; Private sector 
white collar workers; Construction and Building Materials; Workers on Government-Funded 
Training Schemes; Security Industry. 
Women; Ethnic Minorities; Young People; Part-time and Temporary Workers; Self-employed 
Workers (in certain regions). 
General consolidation in: Local Government; NHS; Public Service; Electricity & Gas; 
Universities. 
Police Civilians; Probation and Aftercare; Housing Associations; 
Public Transport. 
Particular campaigns: 
Follow members into private sector, with limited recruitment in adjacent areas 
General consolidation in: 
Particular campaigns: 
Local Authorities; NHS; Public Services; Public Utilities; 
Universities 
Schools meals, caretakers, nurses, home helps 
Follow members into private sector, with limited recruitment in adjacent areas, such as housing 
associations, private nursing homes, law centres, etc. 
Widespread targeting including: Local Authorities; Contract Cleaning; Retail (eg 
Sainsbury's); Hotel & Catering (eg Ladbroke's hotels); 
Bar Staff; Betting Shops and Racing Stables; Channel 
Tunnel; Voluntary Sector. 
Women; Young People; Ethnic Minorities; Part-time and Temporary Workers. 
Consolidation in construction and related industries; Self employed in construction; Women. 
Consolidation in Distribution; Periodic campaigns aimed at particular companies; Women; Part-
time Workers. 
Source: Interviews with union officials, union journals, recruitment literature and general media. 
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response to employee demand or as a defensive measure. However, NAIGO 
and NUPE, whilst having the advantages of size and well-organised core job 
territories, chose not to expand beyond their core public-sector base, probably 
a reflection of their tradition as purely public-sector rather than general unions, 
although they did make some expansionary moves in response to privatisation 
and employee demand. Finally, the EETPU and the AEU tended to 
concentrate on core workers and on direct approaches to the employer. The 
AEU appeared to have the least-developed approach to recruitment 
campaigning amongst our nine unions, perhaps reflecting the fact that the 
union had elected rather than appointed officials, thus making them more 
responsive to the servicing needs of their membership, and less responsive 
to calls from the central leadership for the prioritisation of recruitment. 
Table 9.2 presents a summary of the main criteria which appeared from our 
research to inform the selection of recruitment targets. These are grouped 
according to the underlying rationale, and suggest that recruitment targeting 
was undertaken on the basis of a pragmatic assessment of the threats and 
opportunities facing the union, and as such reflected a combination of 
defensive, membership potential, and other organising considerations. 
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TABLE 9.2: Criteria Used in the Targeting of Recruitment Effort 
Criteria Rationale Examples 
Maintenance of existing 
areas of organisation 
Defensive BIFU-banking 
USDAW-retailing 
Competition in existing areas 
of organisation 
Defensive BIFU-selected clearing 
banks. NALGO/NUPE-
public sector 
Contractors entering union's 
job territories 
Defensive NUPE-public services 
TGWU-agency drivers 
New subsidiaries of existing 
employers 
Defensive BIFU-merchant banking 
subsidiaries 
Areas of lower union density Membership potential BIFU/USDAW-where 
employers less supportive 
Previously-neglected groups 
in the workforce 
Membership potential Many unions-women, young 
people, ethnic minorities, 
peripheral workforce, etc 
Expanding industries/sectors Membership potential TGWU/GMB-private 
services sector 
Less emphasis on "near 
impossible" targets 
Membership potential USDAW-Marks & Spencer 
and others 
Pockets of non-members in 
existing areas of 
organisation 
Membership potential 
Retention potential 
Most unions 
Larger establishments Economies of scale 
Retention potential 
Employer recognition 
BIFU-large labour centres 
UCATT-construction sites 
Need to concentrate 
recruitment efforts 
Critical minimum effort to 
make an impression 
BIFU-targeted campaigns 
TGWU/GMB-national 
priorities 
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(d) Monitoring Recruitment Activity 
The monitoring of results was an area which received greater attention in 
some unions during the 1980s, although in some there had long been formal 
monitoring systems. In what follows, we briefly describe the practice of 
several unions as of 1989-90, with the aim of illustrating the approaches 
adopted by unions. The systems which we describe in some cases apply to 
the whole national union, whilst in others they are specific to a particular 
region. Even in the latter cases, however, what we describe is illustrative of 
the general philosophy of the national union. 
A common approach amongst our sample of unions was for full-time officials 
to submit regular written report forms to their superior at regional or district 
level. For example, in USDAW, the Deputy Divisional Officer compiled a 
weekly "Organising Activity Report" based on reports from each of his full-time 
officials. This gave a detailed breakdown of the week's organising activity in 
terms of companies targeted, branches visited, members recruited, proposed 
follow-up visits, and on any difficulties encountered during recruitment. This 
allowed the Deputy Divisional Officer to monitor recruitment, not only for each 
officer, but also on a company-by-company basis. Here the "difficulties 
encountered" information could be particularly useful. For example, where a 
comment such as "poor facilities" appeared for a particular company, he was 
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able to telephone the National Officer responsible for that company in an 
attempt to improve such facilities. 
In addition, the Deputy Divisional Officer monitored branch membership 
figures: 
"...and when I see a certain trend in a branch, a downward 
trend, I'll be seeking an explanation from the organiser. 
Invariably I'll get it. A supermarket closes; we lose the 
membership. You can do damn all about that. A supermarket 
opens...and you pick members up. There are simple 
explanations, usually, of members lost and members gained. 
But having said that, you've got to watch that the rate of 
recruitment stays up. If a supermarket opens, you've got to 
make sure that you get in there to do the job." 
(USDAW Deputy Divisional Officer) 
However, our respondents from USDAW were generally at pains to point out 
that whilst there was an increased emphasis on recruitment in the 1980s, the 
union had always emphasised recruitment in this way, and such monitoring 
was a long-standing feature of the union's activities. 
Similarly, in UCATT, full-time officials completed a "Regional Organiser's 
Weekly Report and Expenses Form". This included not only details of the 
week's expenses and car mileage, but also details of recruitment activity 
undertaken. The former was approved by the regional secretary and 
forwarded to the central wages department. The recruitment information was 
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used by the regional secretary and regional council to monitor recruitment 
activity. Again, this form of monitoring had long been a feature of the union. 
BIFU Area Organisers spent a great deal of their time visiting bank branches 
in order to recruit members. They were required to submit an eight-weekly 
programme of recruitment visits to the Assistant Secretary (Organisation) with 
a copy to their area Organisational Sub-Committee (OSC), comprised of lay 
members drawn from the elected Area Council. The Organiser also completed 
an "Organiser Report Form" for each individual branch or office visit, 
forwarding copies of these to the Assistant Secretary and to members of the 
area OSC. Every eight weeks, the AS(O) held meetings with Area Organisers 
to discuss their completed programmes, in terms of visits actually made, 
membership densities, staff association strength, and members recruited. 
In the TGWU, officers reported to their District Secretary on their recruitment 
activity, who then compiled a quarterly report for his district. This was 
forwarded to the Regional Organiser, who had overall responsibility for 
recruitment in the region. The report identified new areas of recruitment, other 
major areas of recruitment effort and details of any major membership losses 
due to redundancies or closure. Officials were also asked to provide 
comments on recruitment opportunities and difficulties encountered. The 
reports were discussed at district and regional level, where the information was 
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used to plan recruitment activity. In addition, the Regional Organisers met at 
national level on a National Coordinating Committee and such information was 
intended to inform their discussions and planning of national campaigns. 
Similar procedures operated in both the GMB and the EETPU. In the GMB, 
Regional Industrial Officers drew up a quarterly recruitment report for their 
Regional Secretary and executive, based on reports from individual officials. 
The report set out recruitment trends, weaknesses in campaigns, employment 
trends, future recruitment plans, and resource requirements. Again, this was 
used by the Regional Secretary to inform the allocation of resources. In 
addition, some GMB regions had recently introduced regular recruitment 
meetings, organised by Regional Industrial Officers and attended by all 
officials, where recruitment campaigns were discussed and planned. In the 
EETPU, Area Officials were required to submit a quarterly report to the 
Executive Council, based on reports from individual officials, and giving details 
of recruitment activity, numbers recruited, difficulties encountered and future 
plans in their area. 
In some unions, there was no such attempt to directly monitor the recruitment 
activity of full-time officials, and the union relied solely on branch membership 
returns. Our NALGO respondents informed us that this was the practice in 
their union, with branches submitting an annual membership return to head 
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office, and reporting on a quarterly basis at District Committee level. The AEU 
also relied on monitoring membership on a branch basis, with branch 
secretaries submitting a quarterly report to head office. However, in 1990, the 
Rules Revision Committee made the following alteration to AEU rules: 
"The divisional organisers shall meet with all the assistant 
divisional organisers and district secretaries located within their 
divisions twice a year to discuss the level of organisation and 
recruitment within the division and the steps taken and to be 
taken to improve the same. The divisional organisers shall 
submit written reports to the Executive Council on each such 
meeting." 
(AEU Journal, Reports Section, June 1990) 
This decision was cited by an AEU official we interviewed as a clear 
expression of the increasing emphasis being placed on recruitment within the 
union. What is perhaps significant, however, is that the rules revision came 
at the end of a full decade of steeply falling AEU membership, during which 
major cost savings and contributions increases had been implemented, and 
in spite of which AEU officials were amongst the least likely of those 
interviewed to see recruitment as a key part of their responsibilities (see 
below). 
From the above discussion, there appeared to be two basic approaches to the 
monitoring of recruitment and membership. One involved the direct monitoring 
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of the activities of full-time officials, through a formal written reporting system. 
This was often accompanied by the monitoring of branch membership figures, 
through quarterly or annual returns. The second approach concentrated solely 
on branch membership returns, with no attempt to formally monitor the 
recruitment activity of full-time officials. The latter appeared to occur mainly 
where recruitment had been seen as a matter for lay representatives, with ful l -
time officials concentrating mainly on servicing. These tended to be the 
unions whose core job territories were relatively well-organised, and whose 
major recruitment activity was of a close consolidation type. 
What is clear is that most of our unions appeared to have a reasonably 
systematic approach to the monitoring of recruitment activity and membership 
trends at local level, with some attempt to collate this information at the level 
of the region and/or at the centre, and there was evidence that this could be 
used to evaluate recruitment efforts and to plan future activity. 
In spite of such monitoring, union officials have traditionally been given a high 
degree of autonomy in their work, and it seems that they, and indeed their 
superiors, were often sensitive about any suggestion that their personal 
performance was being monitored, or that they were being given targets to 
meet. Thus, whilst UCATT Regional Organisers reported weekly on their 
recruitment activity, a Regional Secretary explained: 
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"The bottom part of the form is for me to monitor the amount of 
people - not only to monitor, I mean it's not like that, because 
we have a lot of trust in our officers. It's to give my Regional 
Council some idea which areas are more organised than others, 
and which companies are more organised. If we notice a 
company is not appearing on this, well, then I'd pick up the 
'phone and endeavour to go and meet the company and say 
'Look, as far as I'm concerned, the report I'm getting from my 
officers is that we don't seem to have many members inside 
your company. Is there a specific reason for this?' And then, 
they may not have a check-off agreement, so then I could 
negotiate with them a check-off agreement. So it's not only to 
monitor the officers, it's to give me some idea, a picture, of that 
massive area [his region]." 
(UCATT Regional Secretary) 
Several of our other respondents were similarly at pains to point out that any 
monitoring was aimed primarily at ensuring that recruitment opportunities were 
fully exploited, and any difficulties dealt with systematically, rather than 
constituting any form of detailed supervision and assessment of the 
performance of individual officials. When asked whether there was central 
monitoring and control of the recruitment of officials, a EETPU official told us: 
"Oh there is, but it's not control in the sense that you're 
measured. There's no league table. But you have to get out. 
Everyone understands that... it will only be a success if you get 
out there and do it. Even when you do that, we all appreciate 
that there are difficulties, whether it's from the employer, or 
whether it's from the person you are trying to recruit." 
(EETPU Area Official) 
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Similarly, the TGWU did not assign recruitment target figures to officials, since 
again it was generally felt that recruitment success was to some extent beyond 
their control and that such targets would simply make recruitment an even 
more frustrating activity. Thus, in most unions any emphasis on recruitment 
took the form of ensuring that officials undertook a certain amount of 
recruitment activity, rather than setting particular target figures or quotas to be 
achieved by each official. 
A NALGO official told us that his union did not have recruitment quotas for 
individual full-time officials, and explained that it would be difficult to introduce 
them in his union because full-time officials were only usually allowed access 
to the workplace once the branch had called them in. 
BIFU did not produce recruitment targets for full-time Area Organisers, 
although temporary recruiters, employed by the union on one-year contracts 
specifically to recruit members, were assigned a target of an average three 
new members per day. BIFU introduced their monitoring system not so much 
to monitor each organiser's recruitment performance, but rather to monitor 
recruitment problems and to underline the importance of recruitment visits and 
contact with actual and potential members. Thus: 
"They don't really look at the numbers recruited. It's just a 
general chat about what the major issues are and what the 
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opposition is up to, what the response of the membership is to 
a pay settlement, et cetera. We are not asked to justify our 
movements or anything like that." 
(BIFU Area Organiser) 
There was some evidence of resistance to the principle of targeting amongst 
BIFU Area Organisers. This was reflected in their initial response to the 
introduction of the monitoring exercise: 
"We weren't keen on it when it came in. [APEX - their trade 
union] had some discussions on it, but there were various 
assurances given that it wasn't going to be used for disciplinary 
purposes; it was not a form of targeting; it was simply a record 
of where we'd been." 
(BIFU Area Organiser) 
In the event, however, none of the BIFU officials we interviewed had heard of 
the monitoring system being used to impose recruitment quotas, or to 
discipline an official. Of course, this may simply suggest that officials were 
doing their job effectively. As one official put it: 
"Although if an organiser was found not to be doing his job, I'm sure 
these things [report forms] would be used in evidence." 
(BIFU Area Organiser) 
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A regional officer of another union outlined the problems faced in monitoring 
officials' recruitment performance: 
"Recruitment is hard work. It can be stressful for officials, and 
unless there is some mechanism for ensuring that people are 
doing what they are being asked to do, the reality is that they 
don't do it. There has to be some management control. Now 
that is a bit more difficult in trade unions, which are not based on 
the same principles as employers. We don't find it as easy to 
get rid of staff who don't measure up to the standard. We 
wouldn't want to do really, although I say that tongue in cheek, 
because from time to time there are people who are round pegs 
in square holes. The job isn't really for them. But we are stuck 
with the problem of having people that other organisations 
wouldn't have, because of the nature of our organisation as a 
trade union." 
Our interviews with regional and national officials confirmed this view, 
suggesting that there were few effective sanctions deployed against officials 
who reacted unenthusiastically to the new recruitment campaigns, with 
exhortation, example and a tendency to depend on the enthusiastic officials 
being the approach adopted in implementing campaigns. 
However, we did come across one regional secretary who was particularly 
hawkish about encouraging his full-time officials to recruit. He suggested to 
his officials that they should aim to recruit at least ten private-sector members 
per week, and he compiled a quarterly "league table" of officials' recruitment 
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achievements. Table 9.3 compares the recruitment performance of the ful l -
time officials in his region during 1988. 
T A I L ! ©.3: Utnfon ^@gi@ini X: ^@©iryitimi@0Titl FSgumis for HS@8 
OpgainiBsair Jsnm= ApirSJ-
Jouou® 
S®pfi~ 
D©@ 
T@fial 
FtaMe S@efi©ir 
A 74 57 10 20 161 3.0 
B 170 77 89 44 380 7.3 
C 76 9 48 49 182 3.5 
D 145 72 63 111 391 7.5 
E 127 45 16 11 199 3.8 
F 315 192 131 127 765 14.7 
G 97 177 80 6 360 6.9 
H 479 317 138 5 939 18.0 
P'fw&t® S@etoir 
A 25 16 16 37 94 1.8 
B 78 79 121 117 395 7.5 
C 41 57 54 40 192 3.6 
D 45 73 171 138 427 8.2 
E 39 62 59 89 249 4.7 
F 17 55 58 41 171 3.2 
G 43 57 8 87 195 3.7 
H 211 285 381 283 116 22.3 
0 
:@uire®: Internal union documents. 
Note: The names of the union, the region and of individual organisers have 
been excluded to preserve confidentiality. 
Whilst he was at pains to point out that such figures could not necessarily be 
taken at face value, given that the scope for recruitment differed greatly 
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between districts and depended to some extent on factors beyond the 
individual official's control, nevertheless he did meet with each official regularly 
to discuss the figures. If there was evidence that an official was making 
insufficient impact on recruitment, either in general or in a particular area, then 
he was expected to explain why. 
He suggested that his union needed to undergo a "culture change", moving 
towards a greater emphasis on the need for full-time officials to get out to 
workplaces and recruit: 
"If [...] is going to survive, or any union really, I think the priority is to 
get officials who can sell the organisation to people, and there's a lot of 
officials who don't have that ability." 
He argued that it tended to be the newer, younger officials who shared this 
view, and indicated that there had been some problems in getting officials to 
prioritise recruitment: 
"There's a certain amount of officer resentment about this kind 
of thing. They regard it as pressure. Ironically, my two best 
recruiters don't regard it as pressure. They're very much into the 
recruitment orientation, and see it as a necessary union 
operation." 
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He outlined the case of one official who refused to complete the monitoring 
forms, and who eventually took early retirement from the union. Clearly, many 
unions may face resistance from within the organisation in attempting a shift 
towards a more recruitment-oriented culture. 
This particular regional secretary was the only one of our respondents who 
claimed to be in favour of directly linking officials' rewards to their effectiveness 
as recruiters. Whilst he was not able to do this with salary, given his union's 
salary policy, nevertheless he claimed to operate an informal system of 
rewards, for example by selecting good performers for conference delegations 
and overseas trips. 
In general, however, our respondents were strongly opposed to the provision 
of direct financial incentives for recruitment. One official told us that his union 
did not provide such incentives because: 
"...we've all been members for years. We all believe in the 
philosophy of trade unionism. It's not something I think you can 
pay someone to do, as you would pay them to be a salesman." 
(EETPU Area Official) 
This is consistent with the study by Robertson and Sams, which found that 
"the basic motivation to engage in full-time trade union work seems generally 
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to have been non-economic"(1976: 34), with most officials seeing it as being 
a logical progression from their lay involvement, and many claiming that their 
motivation was idealistic. As a UCATT official put it: 
"My grandfather was a trade union official for NUFTA, my dad 
was the District Secretary of the Amalgamated Society of 
Woodworkers, and the family's always had an involvement with 
the labour and trade union movement. ... Five years ago I was 
on fourteen and a half thousand a year, and I took a six 
thousand pounds a year cut to come into this job." 
However, whilst there was neither evidence of, nor support for, providing 
financial rewards for recruitment, it might be possible to provide longer-term 
recognition and reward. As we have seen, the GMB sought to emphasise that 
increasingly officials would receive recognition for their achievements as 
organisers rather than as negotiators. Whilst the union stopped short of 
adopting performance-related pay, nevertheless it was made clear that 
promotion within the union would depend on the individual's achievements in 
this area: 
"People are aware that if they want to move up in the union; if 
they want not just a future, but if they want to go further than 
Organiser... then they must take on board the recruitment idea." 
(GMB Regional Industrial Officer) 
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This point was echoed by officials we spoke to in several other unions, 
although one might question whether unions have sufficient opportunities for 
career advancement to make this an effective incentive for all but a minority 
of officials. 
W@c°@ QffieSafls Spuinidlfircg Mm® Tim@ on Recrultmanlr? 
Given all the above, was there any evidence by the early 1990s that union 
leaderships had been successful in getting their full-time officials to devote 
more time to recruitment? 
We saw above that earlier studies of the work patterns of union officials 
suggested that recruitment was a relatively minor activity for most in terms of 
the amount of time spent. Such a finding emerged very clearly, for example, 
from the work of Kelly and Heery (1989), who found in a survey of 101 local 
officials, carried out in 1987, that only 18 ranked recruitment amongst their 
three most time-consuming activities, with routine office work, conducting and 
preparing for negotiations, training/guiding stewards and attending union 
committees all taking up significantly more time. 
Our own interviews with local full-time officials confirmed that negotiating was 
the most time-consuming activity (see Table 9.4), followed by helping or 
advising union stewards or representatives, and recruitment in joint second 
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place. Routine office work did not emerge as one of the main time-consuming 
activities in our interviews. This finding, along with the high ranking given to 
recruitment compared to earlier studies, may reflect the composition of our 
sample, who were mainly "first-line officials", and in some cases drawn from 
unions which had traditionally placed a great deal of emphasis on recruitment. 
The latter point is significant, given that Kelly and Heery's sample was based 
on officials from seven unions (AEU, ASTMS, EETPU, GMB, NALGO, NUPE 
and TGWU), whilst twelve of their eighteen who ranked recruitment as one of 
their top three activities came from one particular union (the GMB). 
TABLE BA: FyDI-Tom© Offocoals' W@rk Patterns 
Activity 
Most Time-Consuming 
Activity: Number of 
Times Mentioned 
Increasingly time 
Consuming in 
R A N K 
Last 3-5 years 
1st 2nd 3rd Total 
a) Helping/advising stewards or 
representatives 
5 7 5 17 4 
b) Negotiating with employers 9 6 3 18 3 
c) Preparing for negotiations 1 3 1 5 1 
d) Attending union 
branches/committees 
2 0 3 5 1 
e) Helping members with individual 
problems 
0 6 6 12 7 
f) Recruitment 8 3 6 17 9 
g) Routine office work 2 1 1 4 1 
Source: Interviews with 27 full-time officials, 1989-90. 
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However, given that our research was conducted during 1989 and 1990, rather 
later than that of Kelly and Heery and the other studies referred to earlier in 
the chapter, the higher ranking given to recruitment may also reflect to some 
extent a growing awareness of the importance of recruitment amongst officials. 
This is certainly implied by the fact that recruitment was the activity most often 
mentioned as taking up an increasing amount of officials' time over the 
preceding three to five years (Table 9.4). 
The TUC survey of union officials, carried out in 1987, lends weight to this 
interpretation, suggesting that even by then officials had recognised the 
growing importance of recruitment. When asked to identify the different 
aspects of their job which were becoming more or less important, over seventy 
five per cent saw recruitment as becoming more important, with only 2.4 per 
cent seeing it as becoming less so. Recruitment emerged as the top-ranked 
item on this question. Dealing with individual casework and queries was the 
second-ranked item, with forty eight per cent seeing this as becoming more 
important (TUC, 1989a). These results appear to be consistent with our own 
findings. 
Thus, our tentative conclusion is that by the end of the 1980s, local full-time 
officials do appear to have been shifting their work patterns in favour of 
recruitment activity. 
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In spite of this, we still found that the priority given to recruitment activity by 
full-time officials varied considerably between unions. Table 9.5 suggests that 
officials in unions whose core job territories had lower union density were more 
likely to spend a high proportion of their time on recruitment. This included 
officials in B1FU, UCATT and USDAW, whilst those in unions such as the 
AEU, NALGO and, perhaps surprisingly, the TGWU tended to represent the 
other extreme, with a much greater emphasis on negotiations. 
TABLE 9.5: Union density and the t ime devoted t® recruitment by f u l l -
t ime otffieials 
Recruitment Menti 
on© of their Mo 
Ae 
oned by t 
st Time-C 
l lv l t ies 
the ©fffficic 
Sonsumir 
Union Density 
in Core Job 
Yes No Total 
High Density 7 10 17 
Territories Low Density 10 0 10 
TOTAL 17 10 27 
Mote: See Appendix 10 for details of the categorisation of unions 
according to density in core job territories. 
Source: Interviews with 27 union full-time officials, 1989-90. 
The above implies that even by 1989-1990, full-time officials devoted more 
time to recruitment where this was essential simply to maintain existing 
organisation. Thus, the recruitment imperative felt in unions with weakly-
organised core job territories had yet to be matched in all other unions, and 
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in spite of some prioritising of recruitment in the 1980s, the dichotomy between 
the "Organizer" and the "Negotiator" still appeared to be relevant (Brown and 
Lawson, 1973: 437). 
Our interviews suggested that the AEU had greater difficulty than most of the 
other unions in getting full-time officials involved in coordinated recruitment 
campaigns. The officials we interviewed were insistent on the need to 
prioritise servicing over cold-calling unorganised plants. It may be that the 
election of officers made them particularly sensitive to the demands of their 
membership and that this, along with the traditional pattern of recruitment 
through the apprenticeship system in highly-organised plants, militated against 
a reordering of priorities towards new recruitment. It must also be recognised 
that the AEU was at the time of our interviews engaged in a national campaign 
to secure a reduction in the working week in the engineering industry, again 
pointing to the importance of competing priorities. 
The Effeeftiw@n®sg of Unmn Rtmmttmmt Campaigns 
In the final section of this chapter, we briefly evamine the impact of the union 
organising initiatives on membership. More, however, will be said on the 
evaluation of such campaigns in the following chapter. 
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It is clear that the initiatives discussed in this thesis had failed, at least by 
1990, to halt the decline in aggregate union membership. Whilst the rate of 
membership decline slackened from an annual average of 3.7 per cent during 
1980-84 to 1.6 per cent during 1985-89, this was due largely to the 
resumption of employment growth after 1983. In 1989 the rate of decline rose 
to 2.1 per cent, the biggest fall since 1984, whilst the fall in union density 
continued unabated throughout the period. 
Furthermore, whilst particular unions fared rather better than the movement as 
a whole, it is not clear that the observed pattern can be explained by 
differences in recruitment effort, and it appears that employment growth in a 
union's core job territories was a key factor. For example, USDAW claimed 
some success for its "Reach Out" campaign, launched in January 1988, with 
a net increase of 9,517 members during that year. In fact, USDAW's 
membership had stabilised by 1986, and was growing by 1987, and thus 
predates the campaign, appearing to owe much to the growth of employment 
in retailing after 1984. By 1989, USDAW membership was again in decline, 
with a five per cent fall more than cancelling out the growth of the previous two 
years. Similarly, BIFU experienced growth for most of the 1980s, but again 
this appears to be a reflection of employment growth in banking and finance, 
and in fact the union was not quite able to maintain its share of total 
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employment in the sector during the 1980s. (See Appendix 2 for a more 
detailed discussion of membership trends in our sample of unions.) 
Some further evidence on the effectiveness of union recruitment campaigns 
aimed particularly at distant expansion can be found in the TUC's assessment 
of its "Union Yes" pilot campaigns, conducted in Trafford Park, Manchester 
and London's Docklands during 1990. In the Trafford Park campaign, 
conducted during the period 5th to 25th March, 75 companies were selected 
from a list of 500 largely non-union establishments. Public meetings and 
other events were organised, local advertising was arranged, and around 300 
full-time officials and lay activists were involved in approaching companies, 
largely on a cold-call basis. 
The TUC costed the campaign at £78,200, including £52,000 spent on 
advertising alone, but by January 1990 unions were claiming to have recruited 
only 900 new members as a result of the campaign. At over £86 in measured 
direct cost per recruit, this could hardly be seen as an economic success, and 
indeed John Monks, TUC Deputy General Secretary and responsible for the 
campaign, concluded that future campaigns should be organised by the TUC 
regions and at a lower cost. 
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The London Docklands campaign, conducted during 1st to 18th of May, was 
even less successful, with unions claiming to have recruited only 120 new 
members. Thus, whilst the TUC emphasised that the campaigns could bring 
longer-term benefits in terms of a higher union profile in the area, and indeed 
by January 1991 the TUC was claiming that the Trafford Park recruitment total 
had risen to 1,400, it is clear that such a cold-call approach to distant 
expansion faces severe difficulties. 
A constant theme in our research was that recruitment activity competed for 
resources with other priorities, such as servicing existing members and 
campaign work. However, the evidence presented in this chapter shows that 
local full-time officials had been made aware that recruitment was to be a 
priority within their union. In some, though not all of the unions, officials had 
been asked to devote at least a given minimum amount of time specifically to 
recruitment activity, and in several cases officials were required to set aside 
their other activities for a week or so at a time to participate in recruitment 
campaigns. 
All of our unions monitored membership in some way, although unions varied 
in their approach, from a simple membership count on a branch basis, to a 
more detailed evaluation of recruitment activity broken down according to 
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targets and officials. The former was found in unions with very well-organised 
job territories, and where the full-time official's role in recruitment was 
generally limited. 
The latter approach appeared to be undertaken with two aims in mind. Firstly, 
by signalling the priority afforded to recruitment, and perhaps by exerting 
pressure on officials and branches, an effective monitoring system might 
actually increase the level of recruitment effort within the union, particularly 
amongst full-time officials. Secondly, monitoring could provide the necessary 
information for the evaluation of recruitment activity, and so assist in the 
planning and targeting of recruitment campaigns, thus allowing for a more 
effective utilisation of resources. 
On the first point, whilst it was not general practice to set numerical 
recruitment quotas for full-time officials, the systematic monitoring of 
recruitment activity did at least offer the potential for identifying poor 
performers. We heard of only one example where this had resulted in an 
official leaving his job, although it is open to question whether this reflected 
good job performance by officials, a deliberately restrained approach to such 
matters, or a reluctance to discuss such cases with an outside researcher. 
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We came across no examples of remuneration being linked directly to 
recruitment, and it was generally felt that this would be inappropriate, given the 
idealistic motivation of officials, and the fact that recruitment success was to 
a large extent influenced by factors beyond the official's control. We did, 
however, find one regional official who was in favour of such an approach and 
who himself attempted to provide informal rewards for good recruiters, and 
some officials suggested that effective recruiters could be rewarded in the 
longer term by promotion. Thus, whilst unions had not adopted a 
performance-based recruitment culture, there was some evidence of a desire 
to recognise good performance in this area. 
We concluded that full-time officials were spending more time on recruitment 
by the late 1980s. In our interviews, we found that recruitment was the item 
most often referred to as being an increasingly time-consuming part of the 
full-time officials' job, and this was corroborated by the 1987 TUC survey. We 
also found that recruitment was rated as being relatively more time-consuming 
than in studies carried out in earlier years. Clearly, our findings could be 
biased to the extent that officials may have claimed to be doing more than 
they actually were, given the fact that union leaders were exhorting them to 
prioritise recruitment. Only a detailed analysis of work patterns, based 
perhaps on diary studies and systematic observation, could provide more firm 
conclusions on this question. 
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In spite of the apparent progress in prioritising recruitment activity, we found 
continuing differences between unions in the amount of time spent on 
recruitment. It was in those unions which had traditionally given more 
emphasis to the recruitment responsibilities of full-time officials which 
appeared to be further prioritising recruitment activity, whilst officials in those 
unions with relatively well-established core job territories often continued to 
see themselves essentially as negotiators rather than as organisers. We also 
found some suggestion of an uneven reaction to campaigns within particular 
unions (see the following Chapter). 
All this implies that the development of the "recruitment culture", whilst 
apparently in progress, was not complete at the time of our interviews. 
Furthermore, the problems in securing such change must not be 
underestimated, given the traditional autonomy of union officials, their 
competing loyalties to the union centre and to their members, and the fact that 
union tradition and ideology may militate against the use of firm sanctions and 
incentives. Thus, the development of the recruitment culture was likely to be 
a slow process, perhaps even ultimately depending on the gradual inflow of 
a new generation of officials, schooled in the realities of the post-1979 period. 
On the question of making best use of available resources, it is clear that 
many unions were targeting recruitment efforts selectively, choosing targets so 
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as to maximise the return, both in terms of potential recruitment and the ability 
to retain those recruited. Those unions organising in particularly difficult 
sectors, where it was necessary for full-time officials to continually consolidate 
membership, had very limited scope for expansionary recruitment, and their 
priorities were in a sense predetermined. Even here, however, there was clear 
evidence of a carefully targeted and monitored approach in an attempt to 
ensure the best use of scarce resources. 
Targeting was usually done at both national and local levels, and a view that 
came across from many of our interviewees, as well as in the documents we 
studied, was that in spite of the launch of nationally-coordinated campaigns 
in several unions, there was a need for a degree of local autonomy in the 
detailed selection of targets if resources were to be used effectively. 
We found some evidence to support our expectations on the link between 
union characteristics and recruitment targets. We suggested in the previous 
chapter that small unions with weakly organised core job territories could be 
expected to concentrate on distant consolidation, whilst larger unions, with 
well-organised core job territories would be more likely to be able to engage 
in distant expansion. We found some support for this, the main exceptions 
being the limited expansionary recruitment activity of NALGO and NUPE, 
which we attributed to the lack of a general or open tradition in these unions, 
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and the occasional defensive or reactive expansionary campaign undertaken 
even by unions such as BIFU. 
Finally, in spite of attempts by the TUC to develop greater cooperation 
between unions, the increased prioritisation of recruitment appeared in some 
cases to contribute to inter-union rivalry. As an USDAW official put it: 
"It's easier to pinch them from somebody else, far easier, than 
to go out cold." 
(USDAW Divisional Officer) 
Whilst this was by no means a dominating theme in our interviews, 
nevertheless several of our respondents referred to it. It was mentioned 
mainly by officials organising in industries with small, scattered workplaces (i.e 
officials from BIFU, UCATT and USDAW), and by the EETPU officials, who 
claimed that their union had given greater priority to recruitment partly as a 
defensive measure following its expulsion from the TUC in 1988. Officials 
from such unions were the ones tending to spend more time on recruitment, 
and claiming that they were or would like to spend an increasing amount of 
their time on recruitment. This suggests that perceived competition may act 
as a spur to recruitment activity. 
296 
CHAPTER 10 
A CASE STUDY: 
THE TGWU'S LINK UP CAMPAIGN. 1987-1991 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we present a case study of the TGWU's Link Up campaign. 
Our aim is to provide an analysis of the implementation of a national 
recruitment campaign, with particular emphasis on the relationship between 
central coordination and local implementation. We discuss the issues and 
problems raised by a campaign of this type, including the selection of 
recruitment targets, the mobilisation of full-time officials and lay activists, and 
the monitoring of recruitment activity. We conclude the discussion with an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the campaign, in terms of the impact on 
membership and in the eyes of TGWU officials. 
Link Up was chosen as a case study for three reasons. Firstly, the TGWU is 
the largest union in Britain, and Link Up represents the union's major 
recruitment initiative of the late 1980s. Thus, the campaign was likely to be 
one of the most significant initiatives undertaken during this period. Secondly, 
a declared aim of the campaign was to organise hitherto little-unionised 
groups and sectors. Hence, at least on the face of it, Link Up represents an 
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attempt at expansionary recruitment. Finally, the campaign was addressed in 
particular at the peripheral labour force; precisely those sectors felt by many 
to represent the frontiers of trade unionism during the 1980s and 1990s. 
The B@etar@yBHdl to ttha Campaign 
The incentive to launch a major recruitment initiative was provided by two 
factors. Firstly, TGWU membership declined by 708 thousand (equal to 34 per 
cent of the 1979 membership) in the seven years (1979-1986) prior to the 
launch of Link Up. As we have seen, the TGWU was more severely affected 
by declining membership than were most unions. Secondly, the development 
of "flexible" forms of employment, including agency labour and temporary and 
part-time work, along with the growth of female employment, meant that the 
traditional areas of TGWU strength amongst male, full-time, permanent 
employees, were in relative, and at times absolute decline. Given these 
trends, there was by the mid-1980s a growing realisation within the union that 
something had to be done if the TGWU were to avoid a continuing decline in 
its membership, bargaining power and influence. 
However, the bid to organise peripheral workers was not without controversy 
within the union. In 1985, the General Executive Council, recognising the 
growth of agency labour within road transport, sought to lay down conditions 
for the acceptance of agency drivers in unionised workplaces. The union's 
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road transport group, however, opposed these proposals, claiming that such 
agency labour displaced permanent jobs, and the executive's proposals were 
decisively rejected at the union's biennial conference of July 1985. In the 
course of the conference debate, some delegates even argued that such 
drivers should not be allowed into the union, in spite of the fact that the TGWU 
already had a recognition agreement with Manpower. 
However, as the decade progressed with no sign of a change in the political 
climate, and as TGWU membership continued to decline, it was becoming 
increasingly clear that the union must try to come to terms with the growth of 
the peripheral labour force. Even by the middle of the decade there was 
evidence that this was happening. 
In 1985, the TGWU launched its "Living Wage" campaign. Based on a target 
level of minimum terms and conditions to be aimed for by TGWU negotiators, 
the aim was to improve the terms and conditions of low-paid workers and so 
encourage them to join the union. Given the incidence of low pay, the 
campaign had a particular focus on such industries as textiles, hotel and 
catering, agriculture and public services, and on women and young people. A 
national official was given responsibility for ensuring that the campaign was 
developed across the union. Recruitment material was prepared under the 
"Living Wage" slogan, and in 1986 special reduced contribution rates were 
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adopted for part-timers and the young unemployed, reduced rates for YTS 
trainees having already been introduced in 1984. 
The Living Wage campaign was essentially concerned to achieve a target 
wage through existing collective agreements. However, as one TGWU official 
put it to us: 
"...but there were a lot of people below that rate that we were 
not going to achieve it for, because they were unorganised." 
(TGWU Regional Organiser) 
Thus, something more was called for. 
The LayneCu 
Link Up was launched in February 1987 as an attempt to build links between 
the core and peripheral workforces, and in particular to recruit and represent 
the interests of temporary and part-time workers. A launch rally was held at 
the Wembley Conference Centre, attended by the Union's full-time officials 
and senior lay activists, sponsored MPs, and representatives of community 
organisations and the media. With keynote addresses by Neil Kinnock, the 
Leader of the Labour Party, and Ron Todd, the union's General Secretary, the 
aim was to ensure maximum publicity for the campaign, and for the model 
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agreement and the charter of rights for part-time and temporary workers, 
which provided the focus for the initial stages of Link Up. 
In addition, the union held a special weekend seminar for regional secretaries, 
national (trade group) officers and executive officers, to discuss the union's 
approach to the campaign and to recruitment generally. The aim here was to 
try to ensure that the campaign amounted to more than a central publicity 
exercise, and actually led to real recruitment activity on the ground. The union 
had already discussed the need to prioritise recruitment activity for full-time 
officials during a review of officers' jobs and gradings carried out during 1986, 
and had appointed a Regional Organiser in each region with responsibility for 
coordinating recruitment activity. Thus, the early stages of the campaign were 
very much aimed at convincing those inside the union of the need to prioritise 
recruitment. As a TGWU official put it to us in mid-1987: 
"The people we had at the [Wembley] rally were our own officers 
and our own representatives, and it is the creation of a cultural 
change within the union which will have a major effect upon the 
membership and the potential membership...In the early months 
[of the campaign] the major emphasis has really been on 
changing attitudes and gaining cooperation and support from 
within the organisation." 
The national campaign was the responsibility of Bill Morris, Deputy General 
Secretary, and a working party was set up at central office, to coordinate the 
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campaign and to provide guidance to regions. The National Coordinating 
Committee, a quarterly meeting of Regional Organisers and National Officers 
chaired by Bill Morris, was to provide a forum for the discussion of strategy 
and implementation of the campaign, including the analysis of Regional 
Organisers' reports on the progress made in their regions. Whilst Link Up was 
to be a nationwide campaign, regions 5 (the Midlands) and 9 (Yorkshire) were 
chosen to act as pilot regions, and as such were to receive additional support 
from the centre in the initial stages. 
A Link Up "Organiser's Pack" was produced nationally, aimed primarily at lay 
activists. This set out the basic facts on the peripheral labour force, the 
TGWU Charter for Temporary and Part Time Workers, and a model agreement 
regulating the use of such workers to be put to employers by TGWU 
negotiators. In spite of the adoption of Link Up, the union remained opposed 
to the substitution of part-time, temporary and sub-contracted jobs for fu l l -
time, permanent, in-house jobs, except where this was a matter of choice or 
increased opportunities for the workers concerned. Any attempt to organise 
and represent such workers was in some cases therefore a second-best 
option, to be chosen only where the union had failed to secure its preferred 
form of employment. 
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Link Up was seen as a broad-ranging campaign, and involved addressing 
community and welfare issues as well as attempting to recruit members and 
negotiate collective agreements for temporary and part-time employees. 
Thus, in 1988 the union organised "Trade Unions in the Community: ATGWU 
Conference for Social Action Groups". This sought to discuss how the TGWU 
could develop links with the voluntary sector. The aim was to emphasise the 
campaigning, "social justice" aspect of the union, with proposals to offer 
TGWU offices as advice centres, and also to increase the union's membership 
in voluntary organisations (TGWU, no date a). 
Running parallel to Link Up was a programme of measures designed to help 
the union shed its male, white, middle-aged image by adapting its internal 
structures. The setting up of Regional Women's Advisory Committees had 
been approved by conference in 1979, and progress was made during the 
1980s in developing their influence within the union, for example by providing 
for a quarterly report from the RWAC to the Regional Committee and ensuring 
that there was at least one woman from each region in the delegation to the 
TUC and Labour Party conference. The 1987 conference approved the 
establishment of Regional Race Equality Committees along similar lines, and 
a national Equal Opportunities Working Party was set up, as a stop-gap until 
committees had been established in each region. A national women's officer 
and a national officer for race equality were appointed to promote the pursuit 
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of equal opportunities within the union. The union established a national youth 
conference, a national officer was given special responsibility for youth issues, 
and regions were asked to designate an official as youth officer. In March 
1991, it was announced that advisory youth forums were to be set up at 
regional and national levels. 
T t e Ofunrapanginis 
(a) Link Up Phase One, September 1987 to March 1989 
The key feature of Link Up was an attempt to coordinate recruitment activity 
across the union. The 1987 National Action Week was seen as the "kick start" 
for the campaign in the regions. Regional Organisers were asked to develop 
a campaign for the week of 19th to 26th September. Whilst suggested 
activities and campaign materials were produced by the working party at 
central office, and TGWU campaign buses and lorries were available for use 
by regions, the regions themselves were left with considerable autonomy to 
draw up their own schedule of activities and recruitment targets for the week. 
Regional Organisers were to report back to the National Coordinating 
Committee on their region's activities in early November. 
The two pilot regions were given additional assistance by the centre during 
National Action Week, with the aim of securing maximum national media 
coverage for the campaign. 
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Following the national action week, the union selected various national targets 
for particular emphasis on a quarterly basis. In early 1988, regions 2 (the 
South) and 10 (Humberside, Lincolnshire and the East Coast) were added to 
the original pilot regions, and four trade groups, agriculture, construction, 
commercial road transport and public services, were to be the subject of 
concentrated national campaigns for the first quarter of 1988. At the same 
time, a schedule of trade quarterly trade group campaigns was announced to 
cover the period to March 1989 (see Table 10.1). This meant that regions 
were subject to regular requests from the centre to launch new campaigns in 
the specified sectors, and the aim was to maintain the momentum of Link Up 
by developing it into a "rolling recruitment campaign", taking in trade groups 
on a sequential basis (T&G Record, January 1988: 2). 
Thus, Regional Organisers were responsible for ensuring that an ongoing 
programme of recruitment activity was maintained in their regions. Regular 
targeted recruitment campaigns were to be conducted under the Link Up 
banner, with targets selected both centrally and locally. 
305 
TABLE 10.1: MattoimsiB RecirulKtimenf Targets, 1988-9 
T@rg@ii®dl Tradl© 
<Sir@yp 
1st quarter 1988 Agriculture; construction; commercial 
road transport; public services 
2nd quarter 1988 ACTSS; textiles; passenger road 
transport 
3rd quarter 1988 Civil air transport; food, drink and 
tobacco 
4th quarter 1988 Automotive; docks and waterways 
1st quarter 1989 General workers; power and 
engineering; chemicals 
i@yre@: T&G Record, January 1988: 2. 
(b) Phase Two, April 1989 to September 1990 
Following the initial campaigns, the union had decided to broaden Link Up to 
cover all workers rather than just temporaries and part-timers. This was made 
clear in "Link Up: Phase Two", launched on Monday 3rd April 1989, with the 
following three objectives: 
"(1) consolidation of membership in existing strongholds. 
(2) organising and recruiting in new or neglected areas (such 
as temporary and part-time workers, women, young 
people and ethnic minorities). 
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(3) developing our links with the wider community." 
(Action for Link Up: 
Programme for April 1989, TGWU brochure) 
The campaign was to focus on three issues in particular: health and safety, 
training and equal opportunities. These had been identified as key concerns 
of those groups which the union was attempting to recruit. 
During April, the union planned a programme of national and local events, 
including: 
1. An "Equal Opportunities and Childcare" Conference sponsored by the 
TGWU and chaired by Joanna Foster of the Equal Opportunities 
Commission, and with invited representatives from local authorities and 
voluntary organisations. 
2. A TGWU Health and Safety Week to coincide with the TUC Inspection 
Week, involving the launch of a series of Health and Safety News and 
Hazards sheets and a series of workplace health and safety 
inspections. 
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3. The launch of a model training agreement, to help TGWU negotiators 
to press for improved training. 
4. Card inspections and membership audits to be carried out by branches 
and workplaces during April. The aim here was to involve all branch 
secretaries and shop stewards in a bid for 100 per cent membership in 
areas where the union already had recognition agreements. 
The union continued its programme of national and local recruitment 
campaigns. For example during 1989, the union launched a national 
campaign to organise contract cleaners, holding a national delegate cleaner's 
conference in October. Whilst the union restated its opposition to the 
contracting out of services in both the public and private sectors, if recognised 
that where contracting could not be resisted, that the union should attempt to 
organise the workers concerned. Thus, all TGWU branches were urged to 
pressurise their employers to ensure that any contract cleaners were 
unionised, and lay recruitment teams were used in a concerted effort to recruit 
amongst cleaners. 
(c) Link Up for the 90s 
In July 1990 the union announced a two-year programme, approved by the 
general executive council, and designed to continue the Link Up approach. 
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New recruitment and publicity materials were produced, including a TGWU 
video and a members' handbook. 
A third national campaign week was scheduled for the 17th to the 21st 
September 1990, with the same broad aims as the previous year's campaign. 
Once again, health and safety, training and equal opportunities were 
highlighted as key issues, with a national conference on "Women at Work: 
Winning Equal Pay", and a repeat of the card inspection/membership audit 
exercise. In addition, a new campaign was launched, known nationally as 
Recruit-a-Mate, aimed at encouraging ordinary members to recruit 
workmates, friends and relatives into the union. 
The union continued it's community links theme, for example participating in 
an anti-sectarianism campaign aimed at young people in Northern Ireland, and 
launching five joint pilot schemes with the Citizens Advice Bureau, aimed at 
offering the union's advice facilities to members of the public. In addition, the 
union was to emphasise "green" issues, by encouraging its workplace health 
and safety representatives to pursue environmental issues. 
June 1991 saw the launch of a major campaign aimed at recruiting cleaners, 
catering staff and other ancillary workers in local government. Aimed primarily 
at the estimated 250 thousand part-time women workers who were not in a 
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union, the campaign involved a new emphasis on equal rights on pay, 
conditions, pensions and training for women and part-timers, with a demand 
for local authority employers to implement an "equality audit". Also 
emphasised was the need to consolidate local authority membership generally, 
with renewed calls for workplace membership audits. The campaign was to 
run over an extended period, perhaps as long as two years, with lay 
recruitment teams visiting workplaces in each District. The aim was both to 
consolidate membership and also to try to win recognition from private 
contractors. 
In 1991, the plan was to continue the Link Up theme into the future, with 
national action weeks and trade group campaigns. The election of Bill Morris, 
the key architect of Link Up, as the union's General Secretary in 1991 
suggested that the campaigning approach would indeed continue. 
BmpB@m@ntatt§Qifi at Ragienal Leva! 
As has already been emphasised, Link Up was intended to be more than 
simply a national publicity campaign. Hence it is important to examine the 
implementation of the campaign at the local level. 
At the commencement of Link Up, regions were advised by central office to 
draw up "Industrial Area Profiles" on a systematic basis, to assist in the 
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targeting of recruitment efforts at the district level. Initially, districts were 
asked by central office to try to identify three areas where membership could 
be expected to approach 100 per cent, but which had not been checked for 
some time, three areas where the union had a basis of membership and 
recognition but where membership could be extended, and three areas of 
"virgin territory". 
In the Northern region (Region 8) the following targets were chosen for the first 
national action week in September 1987: 
1. Bar staff in Scottish and Newcastle Breweries establishments. Here the 
TGWU already had a recognition agreement covering bar staff, but with 
staff working in scattered workplaces, and with labour turnover as high 
as 100 per cent per annum, membership was often patchy, leaving 
considerable scope for what has been called "distant consolidation". 
2. Bar staff in Vaux Breweries establishments. Here the union had 
recognition agreements covering production and distribution workers, 
but not bar staff, so that whilst the union had generally good relations 
with the company the level of cooperation from the employer was likely 
to be lower than in the Scottish and Newcastle case. This represents 
an attempt at what has been called "close expansion" 
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3. Employees of National Tyre Services. Here again the union had a 
recognition agreement, so that the campaign involved an attempt at 
consolidation. 
The aim here, according to the Regional Organiser concerned, was to target 
a mixture of hard and softer targets, so that at least some sort of positive 
results were likely, in order to guard against demoralisation amongst recruiters. 
In the case of Scottish and Newcastle breweries, for example, the employer 
agreed to write to all managers, informing them of the recruitment campaign 
and requesting their cooperation. Even so, the task was a major one, with 
around 500 establishments to be visited in the region by the 20 or so TGWU 
full-time officials involved. Officials were asked to keep their diaries clear for 
the week of the campaign and the Regional Organiser provided each of them 
with a list of visits and a map. 
The Northern Region also held a campaign to attempt to consolidate 
membership in local authorities, an area where the union had long had 
recognition agreements covering both blue and white collar workers. In one 
local authority, where the majority unions were the GMB, NUPE and NALGO, 
the TGWU was given a list of employees and sent a mailshot aimed at those 
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not in membership of any union. The union claimed a response of some 300, 
providing one of the highlights of the early Link Up campaign in this region. 
Other targets during early phases of Link Up included contract cleaning and 
voluntary organisations, both identified by the union nationally as priority 
recruitment areas. 
Also during 1987, the Northern Regional Organiser sent a circular to branch 
secretaries, urging them to pursue a campaign for 100 per cent membership 
in their workplaces, paying particular attention to the previously neglected 
areas such as part time, temporary and contract workers. 
The Northern Regional Organiser held regular meetings with all District 
Secretaries to plan and coordinate recruitment activity. Targeted recruitment 
campaigns were held approximately once per quarter, when officials were 
asked to try to take a full week out to spend on the campaign. Each District 
Secretary was initially asked to set up a "Lay Member Recruitment Team" of 
four members, to assist them in recruitment on locally and nationally targeted 
campaigns in their district. Finally, District Committees were asked to place 
recruitment as a standing item on their agendas for all meetings, so that 
membership and recruitment opportunities could be discussed on a regular 
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basis. Thus, the aim was to involve all full-time officials and lay activists in a 
coordinated and sustained recruitment effort across the region. 
In the North West (Region 6), in addition to the initial media coverage as a 
result of press releases, the union arranged a week of local radio advertising 
to coincide with the initial week of campaigning on Link Up. The region 
operated four campaign vans, complete with Link Up logos, and stalls were set 
up on local markets. Four main target areas were chosen in the region: bar 
staffs, those working on government training schemes (YTS and Community 
Programme at the time), retailing (with particular emphasis on Sainsbury's), 
and local authorities. An official was assigned as coordinator for each of these 
areas, and full-time officials were asked to report quarterly on their efforts in 
each of these target areas in particular. Of course, officials were also 
expected to continue recruitment activity in their other areas of responsibility. 
Again recruitment was made an agenda item for every district committee within 
the region. District Secretaries required a detailed programme of recruitment 
activity from committees, setting out a schedule of targets and activities, with 
dates and details of personnel and resources to be used. 
The intention of the union was that whilst major national and local campaigns 
would be mounted from time to time, Link Up would be an ongoing exercise, 
with a sustained emphasis on recruitment by all the union's full-time officials 
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and lay activists. Thus, recruitment targets were constantly reviewed at 
national and local levels, and the selection of particular targets did not 
necessarily mean that other areas were to be ignored. Thus, one Regional 
Organiser explained to us his belief that officials should play a part in selecting 
their own targets, where promising recruitment opportunities presented 
themselves. 
A particular feature of Link Up in all regions was the use of lay member 
recruitment teams. This was a national policy of the union, initially adopted 
during the Living Wage campaign. It reflected a recognition that full-time 
official resources were scarce and subject to the competing demands of 
servicing the existing membership, so that there was a need to supplement 
these resources in a relatively low-cost way. Whilst most unions emphasise 
the responsibility of lay members to consolidate membership in their own 
workplaces, the TGWU's Lay Member Recruitment Teams differed from most 
in that they were to be used beyond their own workplaces in campaigns aimed 
both at distant consolidation and at expansion. 
Many lay recruitment team members were retired, unemployed or worked part 
time, although some took days off work or were released by their employer. 
Whilst formal training was often limited, with most drawing on their experience 
of recruiting in their own workplaces, the union produced a Link Up 
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"Organiser's Pack" (see above), and regions held briefings on recruitment 
methods and best practice. 
Lay recruiters were usually deployed in teams of between two and four people. 
The aim was usually to have an experienced activist as the core team 
member, with a full-time official in attendance where other commitments 
allowed. On industrial estates, lay teams were used to canvass workers, 
mainly at the factory gate. In some cases the teams would be accompanied 
by a TGWU publicity vehicle complete with loudspeaker and campaign 
materials. Much of this work was on a "cold-call" basis, aimed largely at un-
unionised workplaces. 
Lay recruitment teams were also used to assist in the consolidation of 
membership in areas such as local authorities and the public services. For 
example, they might visit scattered establishments such as schools in an 
attempt to consolidate membership amongst cleaners. Here, where employers 
were sympathetic, access to workplaces might be arranged in advance, either 
by the full-time official responsible for the team or, in the case of more 
experienced teams, by the lay recruiters themselves. 
It was envisaged that the public services campaign launched in June 1991, 
would make particularly heavy use of lay recruitment teams, drawn from 
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amongst the lay membership working in the targeted occupations. Local 
authorities were to be approached for the release of perhaps two to four 
people in a district, for a period of up to three months. These members would 
then be provided with a week's recruitment training, before going out as 
recruiters. Most were part-time workers, and they were to work their usual 
hours, being paid their normal hourly rate by the union, plus meals and 
expenses. The bill for this activity was to be met ultimately from central funds, 
the campaign having been approved by the general executive committee. 
Lay recruiters were not usually involved in dealing with potential members' 
problems or approaching employers, the aim being to publicise the union and 
to attempt to recruit individual workers into membership. Where a core of 
members was developed in a particular establishment, or employees 
requested a meeting with a representative of the union, then it was usually the 
responsibility of the full-time official to follow this up. In general, formal 
contact with employers was to be left to the full-time official. 
Link Up recruitment campaigns were often characterised by an innovative 
approach. There was a conscious effort to design more attractive recruitment 
literature, often aimed at particular target groups. Local radio and press 
advertising was used in several regions, and the union even took out an 
advertising billboard at Yarmouth races as part of the campaign to recruit 
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stable lads. Many regions invested in recruitment caravans or minibuses, 
which could be taken onto industrial estates, town centres, and so on, in an 
attempt to publicise the union. Public meetings, press conferences, 
sponsorship of sporting and cultural events, and various other means were 
used to promote the union, with an emphasis on attempting to create an image 
as a caring, community-based organisation. 
All this was complemented by reforms in the internal structures and policies 
of the union, designed to promote the involvement of young people, women 
and ethnic minorities. 
Ewaflygifttoira 
Link Up appeared to involve a prioritisation of recruitment activity within the 
union, an allocation of resources to recruitment in terms of the time of full-time 
officials and lay members, the selective targeting of recruitment activity, and 
the systematic monitoring of that activity. Thus, Link Up amounted to more 
than simply a national publicity campaign. But did it work? In this section, we 
attempt an evaluation of Link Up, from the point of view of the full-time 
officials involved in implementing the campaign, and in terms of its impact on 
membership, union recognition and collective bargaining. We end this section 
with a brief discussion of some of the organisational issues raised by Link Up. 
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According to the central office, regional and district officials we interviewed, 
Link Up involved full-time officials spending more time on recruitment than 
they had done previously. The requirement to take time out for recruitment 
clearly affected the work pattern of full-time officials, and did at times conflict 
with their servicing responsibilities: 
"The other difference [with Link Up] is this taking out of a chunk 
of time from an officer's job to devote to recruitment... If a 
problem arises you've got to make your mind up which one you 
do... You've got to say to yourself 'Am I likely to lose more 
members if I don't deal with that than I'll gain if I deal with this?"' 
One Regional Organiser summed up his view of the Link Up recruitment 
campaigning as follows: 
"I'm glad to say, without too much push, it does happen. They 
[officials and lay activists] know the role they've got to play. 
There are people who feel they ought to be doing more, but., if 
you fall on so many rocks there's a lull from time to time and 
you've got to build up the enthusiasm again," 
However, there was a view, expressed by two of the three Regional 
Organisers we interviewed, that the response was at times uneven: 
"We have some difficulty in trying to get people who have been 
full-time officials for some time to understand the necessity of 
actively seeking new recruits, in as much as in the old days... 
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people tended to come in droves and surrender themselves at 
the counter, arising out of a problem or something." 
And also: 
"We've had difficulty in trying to activate some of our districts. 
They can't see the necessity to sit down and plan recruitment, 
and to target areas and go out and look. So the response to 
[Link Up] has been to some extent a patchy response." 
Both the proximity of the district to regional office and the enthusiasm of 
particular officials were seen as key factors explaining the different responses 
of districts. With no real sanctions at their disposal, Regional Organisers had 
to rely on exhortation and on publicising the achievements of the committed 
districts in order to elicit a response from less enthusiastic officials and 
districts. 
Thus, even by 1990 there was a consensus amongst senior officers of the 
TGWU that the union still needed to do more to develop a "recruitment 
consciousness" amongst officials (TGWU, 1990: 10) 
As regards the use of lay recruitment teams, the full-time officials we 
interviewed were generally aware of the possible advantages of using lay 
members in recruitment. For example, in the case of recruiting young people: 
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"It would be no good me going in in my suit. We were seen as 
the establishment, even though we were union officials. So what 
we had to do was get people nearer their age group, who 
dressed more like them. The chap in overalls was more likely 
to recruit the YTS than the union official." 
This view is consistent with research in the USA on union organising, which 
has emphasised the importance of having a recruiter with whom the target 
group can readily identify (Karsh et al, 1953; Northrup, 1989), and with the 
suggestion that more women officers could help unions in the recruitment of 
women (Heery and Kelly, 1988; 1989). 
Officials also recognised that the use of lay teams was a useful complement 
to full-time officials: 
"They [lay recruiters] do an excellent job, and they are able to 
spend the time that an officer doesnt have in leafletting 
companies when the officer has had to move away to represent 
someone or to do a wage deal... then they can still concentrate 
their time on the companies concerned." 
However, certainly in one district we looked at, the experience of using lay 
recruitment teams appeared to have been mixed. Enthusiastic lay member 
teams were set up for the initial National Action Week and sent out with full-
time officials to canvass local industrial estates on a "cold call" basis. 
However, having met with a seemingly indifferent response at the majority of 
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establishments visited, their enthusiasm quickly waned, and the volunteer 
response for the second campaign was, in the words of the District Secretary, 
"fairly minimal". 
"As an officer you gradually get round to know what's happening 
after a while, whereas them poor devils [the lay recruitment 
teams] got into it, met that hostility and suddenly said 'How's 
this?'. They couldn't rationalise it compared to where they'd 
been; a union environment." 
And from another official: 
"The lay people,., their lifestyle is based on their plant; their 
organisation within that plant. They've been the king in that 
particular area and they don't know what the world is like 
outside. They think they do. I'm not being hypercritical of them. 
I try not to be... If you're in a plant where you can go to the boss 
and say 'Get stuffed'... you don't realise that the ordinary guy in 
another establishment just can't do that." 
Availability of lay members to recruit during working hours was clearly 
restricted, unless the union could negotiate their release from their employer 
and meet their wages. In addition: 
"You don't always get the people you want. People may be 
keen, but they're not necessarily the best recruiters." 
Nevertheless, it seems that a small hard core of keen and relatively effective 
lay recruiters was developed, and officials emphasised the importance of 
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numbers in a recruitment team, so that even those who did little more than 
"come along for the ride" were able to make at least some sort of contribution. 
The union appeared to have most success with lay recruitment teams in local 
government and the public services, where recognition existed, at least from 
the public sector employers, but where scattered workplaces were common 
and part-time hours the norm, making for a classic case of distant 
consolidation. Significantly, lay recruitment teams were to be used as the 
mainstay of the public services campaign, launched in the spring of 1991. 
What did the Link Up campaign actually achieve in terms of membership? 
Table 10.2 shows that TGWU membership continued to decline throughout the 
1980s, in spite of the launch of Link Up at the beginning of 1987, and that the 
TGWU's decline continued to be more marked than that of other unions until 
1989. Certainly there was little evidence of any initial impact on TGWU 
membership, with an acceleration in its rate of decline in 1988, a year earlier 
than for other unions, although in 1989 the percentage decline was greater for 
other unions. These figures must be treated with some caution, not least 
because the TGWU and some other unions were computerising their 
membership records during this period, which tended to eliminate some over-
recording of membership by branches, particularly during 1988 and 1989 in the 
case of the TGWU (Joe Irvin, Head of TGWU Policy Support Unit, private 
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correspondence, 13 May 1991). However, Link Up had clearly failed to halt 
the decline in membership. 
TABLE 10.2: T@WU Mtsimteirasli'aop, 1979-8! 
Ynsiir 
Umtofi Md 
(OC 
iinnilbtirslhiip 
X)8) 
ABurjyul % 0@©Dflmi@ 
TGWU AM Oftheire T<SWU Ail Offliere 
1979 2086 11126 
1980 1887 10749 9.54 3.39 
1981 1696 10615 10.12 1.25 
1982 1633 10111 3.71 4.75 
1983 1547 9753 5.27 3.54 
1984 1491 9573 3.62 1.85 
1985 1434 9385 3.82 1.96 
1986 1378 9220 3.91 1.76 
1987 1349 9131 2.10 0.97 
1988 1313 9074 2.67 0.62 
1989 1271 8773 3.20 3.32 
i@yirig<§: Annual Report of the Certification Officer. 
(Shows membership as at 31 December.) 
However, whilst Link Up may not have been able to reverse the decline in 
membership in the short term, this does not necessarily mean that the 
campaign was not worthwhile. As one Regional Organiser put it: 
"While the campaign may have brought the attention of the union 
to the employees of non-organised companies, and if the 
political and economic climate changes we may derive some 
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benefit from the activity and initiatives during the campaign the 
initial response to both campaigns [1987 and 1989] was 
disappointing. 
"Recruitment did take place in a number of establishments, but 
they were threes and fours and quickly fell by the wayside once 
pressurised by their management or [when] recognition was not 
achieved." 
(Dixon, 1989) 
Thus, whilst the campaign perhaps did not have as great an immediate payoff 
as the union would have liked, there might be longer-term benefits through 
raising the profile of the union, so that where workers felt the need for union 
representation in the future they would be aware of what the TGWU had to 
offer. This view is, of course, consistent with the explanation of union growth 
as being largely determined by environmental factors, with union campaigns 
and policies simply exploiting the underlying recruitment opportunities and 
influencing the incidence of union growth between unions, rather than the 
overall level of growth (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976; Bain and Price, 1983). 
In spite of the inability to halt the decline in membership, the TGWU officials 
we interviewed remained fairly committed to Link Up, and claimed that it had 
been quite successful in terms of recruitment. In one region, with a total 
membership of around 60 thousand, we were told that the union recruited 11 
thousand new members during 1989, and in another region we were told of 
an average recruitment rate of around six thousand per quarter during 1989. 
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Regular features on Link Up in the union's newspaper were able to point to 
evidence of the campaign's success in recruiting new members (T&G Record, 
November 1987: 5; January 1988: 2; June 1989: 10-11; October 1990: 10-
11). 
As Table 10.3 shows, whilst the TGWU continued to experience a net loss of 
members in the late 1980s, in fact the union improved its recruitment 
performance. During the period 1985 to 1989, it recruited almost one and a 
quarter million members, with 1989 in particular showing a marked upturn in 
recruitment. The problem appeared to be the outflow of members. Whilst a 
reduction in losses was recorded in 1987, this trend was reversed in 1988 and 
deteriorated even further in 1989. 
One official even went so far as to claim that: 
"We're possibly organising at a higher rate than we did during the 
1970s, in the good times... but the turnover, the loss [is the problem]." 
Other officials certainly echoed that membership loss was the real difficulty 
faced by the union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A District Secretary 
described the difficulties faced in attempting to recruit workers in the peripheral 
labour market. Of the National Action Week campaign to recruit bar staff at 
Scottish and Newcastle Breweries and Vaux in 1987 he said: 
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TABLE 10.3: T@WU Rffleimibeirshllif sea, 1©8 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Membership, 1 January (1) 
Membership Lost (2) 
Members Recruited (3) 
Membership, 31 December (4) 
1,491 
277 
220 
1,434 
1,434 
294 
238 
1,378 
1,378 
270 
241 
1,349 
1,349 
281 
245 
1,313 
1,313 
324 
282 
1,271 
Net Membership Loss: 
Thousands 
% of 1 January 
57 
3.82 
56 
3.91 
29 
2.10 
36 
2.67 
42 
3.20 
(1) & (4) from Annual Reports of the Certification Officer. 
(2) equals (1) plus (3) minus (4) 
(3) from TGWU Record, September 1990, p10. 
"The problem I found was that yes, we recruited them, but within 
a very short space of time we lost them. There's a hell of a 
turnover of labour in these part-time and temporary industries, 
so that we are running fast to stand still." 
Thus, retention of those recruited was a problem not only in establishments 
where recognition had not been won, it could also be difficult with respect to 
those groups of peripheral workers who had high levels of labour turnover. 
Consolidation of any gains made through Link Up was therefore always likely 
to be difficult and recruitment successes were likely to lead to higher 
membership turnover. 
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Not surprisingly, then, the union increasingly concerned itself with retention as 
Link Up wore on. In launching the third (1990) stage of the campaign in the 
union's journal the Deputy General Secretary claimed that: 
"Recruitment is on a rising curve in the union but so is 
membership turnover." 
(T&G Record, August 1990: 11) 
The question of retention was specifically addressed in a number of initiatives. 
Branch membership audits encouraged lay members to check that 
membership levels were maintained. Leaflets were produced, urging those 
retiring or leaving a job for other reasons to retain their membership in order 
to take advantage of the range of TGWU benefits and services. From 1989 
temporary workers were allowed to pay a reduced contribution rate of only 
three pence per week during spells out of work, thus allowing them to maintain 
continuous membership for benefit purposes and retaining them in the union 
pending their taking up another job. 
To what extent did the campaign actually succeed in breaking into new job 
territories? Close expansion was pursued in the case of groups which had in 
the past been on the periphery of collective agreements, for example with bar 
staff at Vaux and in the case of temporary workers generally. Distant 
expansion was attempted by full-time officials and also through the lay 
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recruitment teams, campaigning on industrial estates. The latter was, of 
course, the most difficult and appeared to offer the least tangible gains, at 
least in the short term. 
The officials we interviewed could tell us of only a handful of new recognition 
deals won in recent years. A successful bid for recognition at Industrial 
Clothing Services Limited in Ayrshire, following eight years of recruitment and 
a one day strike over pay, was seen by the local District Secretary as "...our 
biggest success for a decade", and yet the plant employed only 175 people 
(T&G Record, September 1990: 5). Other campaigns, such as at Sainsburys 
and at Ladbrokes, often achieved a great deal of publicity but failed to win 
either recognition or a sustainable membership base. It is perhaps not 
surprising that, following the conspicuous lack of immediate success in the 
Ladbroke Hotels campaign of 1987, the union tended to give a high profile to 
the overall Link Up theme and to broad sectors rather than to specific 
company targets. 
A content analysis of the union's newspaper (T&G Record) for the period 
November 1987 to April 1991 revealed a similar lack of new recognition 
agreements, with only five reported cases of recognition being won for the first 
time. Far more common were reports of continuing efforts to recruit and win 
recognition, and there were four reported cases of employers actually 
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withdrawing recognition. Whilst not all new recognition deals may be reported 
in the union's journal, we are left with the conclusion that Link Up appears to 
have failed to result in the widespread winning of new recognition deals. We 
return to the issue of securing recognition in the following chapter. 
Much of the recruitment activity in Link Up appeared to be aimed at 
consolidating areas of existing membership and recognition, and it was in such 
areas that many of the recruitment successes were achieved. Branch 
secretaries and shop stewards were asked to pursue 100 per cent campaigns 
within their workplaces, lay recruitment teams and mailshots were used to 
consolidate membership in scattered local authority workplaces, and full-time 
officials also participated in campaigns aimed at distant consolidation. Indeed, 
as Link Up developed it is possible to detect something of a shift away from 
targeting the high-profile campaigns on expansion towards focusing them on 
consolidation. In doing this, the union appeared to be trying to learn from its 
successes and failures, the selection of local government as a priority target 
in 1991 being a clear example of this. 
Link Up involved an increase in inter-union competition, both in the above 
consolidation campaigns in local authorities, and in certain attempts to extend 
recruitment into new territory. An example of the latter is provided by the 
launching of a new Hotel, Catering and Leisure section of the union in January 
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1990. The sector was seen as offering major recruitment opportunities for the 
union, given the employment growth and currently low levels of union 
organisation. The TGWU announced its intention to withdraw from the 
agreement which had regulated inter-union competition by restricting unions 
to organising in their agreed sphere of influence, arguing that this had 
hampered union organising attempts by allowing employers to use it as a 
shield. 
As we saw above, Link Up began as a campaign aimed specifically at part-
time and temporary workers. Thus, any evaluation of the campaign must 
consider its achievements in improving the terms and conditions of such 
workers. The union claimed several successes, including resisting the 
contracting-out of school meals in Cambridgeshire, the winning of a favourable 
pay settlement and permanent job status for temporary workers at Yardley 
cosmetics after a month-long strike, Ford's concession of common terms and 
conditions for contracted-out canteen workers, and several cases of equal pay 
and pension rights for temporary and contract cleaners and others (T&G 
Record, various issues). However, even where the union claimed to have won 
improved terms for such staff it is not altogether clear that this was the result 
of union pressure as opposed to the employer's reaction to demographic 
trends and skills shortages (Atkinson, 1989b). 
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To what extent did the Link Up campaign represent "value for money" for the 
union? According to our interviews, whilst there was a specific budget for 
publicity and literature (the national budget was initially set at £100,000 
[Industrial Relations Services, 1987b]), there were no recruitment budgets as 
such at regional level. This reflects the difficulty in directly attributing specific 
costs to the campaign. Whilst items such as the national launch rally, radio 
and newspaper advertising, and literature clearly involved identifiable additional 
costs for the union, the main cost involved was the time of officials. Since no 
additional officials were appointed specifically for the campaign, such costs 
were in a sense hidden, falling on officials in terms of increased workload and 
on members to the extent that servicing might suffer as a result. 
The benefits of Link Up were similarly difficult to quantify, given the possible 
long-term effect of raising the general profile of the union, and indeed of 
unions generally. This point is particularly important, given that the stated 
aims of Link Up included opening the union up to previously-neglected groups 
and developing the union's profile in the community through the campaigning 
work, and so contributing towards the favourable public image of the union 
movement. 
The comments of one of the District Secretaries we spoke to were particularly 
interesting. When asked whether or not Link Up was cost effective, he replied: 
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"The response I got from the Deputy General Secretary when I 
asked that we should examine our costs, was that we can't 
afford not to do it. Our job is not to run precisely like a business. 
Although I accept that we have to run an economic organisation. 
As a District Secretary I accept that part of my job is to see that 
this place is run as efficiently and as cost effectively as possible. 
I acknowledge that; but that doesn't mean that I should always 
judge everything on whether there is a return. The return to us 
is people; a trade union is people." 
To the extent that such a view is shared by those responsible for launching 
campaigns, we would not expect recruitment effort to be evaluated purely in 
terms of the contributions revenue raised from those recruited. 
Link Up raised a number of organisational issues within the union, many of 
which were discussed at a seminar of senior officers (senior executive officials, 
regional secretaries, regional organisers and national officers) in January 1990. 
Most present at the seminar agreed that Link Up had had the indirect benefit 
of increasing communications between regions and central office, although it 
was felt by many that the campaign had involved too much of a "top-down" 
emphasis. Many campaigns were initiated by National Officers at the trade 
group level and then communicated to regions for implementation. With fifteen 
trade groups, each with their own priorities, there was a danger that regions 
could be subjected to a series of ill-coordinated and possibly competing 
demands. One Regional Organiser we spoke to felt that National Officers 
tended to lack an overall perspective and "...tend to become insulated within 
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their own trade groups." The seminar came to the view that this lack of 
coordination meant that full-time officials might experience conflicting demands 
on their time, with the danger that their ability to effectively service existing 
members might be compromised, thus damaging membership retention. 
The National Coordinating Committee offered a possible forum to deal with 
these issues of coordination and prioritisation. However, one Regional 
Organiser we spoke to felt that the NCC had been disappointing during the 
first three years of Link Up, in that it had tended to concentrate on discussing 
Regional Organiser's reports on campaign implementation and had failed to 
develop a more strategic role. He felt that the committee needed to be "given 
more teeth", thereby giving Regional Organisers a greater input into the 
prioritisation of nationally-targeted campaigns. The view that regions must 
have a major influence over the prioritisation of campaigns was broadly 
accepted by the Senior Officers' Seminar: 
"The point was made, and generally accepted, that recruitment 
could not be totally directed from national level, a certain amount 
of regional flexibility is required, with full consultation at all levels 
of the union. But deciding priorities should involve some local 
determination, because this was the level at which specialist 
knowledge existed." 
(TGWU, 1990: 9) 
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Finally, there was also concern from some participants in the seminar that the 
union had placed too much emphasis on the Link Up theme, with the danger 
that the Link Up logo was more prominent than the name of the union on 
much of the campaign material. 
As membership continued to decline into the 1990s in spite of Link Up, there 
was increasing concern within the union at the TGWU's poor image amongst 
employers, with the union often being seen as a militant organisation. Thus: 
"It was also felt that we must improve our relationships with 
employers. This had not been a priority in the past, and had led 
to poor relations, which meant that opportunities had been lost. 
Consequently we were entering 'beauty contests' with an in-built 
disadvantage." 
Whilst the TGWU had long critiscised the EETPU-style of directly approaching 
employers with the offer of single-union no-strike deals, it had become 
painfully clear that the failure to win employer recognition was often a major 
barrier to effective recruitment and retention. In 1989 the union had followed 
the example of the EETPU and GMB-MATSA in producing "A Prospectus for 
Growth: The Route to Effective Industrial Relations", a brochure setting out the 
s\i9iair© 
(TGWU, 1990: 10) 
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advantages for employers in recognising the TGWU. Launched by Deputy 
General Secretary Bill Morris at the 1989 Institute of Personnel Management 
conference at Harrogate, the brochure was written in highly collaborative 
language, with a introduction by Ron Todd, the union's General Secretary, 
claiming that: 
"We are single-minded in our objective to provide the best 
possible environment for industry to operate successfully and 
safely." 
The brochure was to be used in approaching employers, and whilst the TGWU 
stopped short of offering some of the kinds of deals struck by the EETPU, and 
whilst one may question whether or not such a brochure would be sufficient 
to counter any image problems that the union might have, nevertheless its 
launch demonstrates an awareness of the need to compete effectively with 
other unions in the "market" for employer recognition. 
Oonelusions 
The Link Up case study illustrates how a union had to begin by mobilising its 
own officials and lay activists behind a recruitment campaign. Thus, in the 
early stages, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the internal launch, and 
whilst some progress was made in getting full-time officials and lay members 
more involved in recruitment, even by 1990 many in the union recognised that 
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the necessary "recruitment culture" amongst full-time officials was by no 
means complete, so that the response to Link Up at district level, whilst 
significant, was nevertheless uneven. The notion of changing the culture of 
the organisation to reflect the prioritisation of recruitment was echoed by 
officials we interviewed in some of the other unions (see previous Chapter). 
The Link Up case study suggested that whilst there was no rigorous cost-
benefit appraisal of recruitment activity as such, so far as the selection of 
recruitment targets was concerned it appeared that the TGWU, in common 
with the other unions studied, was targeting its recruitment efforts selectively. 
However, in spite of the fact that Link Up was essentially a national campaign, 
regional and district officials argued that there was a need for local flexibility 
in the selection of detailed recruitment targets if resources were to be used 
effectively. 
Whilst Link Up began very clearly as an attempt to extend union organisation 
to new groups, the campaign came to include several initiatives aimed at 
consolidating membership in existing areas of organisation, and the union 
became increasingly concerned with retention as the campaign progressed. 
Some of the most often-quoted "successes" of Link Up involved what was 
essentially distant consolidation, often in competition with other unions, and 
many of the high profile attempts at expansion failed to result in significant 
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advances, at least in the short term. In the latter areas, lack of recognition 
was usually seen as a major stumbling block, and it is significant that by 1990 
the union was trying to improve its image with employers, in an attempt to 
become more competitive in the "employer market for trade unionism" 
(Willman.1989). 
The latter development is particularly interesting, and suggests that the 
TGWU's "militant" image, which served it well in attracting groups of 
disaffected employees during the 1970s, became something of a liability in the 
1980s. As one official explained: 
"We would be flavour of the month with workers. The trouble is, 
we're not flavour of the month with employers". 
(TGWU Regional Organiser) 
The implication is, of course, that there may be a trade off between developing 
an appeal aimed at the "employee market" and one aimed at the "employer 
market". Other unions, may have had more success in combining the two 
approaches, but so far as the TGWU was concerned, this appeared to be a 
problem. 
From a social perspective, the TGWU aimed to present a positive image, 
playing down the view of unions as representatives of a narrow sectional 
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interest group, and to link recruitment with the broader social aims of the 
union, emphasising community as well as workplace involvement. As such, 
Link Up could be seen as an expression of what Watson (1988: 185) refers to 
as "campaigning unionism", in contrast to the narrow business unionism 
associated with unions such as the EETPU. We return to these themes in the 
concluding chapter of the thesis. 
Whilst the campaign had failed to halt the decline in membership by the end 
of the 1980s, there was some evidence of an increase in numbers recruited. 
Membership retention was, however, a key problem, and this was increasingly 
emphasised as the campaign developed. Many officials remained committed 
to the idea of Link Up, if only because of the lack of an alternative approach. 
Some officials rationalised the continuing effort in terms of possible future 
gains, when a more favourable political and economic environment would lead 
to those seeking union representation flocking to the high-profile TGWU. 
The failure of this and other recruitment campaigns to reverse the decline in 
union membership by the early 1990s, suggests that the mobilisation of full-
time officials and lay members behind a campaign was by no means a 
sufficient condition for significant union growth. We therefore need to consider 
in more detail the difficulties faced by union organisers in this period. This is 
the task of the next chapter. 
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CMAFTER M 
THE EIPEMENCE OF UMON OEGAMSMG 
llrctroriiuicttlom 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the experience of union organising 
activity during the late 1980s and early 1990s. We seek to explain why the 
new organising initiatives generally met with at most only limited success. 
We show that recruitment, particularly of an expansionary form, became 
increasingly difficult during the 1980s, not least because of the attitudes of 
employers and government to trade unions. We highlight the key difficulties 
faced by union organisers during this period, and we develop an idealised 
model of the organising process. Again, the analysis of the chapter is based 
largely on interviews with full-time union organisers. 
Tn@ Exparisine© tit Union Organising 
Table 11.1 presents a summary of the main obstacles to recruitment and 
retention identified by our interviewees. We have grouped these under four 
headings: those relating to the intrinsic nature of the industry or occupation 
concerned (structural factors), those relating to the attitudes of employees, 
those relating to employer actions, and those relating to the practices of the 
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TABLE 11.1: Obstacles to Recruitment and Retention 
Recruitment Retention 
Structural Factors: 
Competition from staff 
associations (Banking) 
High labour turnover. 
Temporary sites (construction) 
Employer Factors: 
Refuses access to workforce. 
Refuses recognition. 
Victimisation of trade 
unionists. 
Employer does not 
recommend union 
membership 
Refuses recognition 
Refuses check off 
Employee Factors: 
Lack of understanding of 
trade unions. 
Apathy. 
Free-rider mentality. 
Part-time and temporary 
workers feel not worthwhile. 
Low paid say cannot afford 
I union contributions. 
Temporary/casual workers do not 
retain membership once move jobs. 
Non-craft members do not retain 
membership once move jobs as lack 
union tradition. 
Union Factors: 
Failure to recruit shop 
stewards. 
Failure to approach potential 
members. 
Lack of regular card checks. 
Poor communications with members. 
Poor response to demands for 
servicing 
Source: Interviews with local full-time officials, 1989-90. 
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union or its representatives. All of these factors were mentioned by at least 
three of the officials interviewed, so that the list is representative of the main 
problems faced by our sample of unions during this period. 
Rather than discuss each of the above factors in isolation, we structure our 
discussion of the experience of union organising around the four types of 
recruitment identified earlier: close consolidation, distant consolidation, close 
expansion and distant expansion. 
(a) Close Consolidation 
Close consolidation involves recruiting those who are not members of the 
union in an establishment which is already relatively highly-organised, and 
where union recognition exists. Even here, union density may fall well below 
a hundred per cent, not only because of those individuals who object to joining 
a union, but also because of new starters. Several of the local union officers 
interviewed suggested that membership density often fell simply because new 
starters were not asked to join the union. 
In many unions, this type of recruitment tended to be carried out mainly by 
shop stewards and workplace representatives or by branch officials. Indeed, 
this was traditionally the major role of the steward in many unions. NALGO, 
for example, published a detailed "Stewards Guide to Recruitment" (NALGO, 
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no date) outlining the stewards' role as the union's main recruiters, and 
emphasising the importance of the personal approach and the need for the 
steward to maintain close and regular contact with his or her constituents. 
Other unions produced similar material. 
The ideal model for this is the large workplace, with a strong network of 
representatives enjoying the cooperation of the employer. The provision of 
check-off, access to new starters, and facilities for union representatives are 
valuable aids to this form of recruitment activity. 
Thus, the full-time officer may leave this type of recruitment almost entirely to 
lay people in establishments where the union is recognised. Indeed, this is the 
essence of well-organised, self-sustaining trade unionism and under these 
circumstances recruitment may become a routine matter. Kelly and Heery 
(1989) refer to this as "passive recruitment". A TGWU District Officer summed 
up the view of most of those we interviewed: 
"What we find is that where we are already organised and 
recognised by the employer, we'll have established, even in this 
day and age, a steward or representative on site who will mop 
[new starters] up as soon as they come in... It's where we've not 
got recognition that we've got a problem". 
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An AEU official described the process of close consolidation as follows: 
"Our union, we are very traditional... we were basically a skilled 
union... we operated in the traditional industries. The pattern 
has been that people serve an apprenticeship... and either 
during the apprenticeship, or when you came out of your time, 
the fashion was that you joined a union... nobody really thought 
of doing anything else. If you were a fitter, you proved you were 
a fitter when you had your union card. 
This was our traditional way of recruitment and, indeed, it still is 
in the big well-established companies. We dont find a great 
problem there at the present, apart from the fact that the number 
of apprenticeships has gone down and so therefore we've found 
that we aren't recruiting young members". 
(AEU Regional Officer) 
Clearly, consolidation was not necessarily a problem in well-organised 
establishments, where there was a tradition of trade unionism. Survey 
evidence suggests that workplace trade unionism survived the recession of the 
early 1980s and the political and economic challenges of that decade 
remarkably well (Batstone, 1984; Millward and Stevens, 1986; Maclnnes, 
1987), whilst derecognition of unions was the exception (Towers, 1988; 
Claydon, 1989). 
Whilst our interviewees claimed that close consolidation remained largely 
unproblematic in most cases, this optimistic picture must be qualified on at 
least three counts. Firstly, the withdrawal of legal support for the closed 
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shop during the 1980s, the possibility of further legislation on check-off, and 
the need for continued cooperation from the employer if consolidation were to 
be handled effectively, meant that even this form of recruitment could not 
necessarily be taken for granted in the future. In a few instances, employers 
had recently withdrawn check-off facilities, so that some unions were 
responding by encouraging members to pay their contributions by direct debit. 
Secondly, there was a suggestion from some officials that even the well-
organised workplaces were making increasing demands on the full-time 
official. As we saw in Chapter 9, many officials claimed that they were coming 
under an increasing burden from members' casework and from requests for 
assistance from shop stewards. Such demands, whilst not necessarily 
amounting to the full-time official taking over the shop steward's role, 
nevertheless took up an increasing amount of the officials' time, and arguably 
made it more difficult for him to devote his attention to organising in other 
sectors. 
Finally, as the above AEU officials implied, a major problem arises when the 
traditional job territories contract as the number of recruits declines. Thus, 
even where close consolidation continued to represent a relatively easy and 
cheap form of recruitment, it became increasingly necessary for unions to look 
to other types of recruitment in the face of structural change. 
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(b) Distant Consolidation 
Distant consolidation involves recruiting in widely-spread, often low-density, 
establishments which are, however, covered by recognition agreements. For 
example, banking, retailing and private-sector construction are all 
characterised by union recognition at the industry or enterprise-level, but their 
workforces tend to be scattered into large numbers of comparatively small 
establishments spread over a wide geographical area. 
Under distant consolidation, the union tends to be less able to depend on lay 
representatives to carry out the day to day recruitment activity, since 
workplace trade unionism is more difficult to sustain in small, scattered 
establishments and where the focus of union activity is at the national 
enterprise or industry level. The large number of part-time workers and 
women in banking and retailing, and the prevalence of self-employment and 
the transitory nature of employment in private-sector construction add to the 
difficulties in these particular industries. Such industries had never been 
characterised by closed shop agreements. 
An USDAW Divisional Officer pointed to the relative lack of lay involvement in 
recruitment in his own union: 
"Well, we always hope that lay members would recruit. We 
always urge them to, but we don't get the same response that 
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the AEU get, even in places of comparable size... Their lay 
people will do that. We can't get our lay members to do that. 
We can get them to help us, but we can't get them to initiate it, 
even in the places where they work". 
Even with the trend towards larger retail establishments, employing several 
hundred people, it seems that USDAW had not usually been able to develop 
the kind of relatively self-sufficient trade unionism found in the larger 
engineering establishments, for example. A possible explanation is: 
"...you've got a growth of part-time labour, you've got a 
reduction in full-time staff, so the process of building up a shop 
steward network is slow. Although you might have three 
hundred people in the store you might only have thirty full-time 
staff. All the rest will be part-time staff working around the 
full-time hours... It's a big workforce, but it covers the eleven 
hour day and the six day week." 
(USDAW Divisional Officer) 
A UCATT Regional Secretary, in response to a question about membership 
retention, told us: 
"That's a big problem... We believe the reason for the major 
problem is, one, we haven't got enough shop stewards these 
days, and, two, that we don't believe that all our shop stewards 
religiously carry out their duties... in this organisation they are 
supposed to do a card check once every six weeks, and I don't 
believe we get the same enthusiasm as we did years ago". 
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The relative lack of shop stewards in the private-sector construction industry 
may reflect the transitory nature of the industry, with some individuals being 
reluctant to become involved in union activity, given the essentually temporary 
nature of their employment, and their wish to avoid being seen by employers 
as "troublemakers". 
Add to all this the problem of high labour turnover in industries such as 
retailing and construction, and the implications are clear: 
"Recruitment takes up to fifty per cent of an officer's time in 
USDAW, because in our union, a services union, we have to 
recruit a third of our membership each year to stand still" 
(USDAW Deputy Divisional Officer) 
Similarly, those UCATT officials responsible for private- sector construction 
spent much of their time attempting to organise new sites. Because of the 
short-term nature of most construction sites, such organising activity must be 
ongoing if the union is to maintain its membership, and only when the initial 
organising effort has been successful is it usually possible to establish a shop 
steward, if at all. 
BIFU had full-time representatives seconded by many of the major banks, but 
these tended to focus mainly on casework and negotiations, and were based 
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at bank head offices. In most institutions, there were lay representatives in 
branches and offices, who amongst other things, were responsible for 
recruitment. New starters were often given a pack of material, introducing the 
union. In spite of this, however, full-time area organisers spent a great deal 
of their time in recruitment, visiting branches for this reason. As a BIFU area 
organiser put it to us: 
"A lot of the active reps, don't see it [recruitment] as their role, 
although it should be, and a lot of the ordinary members don't 
see it as their role. That's maybe where we differ from a 
traditional trade union. The shop steward in a shop-floor 
environment would be going round making sure that they were 
in. Some of our reps, are in areas that are least organised." 
In some regions BIFU had temporary recruiters, or "Travelling 
Representatives", on short term contracts, whose sole purpose was to visit 
branches and recruit. Again, the scattered nature of the industry, along with 
the need to "sell" the union to an often apathetic workforce in the face of 
recruitment competition from staff associations, made for a classic case of 
distant consolidation, placing much of the responsibility for recruitment on paid 
union officials. 
How, then, did full-time officials set about the task of distant consolidation? 
The experience of UCATT in the private-sector construction industry provides 
a useful example, and illustrates the importance of exploiting collective 
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agreements and relationships with employers to the full. This shows how the 
effectiveness of distant consolidation may be increased where officials adopt 
a determined and systematic approach. 
UCATT, along with the other unions in the industry and the employers' 
federations, was party to the national Working Rule Agreements covering the 
building and engineering construction industries. These collective agreements 
provided recognition at industry level and access to agreed disputes 
procedures, covering firms affiliated to the employers' associations. Employers 
were to encourage union membership, and there was an agreed framework 
for full-time officials' access to sites, the establishment of shop stewards and 
the provision of check-off facilities for the collection of union contributions. In 
addition, employers were to inform local union officials of new contracts in their 
area, with details of the timetable of expected labour demand, and the names 
of building trades sub-contractors to be used. Thus, the collective 
agreements established a framework within which the union could work to 
maintain the level of organisation within the industry. As we outlined above, 
however, construction is characterised by scattered, temporary sites, making 
for a classic case of distant consolidation. 
Recruitment came through two main channels. Firstly, through employers' 
encouraging their workforce to join the union. Having got an employer to 
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recommend union membership to its workforce, UCATT would often follow this 
up with direct mailshots to individuals, asking them to join. Where a shop 
steward was established on a site, often with the cooperation of the employer, 
face to face recruitment could take place. This often enabled the union to 
recruit large numbers of members with the minimum use of union resources. 
In addition, the main contractor, usually a BEC-affiliated firm and party to the 
national agreement, might be pursuaded to write to any sub-contractors, 
asking them to provide full recognition and facilities for the union. Indeed, the 
union provided contractors with a model letter for this purpose. 
Secondly, it was necessary to supplement the above by full-time officials 
making direct visits to sites, in an attempt to recruit any individuals not already 
in the union. Whilst this was a resource-hungry operation, it was nevertheless 
essential in construction for the reasons outlined earlier. As one official put it, 
when asked whether workers retained their membership from one job to 
another: 
"The lads do retain membership in the sense that when you walk 
on site: 'How long have you been working here?'. 'Oh, I've been 
waiting for you to come'. That's their retention." 
(UCATT, Regional Organiser) 
In one region we looked at, when employers notified regional office of a new 
contract, the details were passed on to the Organiser responsible for that area, 
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who would visit the site to attempt to recruit any non-members. He would 
record the workforce employed by the main contractor and any sub-
contractors, along with details of union membership and numbers recruited 
during the visit. Such reports were submitted to the Regional Secretary, who 
used them to monitor membership and recruitment trends, and to highlight any 
problem areas. 
The collective agreements provided the local union official with considerable 
assistance in his task of consolidating the membership, but it was up to the 
individual official to make the most of such opportunities. This involved 
developing good relationships with employers, who could provide details of 
new starters, and maintaining close contact with the membership by making 
regular site visits and responding promptly and effectively to demands for 
servicing. Thus, distant consolidation could not be taken for granted, but had 
to be worked at. 
It appears that some officials were very much more effective in recruitment 
than others. Our interviews suggest that this was partly a reflection of the 
approach adopted by the particular official. Recruitment in the private sector 
demanded a persistent, systematic approach, and a willingness to exploit 
every recruitment opportunity to the full. The more successful officials 
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appeared to be those who accepted that recruitment was their responsibility 
and a key priority for the unions' continued effectiveness. 
However, it was clear that the performance of officials was not the only factor 
determining recruitment success. Officials of several unions suggested that 
expressions of employer support for union membership and the level of access 
enjoyed by the full-time official were key factors influencing the effectiveness 
of distant consolidation. Some employers strongly recommended that new 
employees join the union on taking up employment, whilst others, even where 
the union was recognised, took a less pro-union line. Officials cited this, 
along with access to the workplace as a key factor in determining the 
effectiveness of recruitment. 
The extent to which union full-time officials were allowed access to the 
workplace in order to carry out recruitment also varied. They would often be 
admitted to the canteen. They might be allowed to set up a table displaying 
union literature, to address the whole workforce, and in some cases even to 
mingle with employees as they ate their lunch. In construction, union officials 
often wandered around the site whilst work was in progress checking union 
cards and attempting to recruit non-members. In banking and finance, the 
visiting full-time official was in some cases shown to a private office and staff 
informed of his presence, whilst in others he would be allowed to approach 
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staff on his own initiative. Thus, the quality of access varied; in some cases 
the full-time official would be admitted to an establishment quite freely, whilst 
in others management might only grant access at particular times and under 
strictly-controlled conditions. 
Even where the union had recognition at enterprise or national level, the 
quality of access allowed by local management varied from company to 
company, and even between establishments in the same company. For 
example, one BIFU official claimed that in one region of a particular clearing 
bank, branch managers who were members of the staff association often 
deliberately obstructed BIFU recruiters. Occasionally BIFU officials appealed 
directly to regional managers or national personnel departments to ensure that 
nationally-agreed levels of access were forthcoming. 
All this meant that union recruitment was critically dependent upon 
management policy, not only centrally, but also locally. Clearly, were 
managements to become less favourably disposed towards endorsing union 
membership and towards allowing union access, then the effectiveness of 
recruitment efforts would decline. Whilst our interviews revealed no general 
reduction in the level of employer support, unions were clearly in a vulnerable 
position, making it vital to retain managerial goodwill. The announcement in 
August 1990 that the Treasury had advised government departments to cease 
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"strongly recommending" that new employees join the union was a source of 
some concern for the civil service unions (Terry, 1991: 104), and were this to 
be followed by other employers, it could reduce the recruitment effectiveness 
of at least some unions. 
In such a vulnerable position, the union's overriding need for employer 
cooperation in securing access and facilities placed moderate, cooperative 
behaviour at a premium. For example, an USDAW Divisional Officer told us 
that some employers would not allow lay members to be involved in formal 
on-site recruitment activity, in some cases not even in their own workplaces. 
As he explained: 
"[The company] need to know who it is that will be visiting their 
stores and speaking to their staff. A full-time official is 
accountable to me, and I would have to answer to the company 
if the facilities and what is said to staff are in any way abused. 
I have no control over lay members. I'd expect them to behave 
in a reasonable, decent proper manner, but if they don't, what 
control do I have over a lay member? 
"[Some lay members] seem to think that trade union membership 
comes on the basis of slagging the employer off, and being as 
militant and aggressive and disparaging about the company. In 
fact, the opposite is true, basically." 
Finally, officials recruiting in industries such as banking, construction and 
retailing were amongst the most likely of our respondents to enter into an 
unprompted discussion of what we have called the "free-rider problem". This 
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concern is hardly surprising from officials recruiting in industries with such a 
large gap between collective bargaining coverage and union membership (see 
below). It suggests, however, that it is in such industries as these that the 
development of selective benefits will be most helpful (see Chapter 6). 
(c) Close Expansion 
Close expansion involves the union attempting to recruit employees who, 
whilst working in organised establishments, are not themselves organised or 
covered by a union recognition agreement. This might involve attempting to 
recruit the peripheral labour force where these groups work alongside a 
unionised workforce, but are not themselves covered by a recognition 
agreement. It may also involve attempts to extend union organisation to 
white-collar, managerial and professional groups, building on an existing base, 
and it may involve bidding for single-union recognition for a whole workforce 
and in the process attempting to extend the scope of union organisation 
beyond existing boundaries. In this section, we deal with each of these. 
Several of the unions we studied were attempting to recruit amongst the 
peripheral workforce, including agency temporary workers, subcontractors, the 
self-employed and employed temporaries and part timers. Where the 
recognition agreement covered such workers, such efforts involved 
consolidation, and much of the Link Up activity was of this type, as was the 
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recruitment of the self employed in construction. In some cases, however, 
particularly where contractors were concerned, such groups were not covered 
by union recognition, so that the union was, according to the Kelly and Heery 
typology, engaged in a form of expansion. The attraction to unions of this 
form of expansion is that existing organisation may be used to exert pressure 
on employers to extend recognition, and costly and potentially drawn-out 
factory-gate campaigns are avoided. 
However, there are potential difficulties. Firstly, such groups were notoriously 
difficult to recruit and retain, given such characteristics as shorter and/or 
irregular hours, low levels of attachment to the employer, low pay and a high 
proportion of women. Secondly, existing members on occasion resisted the 
organisation of such groups, to the extent that they saw their use by 
employers as a potential threat to their own terms, conditions and job security. 
We saw in the previous chapter how members of the road transport group of 
the TGWU were hostile to the suggestion that their union negotiate with 
employers on the use of agency drivers, and how some even questioned the 
legitimacy of admitting such people into the union. 
Thirdly, and perhaps more generally, unions faced resistance from employers 
when attempting to extend organisation in this way. After all, the appeal of 
such forms of employment to many employers is the greater potential for 
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flexibility that they offer, and since unions aimed to restrict this flexibility, for 
example by pushing for rules on the utilisation of such workers, employers 
resisted their organisation. Contractors often base their appeal on their ability 
to provide a service flexibly and at competitive rates, and unionisation may be 
seen as threatening their competitive edge over in-house provision. A NUPE 
official told us of one cleaning contractor in the public services, which refused 
to recognise on a contract-by-contract basis, insisting that if it were to 
recognise unions then it would have to be at national level, and only once a 
significant proportion of its total workforce had joined. Clearly, from the union's 
point of view, this made organisation very much more difficult. 
Whilst we have characterised UCATT's task in the construction industry as 
largely one of distant consolidation, if also contained an element of distant 
expansion. The large main contractors, as BEC affiliates, recognised the 
union at national level, but increasingly the task facing the union on each site 
was to organise not only the main contractor's workforce, but also that of the 
subcontractors and the growing number of self-employed workers. A key 
factor in the success of such recruitment was, as we have seen the extent of 
cooperation received from the main contractor, as well as the degree of 
enthusiasm shown by the union official concerned. Clearly, both factors varied 
from case to case, and the union's organising efforts were particularly 
vulnerable to changes in employer policy. 
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Close expansion of a rather different kind occurred during the late 1960s and 
1970s, when groups of previously un-unionised white-collar and managerial 
workers were organised (Bain, 1970; Snape and Bamber, 1989). Thus, unions 
such as ASTMS and TASS were able to extend their organisation from their 
original job territories such as technicians and draughtsmen to include the 
supervisory, professional and managerial grades (Kelly and Heery, 1989; 
Smith, 1987; Carter, 1979). 
However, this expansion into new grades within existing areas of union 
strength is eventually subject to a saturation effect and, given that most of 
these gains were made in a period when conditions were more conducive to 
union growth, by the mid-1980s it seemed unlikely that further expansion 
would be possible in this area (Bain and Price, 1983: 32). Furthermore, whilst 
there was no significant general trend towards the de-recognition of unions 
by employers, the few cases that had occurred were concentrated upon the 
white-collar, particularly managerial and professional, groups first organised 
in the previous decade. Thus: 
"Given the generally greater resistance to white-collar unionism 
than manual unionism by employers, many recent derecognitions 
can be seen as an opportunist reaction to the concessions which 
employers were forced to make in the 1970s on the issue of 
white-collar unionism." 
(Claydon, 1989: 222) 
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This suggests that not only was there limited scope for close expansion 
involving white-collar workers in manufacturing industry, but also that any such 
gains were fragile and difficult to defend in times of adversity. 
There may have been more scope for distant expansion where single union 
deals build on an existing group of members in a workplace. For example, a 
particular union may organise technicians in an establishment, and from this 
base bid for single-union status with the employer. This is an extremely 
controversial area, since such an approach would be likely to result in an 
inter-union dispute if other unions were denied recognition. Furthermore, 
whilst this would amount to close expansion from the point of view of the union 
concerned, it is likely that the members would simply be won at the expense 
of rival unions, so that the net effect on aggregate union membership would 
be nil. 
In sum, whilst distant expansion may represent an attractive option for unions, 
particularly given that existing lay activists may play a prominent role at little 
direct cost to the union, the scope for such recruitment was likely to vary 
considerably depending on the group in question. Whilst unions appeared to 
have had some initial successes in extending organisation to contractors, such 
groups often proved difficult to recruit and retain, not least because of 
employer resistance to unionisation, whilst the prospects for further advances 
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in the organisation of white collar groups, such as had occurred in the 1970s, 
appeared limited. 
(d) Distant Expansion 
This is arguably the most difficult of the four types of recruitment. Distant 
expansion involves recruiting in job territories for which there is no union 
recognition, and which are remote from areas of union organisation. 
Most of the union officials we interviewed said that recruitment, particularly of 
the distant expansion form, was more difficult in the 1980s, compared to the 
major expansion of the previous decade: 
"In the 1970s, the reality was that everyone was joining. You 
didn't have to [do much]. It was just an additional exercise at 
that time, if you went out and 'staked out' a place. They used to 
come into the office, and that's still the best form of contact, by 
the way." 
(TGWU District Officer) 
"[In the 1970s] It was a different approach. You didn't need to 
approach them, they approached you. What you are fighting 
against now is fear, employer resistance and state-sponsored 
mini-terrorism." 
(TGWU District Officer) 
Several officials, particularly from the large general unions, claimed that their 
attempts to recruit were sometimes hampered by employer victimisation of 
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union activists, and by a general fear of losing their job amongst the workforce. 
Thus, when the employer was contacted requesting a meeting, a frequent 
response was to ask for the names of the union's members in the company, 
which the union would, of course, refuse to supply. 
As we have already seen in Chapter 3 it has long been recognised in the 
industrial relations literature that recognition by the employer is effectively a 
prerequisite for union growth (Bain, 1970; Clegg, 1976). This was seen very 
clearly in our interviews with local union officials. 
"We lose them [members] fairly rapidly after they join if we don't 
achieve recognition. [ What is the typical pattern ?] A few 
people join, we get the membership up to a degree, we try and 
get the recognition with the employer, we fail, the employer puts 
the screws on and the members drift away. That recurs" 
(NUPE Regional Secretary) 
This problem became more acute during the 1980s, as employers became 
more reluctant to concede recognition: 
"I don't find any difficulty in recruiting... in this area... The union's 
problem is that the employers, following what I consider to be 
the government's line, are resisting trade union organisation. [ 
How do you resolve recognition disputes ?] You don't. ACAS 
has no statutory procedures now. The workforce, because it's 
frightened, invariably won't take industrial action to force the 
issue, so you lose out. You don't get the union organisation, 
and so the membership drifts away". 
(TGWU District Secretary) 
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Recognition is clearly a critical stage in union organising. How then do unions 
set about securing recognition? 
An AEU District Secretary described his approach to newly-established firms 
as follows. Firstly, he would write a letter of introduction to an appropriate 
member of management, requesting permission to visit the firm. He would 
usually claim to have members in the firm. (This was often the case with the 
AEU, since time-served craftsmen tend to retain their union membership when 
moving from a union plant). Having been granted such permission, he would 
meet management to introduce himself and the union, asking for an 
opportunity to speak to the workforce, either at lunchtime or at a mass 
meeting. Here, he would explain to them the benefits of AEU membership, 
and leave behind application forms. If possible, he would make a follow-up 
visit within three weeks, by which time he would hope to have a number of 
completed forms. At this stage, even if only a few had joined, he would 
attempt to establish a shop steward, who would then take primary 
responsibility for recruiting the rest of the workforce. Only once a significant 
proportion of the workforce had been organised, often well in excess of fifty 
per cent, would the employer concede recognition, if at all. Only exceptionally, 
it seems, do firms grant recognition before the union has built up a significant 
membership. 
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This particular AEU official expressed a preference for this kind of approach, 
rather than having to fight for recognition once the workforce have a grievance 
with the company and turn to the union for help. Of the latter adversarial 
approach, he said: 
"This is not our favourite way of going into a company. 
We would prefer to go in and be an enabling body to the 
company..." 
An example of such a fight for recognition is provided in the following account 
from another AEU official of his attempt to organise a new plant: 
"We already had a single union agreement with [company X] at 
Peterlee. We had a headstart on everybody, because we were 
the only ones who knew right from the start. But, by God, it 
didn't half take some chasing up to get that single union 
agreement, which we've recently signed. 
We wrote to them. Going back, we knew they were building [a 
new plant at Eaglescliffe]. We asked, immediately, what's going 
to be the situation? 'Oh, no need to worry.' 
Then, of course, different managers came in. We then started 
to get a bit concerned, because people were starting in the 
factory. We contacted them again and said 'Hey, what's going 
on?' 'Oh, don't worry'. 
Eventually we did start to get worried, because we had the 
information, see, from our people at Peterlee, that it was building 
up. People were starting there... We suspected we were being 
deliberately fobbed off by this time. 
We wrote to them. We met them, and we thought we were 
going into friendly negotiations, because we had negotiating 
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rights [at the company's other local plants]. And here was their 
one place without a union. 
In fact, they wrote an article in the press, where they said no 
union had shown any interest. That was an article in the press, 
and of course we were concerned because we'd already written 
to them. 
When we went there, all the niceties were said, then their first 
question was 'You tell us why we need a union.' Of course, we 
were taken aback slightly, but we told them why they needed a 
union. It was because we would grow together, we would suffer 
the hardships together and we could suffer the profits together. 
That wouldn't be the case if they went in and took a chance 
because when the people in there demanded a union we would 
be going in there with no interests of the company's at heart, 
apart from eventually to keep the jobs of course, but we would 
be in there backing these people. They're the ones who wanted 
us, you didn't'. We would be going in there in an us and them 
position. So we told them that... 
So what they did was they wrote to us and thanked us very 
much and said how much they liked us, but 'don't call us, we'll 
call you' type of thing. 
Well, we did have members there. We got the message to 
them, what had happened, and they walked out. The moment 
they walked out, I had the convener and shop steward from 
Peterlee down there with forms, issuing them out and recruiting 
them on the spot. 
We knew before that they were going to walk out, because our 
convener from Peterlee was in touch with them. He clocked off, 
got in his car, collected some forms, bang, down, recruited them 
all outside the gates. 
We then met with some of these lads, sounded out their 
opinions, told the management that we now had the members 
there. What they had said was that if the employees want a 
union they wouldn't stand in their way. We said, 'Well they do, 
They're members of our union'. 
We met with them off-site. We said we wanted a ballot on trade 
union recognition. The company came back to us and said, 
365 
'Right, don't bother about the ballot. We are going to negotiate 
an agreement with you'. 
It took some months to sort out every comma, every dot. It was 
a morass, the agreement, when we started. Totally 
unacceptable. Eventually we got it into a form that was 
acceptable. It took quite some time. 
By this time, of course, people were losing interest. They gave 
the lads the biggest rise we've ever had, by the way, as an 
inducement not to go along with it. Without any negotiation, they 
gave them it... 
Eventually I went along to sign the agreement. When I got there 
they said what they were going to do... was put it to their 
employees to see whether they wanted a union or not... 
Now that's the type of thing you're up against... [It is resolved 
now but] we still have a job to do. I'm just in the throes of 
setting up the organisation now. Hopefully I'll have two shop 
stewards by now, although I haven't been informed as yet. But 
I've had a load more forms back, wanting to join the union, so 
there is a nucleus there and we've got to build from there". 
(AEU, District Secretary) 
Thus, whilst single union deals may sometimes be handed to the union "on a 
plate", as a result of a union "beauty contest" or where a company with an 
existing agreement invites the union into its new plant, this is not always so. 
In the above case, the union faced the classic delaying tactics from 
management, initially refusing recognition, then bowing to industrial action by 
opening negotiations, offering an agreement which the union found 
unacceptable, and taking the union through drawn-out negotiations and 
awarding a large pay rise, before going to a ballot. Industrial action played a 
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key role in this case and, significantly, many officials saw the increased 
reluctance to take industrial action as a key problem in securing recognition. 
In this particular case, the union won recognition, although by this time many 
of its members were in arrears with their contributions, and the union had to 
rebuild its organisation at the plant. 
Another AEU District Secretary made it clear that, whilst he would often write 
to employers, requesting access to the workforce, the main focus of his 
organising activity was the workforce rather than the employer. 
"... I concentrate my efforts on the workforce, explaining to them 
the benefits of being part of the trade union, rather than going to 
the employer, and the employer saying 'Well, what have you got 
to offer me?" 
"If a new factory opens up, almost inevitably, in the factory, 
there's union members go in. Green card holders [craftsmen]. 
And the incentive to organise must come from within. Very 
rarely is it successful from outside, unless it is a 'sweetheart 
deal'. And I will not, as a matter of principle, get involved in 
'sweetheart deals'." 
Several of our respondents agreed that recognition should not be accepted in 
return for "sweetheart deals". This particular AEU official felt that the problem 
facing unions in extending organisation was not simply the securing of 
recognition, but securing it on terms which would be acceptable to the union, 
and which would result in effective organisation of the workforce. 
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Most of the officials interviewed suggested that where the employer was 
reluctant to grant recognition, effective organisation was best achieved around 
a specific issue or grievance, which would mobilise the workforce in the 
protection of their own interests. Pay and disciplinary matters emerged as 
key issues in this respect. The TGWU's guide for lay recruiters echoes this 
point: 
"A formal procedural approach can be counter-productive with 
hostile employers. Best results have been obtained by seeing 
that the issue around which organisation takes place is not 
recognition as such, but a concrete issue such as a wage 
increase or advance on some backward condition of employment 
such as holiday pay. 
By posing the union case in practical terms of direct benefit to all 
workers, a wider basis of support can often be won than with 
pure 'recognition' demands. Also victimisation is likely to be 
seen by fellow workers as a cause for united action if the issue 
is a quite fair and just claim to everyone's benefit instead of an 
unfortunate by-product of an organisational tussle" 
(TGWU, no date b: 16) 
For example, a TGWU official told us of his experience in trying to organise 
a new plant: 
"It may take months. It took me nearly twelve months in a place. 
I'm still trying to get a hundred per cent, because the employer 
won't recognise us, although they have met us and said 'Don't 
come back until you have fifty per cent'... Now, I could get 
nothing to hang my cap on, you see, and people were saying, 
'We need a union, but we realise that you can't do anything'. 
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Now, the hard core stayed in, and then the company dismissed 
someone unfairly by means of redundancy. Not the fact that the 
redundancy was unfair, but the way they went about it. And I 
got a settlement out of it, because I would've plastered it all over 
the papers. But they settled out of court, and I used that... that 
showed the people, and the membership started going up 
because they realised that we could do something, although we 
didn't negotiate the wages. So they saw it as protection. 
And that really is the essence of whether you retain them. If you 
can't do anything for them you'll lose them." 
(TGWU District Officer) 
Thus, the union may gain members where there are grievances, and where 
it is able to demonstrate that it can do something for the workforce. However, 
ultimately the most effective way to do this is to win recognition and thus 
negotiate on terms and conditions. Without this, organisation is likely to be 
fragile and transitory. The same official explained it as follows: 
"If there's a lot of problems you keep them for a long while. If 
the employer consistently sacks people unfairly, and you keep 
getting settlements out of him. But the wise employer doesn't do 
that see... We can keep them in for one, two or three years, but 
the key is can we negotiate for them, at the end of the day, their 
wages". 
(TGWU District Officer) 
A key element in the organising process, according to many of our 
respondents, was the establishment of a shop steward. As an AEU District 
Secretary put it: 
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"If you get the right shop stewards, and they represent the 
members according to the agreements they've reached, you'll 
always have a base. If you fail to establish that, it's just like an 
hour glass; you turn it over and then you have to start all over 
again". 
However, the shop steward may be in a very difficult position if the employer 
is hostile to trade unionism: 
"The employer will be all sweetness and light with you... but 
when you've gone he puts the pressure on, and it's very difficult 
retaining shop stewards. And that's the problem. No district 
officer can maintain organisation from the outside, he cannot do 
it. That's one of the main problems of the so-called white-collar 
unions, even today". 
(AEU District Secretary) 
This is largely a problem of access to the workforce. The shop steward has 
daily access and a detailed day to day knowledge of the firm, in a way which 
the full-time official does not, so that the steward is better placed to 
consolidate and maintain union membership within the workplace. Thus, as 
we saw earlier, any weakening of stewards' organisation or reduction in 
facilities provided by management may reduce the effectiveness of union 
recruitment. 
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In several of our interviews, we were given examples of companies who, whilst 
claiming not to be anti-union, would nevertheless afford only very limited 
access to their workforce. For example, in one company, which had no union 
recognition agreement but had been the subject of repeated recruitment drives 
by the TGWU, had agreed to admit TGWU full-time officials to their stores. A 
room would be allocated to the official and staff would be informed of his 
presence by management, but he would not be allowed to take the initiative 
in approaching staff. As one official put it: 
"It's all a game. It's the facade of giving you the facility, but in 
reality they want you to fail." 
(TGWU District Officer) 
Distent Expansion and ftha Sm@a8°Fiirm Sector 
The small-firm sector seems to be particularly difficult to organise, not only 
because of a possibly lower propensity for workers to join, but also because 
of employer opposition and a lack of access for the union official: 
"Ten is a small business, but you can't afford not to have a go 
at them. It's more difficult, mind. An employer exercises a 
greater degree of control over that labour force. He knows 
everything that's going on, and if he wants to oppose trade 
unions, which at the moment they are doing, then he has all the 
means at his disposal. He has far superior access than what we 
do". 
(TGWU District Secretary) 
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Unions had often tried to extend organisation to suppliers and contractors of 
unionised firms. This may be a useful approach to organising small firms. 
However, such an approach was undermined by legislation. The 1982 
Employment Act removes union immunities in cases of industrial action taken 
against employers in a bid to force them to use labour-only suppliers or 
contractors, and employers may no longer refuse or terminate a contract on 
grounds of union status (Mackie, 1989: 287-288). 
Given the difficulties of organising small workplaces, one union official, with 
organising experience in the clothing industry told us that: 
"When I was a trade union officer in the 1970s, when inflation 
was fifteen to twenty per cent, if a worker 'phoned me up and 
told me they wanted to be recruited, if there were any less than 
two dozen people in the place I never bothered going, because 
there were so many other people to recruit. You got 
discouraged by the fact that there was labour turnover in 
representatives. It seemed to cost more time to service small 
workplaces than large workplaces". 
(TUC Official) 
Similarly, Bain's study of recruitment in the late 1960s illustrates how a union 
may prioritise recruitment targets in terms of the potential membership: 
"But if the individuals happened to be from a combine [i.e. a 
large multi-establishment firm], then they received special 
attention. As one ASSET official put it, 'I will drop everything to 
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get them in. if they weren't from a combine I might not do this 
unless it was an extremely large group or I wasn't very busy."' 
(Bain, 1970: 92) 
This suggests that unions are more likely to show a keen interest in organising 
small firms once other opportunities become scarce or, as in the 1980s, when 
the small-firm sector promised to be a major sector of employment growth. 
However, small workplaces might be uneconomic to organise: 
"Any full-time officer would be hard pushed to cover as many as 
fifty workplaces in a patch. If these had ten or fifteen people in 
each, then how much does that come to at £1 per week? It just 
doesn't work out, economically, to be able to service their 
collective bargaining needs. Was it, in fact, economic for unions 
to be recruiting in that area at all? If they could recruit them 
could they then, in fact, service them? Should the membership 
in large workplaces subsidise the membership in small 
workplaces?" 
(TUC Official) 
Whether or not one agrees with the figure of fifty workplaces, and clearly this 
depends on the particular industry, the point is that unions might not be wise 
to follow a strategy of expansion into the small-firm sector. Even when they 
are able to build an organisation and win recognition, it may then prove difficult 
to provide an effective service to the membership, and any initial organising 
success may mean that the official has little time for further organising. This 
suggests that unions may need to plan their recruitment selectively. 
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Our discussion of the expansionary organising process is summarised in 
Figure 11.2. 
FIQUI^E 111.2: Tlh© Process ©If E^psnms5©onsiiry ^©©iry5to@iriiS: A Suminnisiirv 
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This highlights the importance of an issue or grievance around which a 
recruitment campaign can be based, either to make the union's approach 
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effective or to motivate the employees to take the initiative in approaching the 
union themselves. This finding is consistent with research on union organising 
in the USA (see for example Karsh et al, 1953; Northrup, 1990). Also 
important is the winning of employer recognition. Where this is not 
forthcoming, any membership will tend to drift away, unless the union is able 
to demonstrate that it can offer tangible gains or benefits to the members 
without recognition. This is the thinking behind the selective benefits incentive 
approach, as discussed in chapter 6. 
Where recognition is won, the next step is to establish an effective shop 
stewards' organisation in the workplace. This is the ideal close-consolidation 
model. Where the union fails to establish an effective shop steward's 
organisation, then membership consolidation will usually prove to be more 
difficult, and the full-time official will subsequently have to play a greater role 
in distant consolidation. 
This analysis highlights the crucial role of the employer in influencing the 
outcome of union organising efforts. Our respondents saw the increasingly 
anti-recognition stance of some employers as a key reason for their limited 
recruitment success during the 1980s and early 1990s, and employer attitudes 
were also felt to influence the chances of establishing a shop stewards' 
organisation. Even where recognition existed, the quality of access to the 
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workforce enjoyed by the full-time official often varied, depending on the 
attitude of the employer. 
The analysis has clear implications for recruitment initiatives aimed at 
expanding into those job territories which were growing in the 1980s and 
1990s. The trend towards smaller plants and a flexible labour force, along 
with employer hostility to unions and the lack of a tradition of unionisation 
amongst the workforce, were likely to mean that the recruitment process 
outlined above would become more difficult at each and every stage. Initial 
recruitment is likely to be more difficult where there is a lack of tradition of 
trade union membership in the workforce, and where the collective ethic has 
to be developed from nothing. Recognition will be more difficult to secure 
where employers' resistance is greater.and where employees are reluctant to 
undertake industrial action to force the issue. Finally, as we have seen, it is 
more difficult to secure good shop stewards in smaller establishments and 
where density has traditionally been low. 
The industries and job territories which unions will need to penetrate share 
many of the characteristics of retailing, construction and banking. Thus, we 
suggest that such recruitment efforts are less likely to lead to the development 
of self-sustaining workplace trade unionism than has been the case in many 
of the traditional strongholds of trade unionism in manufacturing and the public 
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sector. If this is so, it means that even where recruitment takes place, there 
will be a heavy burden on full-time officials to service and maintain the 
membership. This is then likely to limit the ability of such officials to devote 
time to further expansion. 
We set out in this chapter to explain why the new organising initiatives had by 
1991 met with at most only limited success. Our analysis confirmed the 
pattern of full-time official involvement suggested by Kelly and Heery (1989) 
(see chapter 8). This is summarised in Table 11.3. Our interviews suggested 
no major changes in this pattern, but recruitment had become more difficult 
during the 1980s, particularly away from the union's core job territories. 
Whilst we found little evidence that close consolidation in well-organised 
establishments had become significantly more difficult during the 1980s, some 
officials recognised that their well-organised job territories were contracting, 
so that increasingly there was a need to look to other forms of recruitment. 
Furthermore, some of our respondents suggested that shop stewards had 
become less self-reliant in terms of servicing the membership, and were thus 
making greater demands on the full-time official for advice and assistance. 
This could have implications for the ability of full-time officials to spend time 
on recruitment in other job territories. 
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TABLE 11=3: Th@ Role of the Fyil-Tom® Official In Union Organising 
Coverage by 
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may vary 
No, Expansion Role may vary but likely 
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support for lay member 
initiatives, or at least 
may draw on lay 
member support 
Major role for full-time 
official in recruitment, 
bidding for recognition, 
and building workplace 
organisation. Access 
often difficult. 
In those sectors characterised by distant consolidation, full-time officials had 
less time to devote to organising new job territories. The task facing unions 
here was essentially one of exploiting collective agreements and relationships 
with employers to the full, and there appeared to be much that unions could 
do to improve the effectiveness of this form of recruitment, partly because it 
had often been a neglected area in the past. However, unions were heavily 
dependent on a degree of employer support, in terms of recommending union 
membership to new employees and providing good quality access to the 
workplace for full-time officials. Whilst our interviews did not reveal any 
general trend towards a reduction of employer support in this respect, 
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nevertheless unions remained highly vulnerable to any future changes in 
employer policy. 
We suggested that close expansion often appeared to be an attractive option 
for unions, given that the strength of existing strongholds could be utilised, 
without the need for factory-gate campaigns and cold-calling. However, our 
interviews identified a number of problems with this approach. Such groups 
had often remained unorganised precisely because of the particular difficulties 
involved, including the nature of such workers themselves and strong employer 
opposition. Indeed, we suggested that employers often opted for the 
peripheral workforce and subcontracting because of the flexibility it offered, 
and unionisation might well be seen as a threat to such flexibility. Also, earlier 
gains in such areas as white-collar, managerial and professional employment 
could be fragile, since some employers had attempted to roll back the frontiers 
of unionisation when the opportunity arose. 
Distant expansion has certain characteristics which distinguish it from the other 
types of recruitment and which make it a more problematical exercise. Firstly, 
distant expansion, even more than other types of recruitment, is likely to 
require a commitment of resources to what is essentially an uncertain and 
perhaps long term undertaking, with no guarantee of a return. 
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Secondly, any attempt to extend union recognition to new workplaces is 
particularly vulnerable to changes in the economic and political environment. 
The willingness of employers to concede recognition, and the ability of 
employees to fight for it depend upon such factors as the state of the 
economy, the government's own example on union recognition and the legal 
framework. In general, since the late 1970s these had been unfavourable to 
the unions. 
In addition, we suggested that expansionary recruitment was likely to be 
particularly difficult in the growing sectors such as small firms, private services 
and the 'flexible' workforce. We saw in chapter 3 that there was evidence of 
a latent demand for union representation amongst such workers. Our analysis 
of union organising campaigns has suggested that the difficulty was in 
translating this into effective organisation. Even where some initial recruitment 
was achieved, the union faced major problems in securing recognition and in 
building workplace organisation, so that it often proved impossible to retain 
and consolidate the membership. Furthermore, we suggest that even if unions 
were to have some success in organising these areas, the subsequent heavy 
servicing burden on full-time officials would limit their ability to devote attention 
to further expansion. 
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Thus, whilst some commentators had argued that unions must seek to extend 
their membership into the hitherto unorganised sectors, nevertheless one can 
understand the sentiments of one union officer: 
"If union resources are to be deployed sensibly and 
economically, then why start with the hardest nut first? We 
should be testing whether we have sufficient density in places 
where we already have recognition" 
(TUC official) 
We have argued that there is some sense in this view, in that there was 
considerable numerical scope for consolidation, and it had often been a 
neglected area in the past, with significant room for improved performance. 
Also, in our discussion of the development of unions' selective benefits, we 
concluded that such benefits were more likely to provide an effective incentive 
to join a union where recognition existed and the employer was not strongly 
anti-union. 
There was certainly a tendency for some unions to focus their efforts on 
consolidation rather than on expansion, particularly into distant job territories. 
Officials in USDAW and UCATT, for example, clearly had their hands full 
simply trying to maintain their existing organisation. Even in the case of the 
TGWU and the GMB, which we identified as being more committed to 
expansion than most unions, many of the initiatives focused on consolidation, 
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and as the TGWU's Link Up campaign progressed there appeared to be an 
increasing emphasis on consolidation and the need for lay members to recruit, 
along with a growing concern within the union at the inability to win recognition 
from employers. Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties involved, at least 
some unions continued to mount expansionary recruitment campaigns, 
perhaps because of their possible impact in the longer term, and also because 
their was a feeling that any effort was worthwhile in an increasingly difficult 
situation. 
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PART FIVE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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CMAFH7EH 12 
ImttroritoeMon 
In this penultimate chapter, we summarise our findings in terms of the first 
three aims of the thesis, as set out in chapter 1. These were: to describe the 
initiatives being undertaken by unions in the 1980s and early 1990s, to 
examine the implementation of the organising initiatives, and to examine the 
effectiveness of such initiatives during the period up to 1991. In the following 
chapter, we address the final aim of the thesis, by discussing the implications 
of our findings for the debates on union strategy and for the future of British 
unions. 
Union R e s p o n s e s ft® the "RflnmbeirshBp GtrfisSa" 
The first aim of the thesis was to describe the kinds of initiatives being 
introduced by unions. On services and benefits, we found that whilst there 
was no clear reversal of the long term trend away from traditional cash 
benefits, unions were introducing a range of new discount services, including 
financial and legal services, travel and tourism, and many unions were 
developing their training facilities. A clear theme in much of this was the 
notion that the union was catering for its members not simply as workers, but 
also increasingly as consumers. Most of the officials we interviewed accepted 
that their union should provide as wide a range of services as possible, but 
384 
many emphasised that the new services were of an ancillary nature, and that 
the primary purpose of the union must be to represent their members as 
employees. Falling membership, and in some cases the need to match the 
initiatives of other unions, were cited as reasons for the development of such 
services, whilst aggressive marketing by the third-party providers of many of 
the suppliers of discounts was another reason for their increased provision. 
(Chapter 6). 
On contributions, there was concern that the generally low level of contribution 
rates led to an underfunding of the union movement, which could act as a 
constraint on the maintenance amd improvement of services and benefits and 
on the undertaking of major recruitment campaigns. We could not conclude 
from our evidence that the generally low level of contributions was due to 
price competition between unions, although it appears that this may have 
been important in the case of particular unions. We could not firmly conclude 
that membership in general was highly "price elastic", and the contributions 
increases of the 1980s appeared to be as much a consequence as a cause 
of declining membership. This might suggest that further contributions 
increases were feasible, although there was some evidence of a price 
elasticity effect, which might become more pronounced were contributions to 
increase to levels unprecedented in recent experience. Also, our evidence 
suggested that the lower paid, including women workers, were more sensitive 
to the level of contributions. (Chapter 7). 
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We found that higher cash benefits and the linking of contributions to the 
individual's pay appeared to allow a union to levy a higher average level of 
contribution per member. The former offered some comfort to those who 
advocated the high cost/high benefits approach to unionism in the future. We 
inferred from the latter that unions might be advised to practise "price 
discrimination", by relating the individual's contributions to their ability to pay. 
(Chapter 7). 
Whilst some of the officials we interviewed expressed reservations about 
linking contributions to the individual's earnings, largely on grounds of equity 
and administrative difficulty, we found that in recent years some unions had 
revised their contribution scales, introducing lower rates for such groups as 
part-time workers, youths, those on government-funded training schemes, 
those on temporary contracts, the unemployed and in a few cases those 
members for whom the union did not yet have recognition from the employer 
for collective bargaining purposes. In many cases, such reduced-rate 
contributions were linked to a lower level of servicing, and thus are more 
properly referred to as "differential pricing" rather than true "price 
discrimination". (Chapter 7). 
We rejected the view that increased contributions were a viable alternative to 
organising campaigns, and that unions would necessarily shy away from 
recruiting the peripheral labour force because of their resistance to high 
contributions. Indeed, we suggested that many of the developments in 
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contributions policies could be seen as an attempt to combine a higher 
general level of contributions with selective reductions aimed at the more 
price-sensitive groups. (Chapter 7). 
We found evidence that by the late 1980s, unions were making considerable 
efforts to develop their approach to recruitment, both at the level of the TUC 
and in the case of individual unions. However, whilst most of our unions were 
prioritising recruitment in response to declining membership, there was 
considerable diversity in the methods and recruitment targets of the various 
unions. Some campaigns, particularly those of the large general unions, 
involved a long-term horizon, and a major commitment of the time of full-time 
officials, whilst others consisted mainly of exhorting lay activists to step up 
their recruitment efforts. Some involved attempts to expand union 
organisation into new areas, whilst others focused mainly on consolidating 
existing organisation. We found that whilst most unions adopted a variety of 
approaches, a union's approach to organising was influenced by the union's 
size, the degree of organisation of its core job territories, and the internal 
characteristics of the union. (Chapters 8 and 9). 
Th® Implementation of Union Organising Initiatives 
A second aim of the thesis was to examine the extent to which unions were 
able to implement their organising campaigns at local level, and in particular 
to establish whether or not unions were able to effectively mobilise their full-
time officials behind such campaigns. We identified four key areas which 
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unions would need to address: the communication of the prioritisation of 
recruitment within the union, the allocation of resources to recruitment, the 
effective targeting of recruitment campaigns, and the monitoring of recruitment 
activity. 
We found that in most unions, leaders were effectively communicating to 
officials that recruitment was to be a key priority, and officials were 
increasingly being expected to devote specific blocks of time to recruitment 
activity. Most of those we interviewed recognised that more effective 
recruitment was vital to the continued well-being of their union, although 
many pointed to the tradeoffs in terms of the servicing of existing members. 
Whilst the necessary shift to a "recruitment culture" was incomplete, given the 
uneven response to campaigns, and the fact that some unions had made less 
progress than others, it appeared that full-time officials were spending an 
increasing proportion of their time on recruitment activity. (Chapter 9). 
The targeting of recruitment activity appeared to reflect a pragmatic 
assessment of the threats and opportunities facing the union. We found some 
evidence that unions were selecting targets in an attempt to make best use 
of their scarce resources, for example concentrating on larger workplaces so 
as to reap economies of scale, and on areas of lower density where potential 
recruitment was greater. In some cases officials were sensitive about the 
need to avoid wasting resources on long-term campaigns where the chances 
of success were remote. (Chapter 9). 
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Most of our unions were systematically monitoring the level of membership 
and recruitment, and some had developed their monitoring procedures in 
recent years. The aim was to increase the emphasis on recruitment by 
signalling its prioritisation to officials and lay activists, and also to allow for the 
evaluation of recruitment activity so as to make best use of available 
resources. However, officials were, with one or two exceptions, highly 
sensitive about any suggestion of monitoring the recruitment performance of 
particular officials. Recruitment, and indeed retention, were felt to be largely 
influenced by factors beyond the control of the individual official, whilst any 
suggestion that officials might be further motivated by financial incentives or 
individual appraisal was in most cases resisted. (Chapter 9). 
Thus, our sample of unions were making some progress in each of our four 
key areas. Our findings contrast with those of Mason and Bain (1991). On 
the basis of their survey of union headquarters, they argue that in 1990 most 
unions did not have a national official with sole responsibility for recruitment, 
a recruitment budget, nor a "sophisticated" monitoring system at national 
level, and that this was evidence of "...a gap between theoretical commitment 
[to recruitment] and existing practice" (1991: 44). Our own findings, based on 
a local perspective, suggest that whilst not all of our unions had made a 
transformation towards a "recruitment culture", it did appear that the 
recruitment initiatives amounted to more than simply a declaration by the 
leadership or head office on the need for recruitment, and that a serious 
attempt was being made to implement them at local level. 
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Tlh® EfffliacftllvenB88 off Untem Qirganllaling ImKlaiavea 
Our survey of the literature on trade union growth and decline showed that 
there is some disagreement on the extent to which trade union strategies can 
exert an influence on aggregate membership independent of environmental 
factors. We referred to this as the "Bain-Undy debate" (chapter 3). The third 
aim of the thesis was to contribute to this debate by examining the 
effectiveness of organising strategies during this period. 
In considering the effectiveness of such initiatives, the first question of course 
is what criteria to use in our evaluation. Since much of the pressure for the 
adoption of such initiatives came from the perception of a "crisis" of declining 
membership, the obvious approach is to assess them in terms of their impact 
on membership. In spite of the increased efforts of unions, we could not 
conclude that the campaigns had had a major effect on membership. 
Aggregate membership continued to decline to the end of the 1980s, and 
whilst some unions experienced growth, particularly in the latter part of the 
decade, this appeared to owe more to sectoral patterns of employment growth 
than to the organising initiatives of such unions. Even the TUC-coordinated 
campaigns at Trafford Park and London Docklands failed to significantly 
extend unionisation. (Chapter 9). 
Our case study of the TGWU's Link Up recruitment campaign showed that 
recruitment appeared to increase following the implementation of the 
campaign, and our interviews with TGWU officials suggested that there had 
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been some recruitment successes, often in what were seen as difficult 
recruitment areas. However, the campaign was unable to check the decline 
in the union's membership, largely it seems because the outflow of members 
increased to more than cancel out the gains made. Our interviews suggested 
that in many cases the newly-recruited members were proving very difficult 
to retain, because of a lack of employer recognition or because of the 
characteristics of the workers themselves. This highlights the particular 
difficulties involved in targeting recruitment efforts at the difficult to organise 
sectors and groups. (Chapter 10). 
We found no evidence that the union had subjected Link Up to any form of 
rigorous cost-benefit analysis, indeed one of our respondents specifically 
questioned the appropriateness of such an analysis. It appeared that the 
continued emphasis on such campaigns owed much to the feeling that at 
least something must be done and a faith that the campaign would pay 
dividends in the future, once the economic and political environment became 
more favourable. In this respect, some officials held a view not altogether out 
of sympathy with the econometrician's version of union growth as being 
determined by environmental and structural factors, largely beyond the control 
of union strategy. This is perhaps a convenient excuse for those who have 
tried and failed, but it does appear to be consistent with much of our 
evidence. (Chapter 10). 
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We found that local officials, whilst welcoming the various developments in the 
services and benefits of their union as providing an additional argument in 
favour of joining, did not consider them to be a major factor in recruitment and 
retention. In particular, it was felt that the notion of members joining on the 
basis of such benefits alone, and remaining in the union on a long term basis 
in the absence of employer recognition, was at that time idealistic, given the 
limited significance of the benefits, particularly in the face of any employer 
hostility to union membership. (Chapter 6). 
Finally, given the apparent inability of the new initiatives to reverse the decline 
in union membership, we felt it necessary to examine the problems faced by 
unions, and from our interviews we identified the perceived difficulties in 
recruiting and retaining members. What emerged very clearly from this 
analysis was that the key problem in extending organisation was not so much 
the lack of a latent demand for union representation, as an inability to develop 
this into effective organisation in new job territories. (Chapter 11). 
Close consolidation, the maintenance of membership in highly-organised 
sites, was not usually seen as a major problem by officials, even in the 1980s, 
since workplace organisation generally remained intact. Even here, however, 
it was clear that unions could not afford to be complacent, since past and 
possible future legislation on the closed shop and on check-off, along with the 
possibility of future changes in employer attitudes, might threaten the 
effectiveness of consolidation in particular cases. Distant consolidation, the 
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maintenance of organisation across scattered establishments with a lack of 
effective workplace organisation, required greater involvement from the full-
time official, and unions organising in industries characterised by this form of 
recruitment tended to have fewer resources available to devote to 
expansionary recruitment campaigns. Whilst much could be done to improve 
the effectiveness of distant consolidation through greater effort and closer 
monitoring, unions were heavily dependent on the employer's support for 
union membership and for access to the workplace. This meant that the 
union was always highly vulnerable to changes in employer policy. (Chapter 
11). 
We found that whilst many unions had identified close expansion as a key 
area, it was often highly problematic, not least because such unorganised 
groups fended to be the most difficult to organise, because of possible 
employer resistance, and also because of the nature of the jobs themselves. 
This certainly appeared to be so in the case of contractors and agency labour, 
a key target for some unions. The limited incidence of derecognition was 
concentrated amongst white collar and professional groups which had often 
been the subject of close expansion during the 1970s. (Chapter 11). 
However, the most difficult form of recruitment was clearly distant expansion: 
where unions were attempting to break into wholly unorganised enterprises. 
Here, employer resistance was identified as a key factor, particularly in terms 
of winning recognition, and the difficulty in winning recognition was seen by 
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officials as a major factor undermining their ability to retain and consolidate 
any initial recruitment gains. Such problems were particularly severe in the 
case of peripheral workers and in the private services and newly-expanding 
industries, where a tradition of union organisation was lacking, so that initial 
membership was low, employees were often sceptical, especially after an 
initial failure to win recognition, and where employer resistance was often 
particularly strong. (Chapter 11). 
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CONCLUSEONS 
In this concluding chapter, we do three things. Firstly, we discuss the 
implications of our findings for the debates on trade union strategy. Secondly, 
we discuss the implications for the future of the union movement, referring 
back to the literature on union growth and decline. Finally, we evaluate the 
study and examine the implications for future research in this area. 
ImpiieatiiQiraa for Unl@n Stmtmw 
By the mid-1980s, trade union leaders and academics were increasingly 
making statements about the future role of unions, and the ensuing debate 
polarised along familiar lines. Thus, Towers (1989) distinguishes between the 
"new realist" unions, such as the EETPU and the AEU, concentrating on 
organising core workers and emphasising the pursuit of their members' 
interests in a narrowly sectional way, and the "new traditionalists", epitomised 
by the TGWU and the GMB, who emphasised a broader social campaigning 
approach, and aimed to organise not only core workers but also the growing 
peripheral workforce. As we saw in our introductory chapter, the former group 
was at the centre of the "New Realism" which emerged at the 1983 Trades 
Union Congress. The latter group represented an attempt by some on the 
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centre-left of the union movement to regain some of the initiative in the 
debates on union strategy, and was initially associated with people such as 
John Edmonds of the GMB and Tom Sawyer of NUPE. 
Watson (1988) adopts parallel categories, distinguishing between "business 
unionism" and "campaigning unionism", and quoting the EETPU and NUPE as 
leading examples of the two approaches. Again, the distinction is drawn on 
the basis of the wider social goals and the more inclusive nature of the latter, 
and between seeing unions as simply providing a service to members or 
alternatively as the representatives of a social cause. Watson argues that this 
dichotomy reflects a combination of pragmatism and ideology, with both 
membership characteristics and leadership traditions being important in 
moulding the approach taken by particular unions. 
The business unionism/campaigning unionism distinction appears to be 
reflected in the approach to recruitment, with business unionism being 
associated with single-union deals (Taylor, 1985: Rico, 1987) and the direct 
approach to the employer, and campaigning unionism being more usually 
associated with attempts to build up a membership base prior to approaching 
the employer for recognition, referred to by Willman (1989) as the "employer 
market" and "membership market" respectively. The former approach became 
396 
the key source of inter-union conflict during the late 1980s, eventually leading 
to the EETPU's expulsion from the TUC. 
It has also been suggested that trade union strategies can be categorised 
according to whether they are primarily aimed at "core" or "periphery" workers 
(Atkinson and Gregory, 1986; Atkinson, 1989a; Edmonds, 1986a). Thus, 
business unionism, with its emphasis on single-union deals, selling the union 
to enlightened employers as an effective "voice" mechanism, and to 
employees as a provider of individualised services, tends to concentrate on the 
permanent workforce in relatively stable establishments. Such employees are 
likely to be treated in a relatively privileged way by the employer, due to their 
possession of specific skills, and the need to encourage skills acquisition and 
functional flexibility (Atkinson, 1984). 
Employment stability, individual job commitment and the possibility that 
employers may accept the non-zero sum arguments for trade union 
recognition (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) are all likely to favour unionisation of 
core workers. However, unions may face competition from the employer for 
the loyalties of this group, in the form of sophisticated human resource 
management and communications strategies, so that unions may find it 
increasingly necessary to innovate in terms of the bargaining agenda and 
selective benefits offered (Atkinson and Gregory, 1986: 16). 
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In contrast, campaigning unionism is seen as a more inclusive approach, 
seeking to organise the whole workforce, regardless of employment status and 
skill level. Thus, the union's organising efforts extend beyond the privileged 
core, to include those treated on a hire and fire basis, such as less-skilled 
employees, part-time and temporary workers, contract staff, and public-
subsidy trainees. Such groups are used by the employer to provide "numerical 
flexibility", usually, although not exclusively in relatively low-skilled jobs 
(Atkinson, 1984). They are likely to include a high proportion of women, young 
people and ethnic minority workers. 
Here employer resistance to unionisation may be particularly keen, since 
unions threaten to constrain the employer's flexibility in the use of such staff 
and to press for expensive improvements in terms and conditions. Add to this 
the logistical difficulties in recruiting and representing a diverse flexible 
workforce, and the likely problems facing union organisers are clear. Not 
surprisingly, then, such workers were seen by some as representing the 
frontiers of trade unionism; as a group which was in need of union 
representation, given their exploitation by employers, but which had been 
neglected by unions in the past (Edmonds, 1986a). 
To what extent was the dichotomy between business unionism and 
campaigning unionism reflected in the actual behaviour of our sample of 
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unions? Clearly, there is some broad justification for categorising the EETPU 
and the AEU as "new realists" or "business unions", and the GMB, NUPE and 
the TGWU as "new traditionalists" or "campaigning unions", given the former 
group's particular association with single-union, no-strike agreements, and the 
latter's greater emphasis on recruiting the peripheral labour force and on 
broader social campaigns, epitomised perhaps by the Link Up and FLARE 
campaigns. However, there were considerable overlaps in the types of 
initiatives launched by the various unions. 
Even though the development of financial services and other discounts was 
initially associated in the media with the EETPU, who enthusiastically 
embraced the notion of members as "clients", in fact many white collar unions 
such as NALGO and BIFU had long provided a wide range of such services, 
and such developments were soon followed by other manual unions, including 
NUPE, the GMB and even the TGWU. We therefore suggest that to associate 
the development of such selective benefits solely with a narrow group of 
unions, as some writers have done (see for example, Waddington, 1988b), is 
incorrect. Equally, Mason and Bain (1991: 36-7) are unjustified in 
counterposing a "services" approach with a "militancy" approach to attracting 
members. 
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Similarly, whilst the EETPU and to a lesser extent the AEU, were seen as the 
market leaders in securing single-union deals with employers, the GM3 was 
quick to adopt the EETPU's glossy brochure and presentation approach to 
employers, and by 1990 even the TGWU, amongst the most severe in its 
criticisms of the EETPU's approach, was becoming concerned at its lack of 
success in securing such agreements, and had produced its own brochure 
aimed at selling the union to employers. Thus, it appears that there may have 
been something of a convergence in practice, as the organising methods used 
by different unions were increasingly adopted on a pragmatic basis, rather 
than reflecting any basic ideological schism. 
Unions did differ in terms of their priority recruitment targets, with unions such 
as the GMB, the TGWU and NUPE focusing on the peripheral labour force to 
a much greater extent than unions such as the EETPU and the AEU. 
However, again this appeared to owe more to pragmatism than to ideology, 
with many unions concentrating on consolidating and defending their existing 
job territories. Even where unions sought to extend their organisation to new 
sectors or establishments, the choice of recruitment targets tended to reflect 
an assessment of membership potential and the chances of success. 
Furthermore, to present the recruitment of core and peripheral workers as a 
simple choice between one or the other is misleading, since in many cases 
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initiatives aimed at these two groups could be seen as complementary. 
Hyman (1989: chapter 8) notes that recession and restructuring in the 1980s 
meant that many unionised and formerly secure primary sector workers faced 
the threat of unemployment, raising the possibility of their seeing their interests 
as increasingly congruent with those of traditionally less-secure and non-
unionised secondary sector workers. Atkinson and Gregory (1986) argue that 
a viable strategy for unions would be to confront employers' attempts to 
segment the workforce into core and periphery. Thus: 
"A broad union strategy which confronted employers' flexibility 
demands with countervailing demands for employment security, 
investment in training and equality of treatment for all workers 
might prove an effective means of redistributing some of the 
benefits of efficiency through flexibility to the totality of the labour 
force. As a unifying response to management strategy which 
threatens to fragment the union movement at enterprise level, it 
has much to commend it." 
(Atkinson and Gregory, 1986: 17) 
We have seen that many of the initiatives aimed at peripheral workers were 
designed along these lines. For example, Link Up aimed to restrict or to 
regulate the use of part-time and temporary workers, and to secure pro-rata 
terms and conditions, not least because the unregulated use of such labour 
might ultimately threaten the employment security and terms and conditions 
of permanent full-time staff. Similarly, attempts by UCATT and the EETPU 
to organise and represent the growing numbers of self-employed in 
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construction and electrical contracting could be seen as an attempt to defend 
existing organisation and bargaining arrangements. 
Finally, we suggest that it was fruitless to see the future of the union 
movement as necessitating a clear choice between either business unionism 
or campaigning unionism. Rather, unions were adopting an approach, or even 
a mix of approaches, suited to their particular recruitment territories. Indeed, 
were we minded to develop a descriptive typology of union models, we might 
suggest that a simple dichotomy would be insufficient to reflect the diversity 
of approaches. 
For example, along with the business and campaigning unionism models, we 
could identify a new model "professional" union, epitomised by the Royal 
College of Nursing and the Professional Association of Teachers. Ruling out 
strike action, emphasising professional ethics and services, and attempting to 
mobilise the "balance sheet of public opinion" to further their aims (Clay, 1987: 
143), such an approach is clearly distinguishable from business unionism, both 
in terms of its methods and its applicability only to highly-visible professional 
groups (Clay, 1987; see also Crane's (1986) study of Australian teachers' 
unions on the latter point). 
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The GMB's FLARE campaign might be interpreted, at least in principle, as 
offering a different approach to representing the peripheral labour force, not 
just through collective bargaining as was envisaged in the TGWU's Link Up 
campaign, but also by the winning and monitoring of statutory employment 
rights (Edmonds, 1986a). Cobble (1991) offers yet another model for the 
unionisation of service-sector workers, focusing on the development of an 
occupational identity, control of the supply of competent labour, and union 
regulation of work standards. 
In sum, our contention is that whilst dichotomies such as those of Towers and 
Watson may offer some useful insights into the broad terms of the union 
strategy debate, they give an idealised picture of union behaviour and risk 
overemphasising the extent to which such behaviour was a simple reflection 
of an ideological split in the labour movement. Political and ideological 
differences there no doubt were, but union organising initiatives were very 
much driven by the search for effective solutions, and a decade of declining 
membership was teaching union leaders of the need for innovation. Whilst 
unions differed in their approaches and in the types of recruitment targets 
selected, this appeared to reflect a pragmatic assessment of comparative 
advantage and of defensive necessity, rather than any abstract ideologically-
informed choice between organising core or peripheral workers, and there was 
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no sense in which the union movement faced a stark choice between opting 
for business unionism or for campaigning unionism. 
ImpMSsa^Qims for th® Fyfar® @f  th@ Tradl® Uflnn@ini Mw®mni®ir}t 
In a series of papers and articles, Paul Willman (1989; 1990; Willman and 
Morris, 1988a; 1988b) has suggested that unions would not seek growth 
through membership recruitment campaigns, particularly in the difficult to 
organise sectors. According to Willman, unions would adopt what he calls 
"market share" trade unionism, preferring to compete for single-union deals 
with employers and for mergers, both of which represent a more economical 
means of securing additional membership than directly recruiting individual 
members. The implication is that the difficult to organise groups, including the 
peripheral labour force and those whose employers are hostile to unionisation, 
would be to some extent written off by union organisers. 
There is something in the notion that mergers and single-union deals offer an 
economical means of recruitment, and it is clear that many unions were 
affording them a high priority. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 10, the TGWU 
became increasingly concerned at its relatively poor performance in each of 
these areas. However, we must question Wiliman's conclusions in at least 
four respects. 
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Firstly, he argues that the decline in union finances in the 1970s is evidence 
that membership recruitment is not necessarily beneficial to unions, at least 
from a financial point of view. Thus: 
"It is possible that union behaviour in the 1980s is influenced by 
the experience of cost-ineffective growth in the previous decade 
and that 'market share' unionism has emerged as a growth 
strategy in part because of the recent experience of cost-
ineffective growth." 
(Willman, 1989: 266) 
However, we showed in chapter 7 that such reasoning is flawed, in that unions 
appeared to determine contributions rates on a satisficing basis, so that there 
was no necessity for major increases in real contributions during the 1970s 
because at that time rapid growth meant that immediate financial crisis was 
avoided. Sharply declining membership and the threat of financial difficulties 
provided the stimulus to increase real contributions during the 1980s, and 
unions appear to have been successful in this, no doubt helped by lower levels 
of inflation and by rising real earnings. Thus, we cannot conclude that the 
membership growth of the 1970s was necessarily "cost-ineffective", it is simply 
that compared to the 1980s the need to increase real contributions was less 
urgent. 
405 
Secondly, we have shown how much of the recruitment effort of the 1980s 
was aimed at consolidating existing areas, and that in certain sectors such an 
approach was considered essential if the union was to maintain its existing 
areas of organisation. In such cases unions were obliged by circumstances 
to treat individual recruitment as a key priority. Even where the need for 
consolidation was less pressing, unions might be expected to prioritise it in a 
period of declining membership, particularly where if could be delegated 
largely to lay members at little direct financial cost to the union. 
Thirdly, at least some unions could be expected to attempt to extend their 
organisation, in order to preserve their bargaining strength and political 
influence. Whilst unions representing well-organised and clearly-delineated 
industries and occupations might do little in the way of expansionary 
recruitment, those unions with large semi-skilled memberships vulnerable to 
general labour market trends would feel compelled to attempt to recruit in 
expanding job territories in order to avoid the undermining of their members' 
terms and conditions, and those unions representing workers with less labour 
market "clout" would be particularly concerned about a possible long-term 
marginalisation of the union movement as a social and political force 
(Edmonds, 1986c: 7). 
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Finally, contrary to Willman, we would suggest that inter-union competition 
might in some circumstances promote aggregate union growth. For example 
in the case of consolidation in the public sector, we found evidence to suggest 
that actual and potential competition between unions could act as a spur, 
encouraging recruitment activity. 
In sum, we cannot agree with Willman that unions would necessarily reduce 
the emphasis on recruiting individual members. Membership recruitment had 
not necessarily been financially damaging to unions in the past, whilst the 
circumstances of the 1980s might be expected to lead unions to place a 
greater emphasis on recruitment. 
In fact, it appears that much of the growth of the 1970s was received rather 
than actively sought by union leaders, and as we have shown, it is simply not 
true that unions reduced the emphasis on recruitment campaigns in the 1980s; 
quite the reverse. Thus, any notion of a recruitment growth strategy being 
emphasised in the 1970s and subsequently abandoned in the 1980s is false. 
Whilst single-union deals and mergers may represent an ideal low-cost 
means of securing growth, in general there is little evidence to suggest that 
they were used to the exclusion of recruitment campaigns. 
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However, whilst we feel that Willman overstates the extent to which financial 
considerations constrained union organising activity, we are not necessarily 
suggesting that unions would find it easy to extend their organisation. We 
therefore find it difficult to agree with Kelly and Heery's conclusion on the likely 
effectiveness of recruitment campaigns: 
"Bain's arguments for the ineffectiveness of recruitment 
campaigns turned out to be quite unconvincing, and insufficient 
to prove his case. In our view it remains an open question as to 
whether an extensive mobilisation of union resources would 
significantly increase aggregate membership in conditions of low 
inflation and high unemployment." 
(Kelly and Heery, 1989: 211) 
It may be that unions could have done more on recruitment, and their efforts 
may have fallen short of what Kelly and Heery would see as an "extensive 
mobilisation" of resources. Certainly there was an unevenness, both between 
and within unions, in the extent to which organising activity was effectively 
prioritised, and there were often organisational barriers limiting the transition 
towards a "recruitment culture". Nevertheless, we found considerable 
evidence that unions were launching and actually implementing organising 
campaigns, as well as developing their services, benefits and contributions 
policies. However, such developments were clearly not in themselves a 
sufficient condition for a resumption of union growth. Unions were often able 
to recruit pockets of members, but it proved difficult to consolidate these and 
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to build effective organisation, due to the nature of the workforce involved and, 
critically, to the resistance of employers to union recognition (see chapters 10 
and 11). 
The problem facing unions was thus not so much the lack of an underlying 
propensity to unionise on the part of employees, nor even an inability to recruit 
individual members, but rather the difficulties in consolidating any initial 
membership gains into effective organisation. This was particularly so during 
a period when the economic and political climate was such as to convince 
many employers of the viability of the non-union option, and when the threat 
of industrial action to force the issue of recognition was remote. 
It could be argued that unions might have achieved better results through a 
more effective mobilisation of officials and members behind the organising 
campaigns. However, such a view could be questioned on two grounds. 
Firstly, whilst some unions did comparatively little in this respect, others did 
rather more, and given the organisational and "managerial" obstacles, it is not 
clear how much more they could have done. Secondly, it is possible that the 
mobilisation of additional resources would have resulted in the recruitment of 
additional pockets of membership, but where recognition was lacking there is 
no reason to suppose that this would have led to more effective consolidation 
and organisation. Additional effort might have produced more in cases of 
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distant consolidation, where recognition existed and yet density was low, 
although the unions organising such sectors were those which were already 
making the most effort on recruitment. 
Thus, many of the officials we interviewed appeared to have some sympathy 
with the deterministic theory of union growth as reflected in the econometric 
models, at least as regards the short run. A constant theme in our interviews 
was the difficulty in winning new recognition agreements in the economic and 
political climate of the 1980s. Significantly, by 1991 the TUC was seriously 
considering proposals for the reintroduction of a statutory recognition 
procedure in Britain, reflecting the improved showing of Labour in the opinion 
polls, and also a growing belief that recruitment campaigns were not in 
themselves enough to secure the future of the union movement, particularly 
in small-firms, in the growing "hi-tech" and private-services sectors, and in 
the face of strong employer resistance to unionisation (TUC, 1991b; Labour 
Research Department, 1991c; McCarthy, 1985b). 
We suggest that the effectiveness of the union organising initiatives can only 
be properly assessed within the context of the literature on union growth. We 
argued in chapter 3 that it is useful to distinguish between short-term cyclical 
factors and more long-term influences on union growth and density (Bain and 
Price, 1983; Carruth and Disney, 1988). The sharp decline in membership 
410 
and density in the 1980s was attributable largely to business cycle factors, 
especially lower inflation, stronger real wage growth and rising unemployment, 
and to the influence of hostile Conservative governments (Carruth and Disney, 
1988; Disney, 1990), although there was some disagreement in the literature 
over the role of Conservative employment legislation in particular (Freeman 
and Pelletier, 1990; Disney, 1990). Structural change in the labour force, with 
a relative shift away from the highly unionised groups and sectors, did not 
account for the particularly sharp decline during the 1980s, but such shifts 
appeared to imply a more gradual long-term decline in density, if not in 
membership (Bain and Price, 1983). 
These econometric models appeared to leave at least some scope for factors 
other than those specified to contribute to union growth, and this thesis 
discussed the extent to which union strategies might be one such factor. We 
suggested in our introductory chapter that the initial response of union leaders, 
particularly before 1983, was to count on the eventual return of a Labour 
government, and a political and economic climate more conducive to union 
growth. However, with Labour's second and third electoral defeats in 1983 
and 1987, and the realisation that employment growth did not automatically 
feed through into union membership, there was a growing view amongst union 
leaders that it was not sufficient simply to "batten down the hatches" and await 
better times. There was thus an increasing emphasis on new organising 
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initiatives and on the development of union services by the latter half of the 
1980s. 
The distinction between short-term cyclical developments and long-term 
structural ones may be useful in discussing the likely success of such 
initiatives. One might argue that in the early 1980s the focus was largely on 
an anticipated reversal of the adverse cyclical factors, both economic and 
political, which were causing a particularly sharp decline in those years. As 
the decade wore on, however, attention shifted towards the longer-term 
structural developments, and to how unions might avoid a more gradual but 
in the longer term more fundamental decline in the face of structural shifts 
towards female, peripheral, small-firm and private-services employment. 
Viewed in this light, the admittedly modest achievements of union organising 
campaigns by 1991 was only to be expected. The realistic aim of such 
initiatives was to check any long-term structural decline and to eventually 
extend union organisation to the expanding sectors of the labour market, 
rather than necessarily to reverse the largely cyclical losses of the 1980s. The 
latter were only likely to be seriously addressed by a shift in the economic and 
political cycle, involving some combination of higher inflation, stagnating real 
wages, lower unemployment and a pro-union government (Disney, 1990). 
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Kelly (1987: 17-18) and Bain (1986: 158) are amongst those who have 
pointed out that unions have grown in the past precisely by organising those 
groups who were previously felt to be unorganisable, including semi-skilled 
workers, clerks, supervisors, managers and women. However, such major 
expansions in the union's organised job territories have usually occurred when 
the economic and political conditions have been favourable, probably because 
of the difficulties in securing new recognition agreements in a hostile 
environment. Thus, both Cronin (1979) and Kelly (1988) point out that periods 
of rapid union growth have been characterised by high levels of industrial 
action, suggesting that both generalised industrial discontent and the absence 
of a restraining "fear factor" may be essential prerequisites for a significant 
extension of union organisation. Several of our interviewees attributed their 
inability to win recognition at least in part to the reluctance of employees to 
take industrial action during the 1980s, and to the realisation by employers that 
unions had no means of forcing the issue of recognition. 
Thus, the organising campaigns and other initiatives must be viewed in a 
longer-term perspective. It may be that the initiatives described in this thesis 
were laying the basis for future expansion when conditions became more 
favourable to the winning of recognition, by raising the profile of unions 
amongst the targeted groups. In the meantime, of course, periodic setbacks 
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could be anticipated as a result of short-term developments in the economy 
and in the political climate. 
On one level, we are offering a reconciliation of the Bain/Undy debate on the 
relative importance of environmental and leadership factors in determining 
union growth (see chapter 3). We suggest that the ability of unions to 
increase membership through recruitment and other initiatives, whilst perhaps 
not negligable, is nevertheless limited by economic and political factors in the 
short run. In the long run, however, it may not be possible to mechanically 
predict declining membership simply by extrapolating current cross-section 
density patterns into the future, since it is here that union strategies may shift 
"...the basic parameters of the unionisation equation..." (Bain, 1986: 158). 
In sum, our view is that unions were actively attempting to come to terms with 
membership decline by the late 1980s, and that membership recruitment 
campaigns were seen as an important part of that response. However, whilst 
such campaigns had potential in terms of consolidating existing areas of 
organisation, their effectiveness in extending union organisation to new job 
territories was severely limited by the inability to secure recognition from 
employers, in a period when the economic and political conditions were 
unfavourable to unions. Nevertheless, such campaigns, along with the other 
developments in services, contributions, collective bargaining aims and internal 
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structures, might enable unions to make advances in organising new job 
territories in the longer term, when the economic and political conditions were 
more favourable. By the early 1990s it was simply too early to judge the long-
term effectiveness of unions' attempts to come to terms with declining 
membership and a changing labour market. 
BimplaaiftB@nfs for Futum Rmmmh 
We set out in this thesis to describe the unions' responses to declining 
membership, and to examine the implementation and effectiveness of such 
responses. In this chapter, we have discussed the implications of our findings 
for union strategy and for the future of unions in Britain. Whilst we have made 
some progress towards our research aims, a number of questions remain 
unanswered, and it is the task of this final section to review these and to 
briefly set out a number of research priorities which emerge from our study. 
Firstly, our research draws mainly on interviews in the north of the country. 
Whilst we have been careful to avoid basing our conclusions on the 
experience of a single city or region, and we did learn something of experience 
in the south east of England, it would be useful to compare our findings with 
those of a similar study drawing on interviews with local officials based in the 
south east. Tighter labour markets, a more services-based economy, and a 
different social and political culture may mean that the problems facing union 
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campaigns are even more severe than in the north, so that we would expect 
that our conclusions on the limited short term success of union campaigns 
would be strengthened by such a comparison. 
Secondly, we focus on the experience of a sample of large unions, and 
examine one particular campaign in detail. Clearly, there is a need for 
research on other campaigns and unions. Whilst there is likely to be a degree 
of common experience, and our sample of unions accounted for 53 per cent 
of total union membership in 1989, nevertheless differences in membership 
composition, employer policies and sectoral characteristics mean that we 
cannot necessarily generalise our findings across all unions. 
Thirdly, there is a need to develop some of the organisational issues raised by 
this study and by other writers (Kelly and Heery, 1989; Mason and Bain, 
1991). Thus, whilst we have discussed some of the problems encountered in 
developing a "recruitment culture", there is a need for a more in-depth study 
of the way in which various unions manage their resources, and not least their 
full-time officials. A more developed analysis of unions along the lines of the 
research on corporate culture and performance in business organisations 
would have much to offer in terms of understanding the development of unions 
as organisations. Such research might also offer useful insights for 
practitioners themselves. 
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Finally, given our conclusion to the previous section, there is a need to 
continue to monitor the effectiveness of union campaigns in the future. The 
context within which the unions operate continues to change as we enter the 
1990s. Competition is likely to continue to be keen, not least because of 
closer economic and monetary integration in Europe, and the control of costs 
and inflation will remain a key priority for employers and governments alike. 
Unemployment is unlikely to fall to pre-1980s levels in the foreseeable future, 
particularly given the movement into recession by 1990. On the other hand, 
the implementation of the provisions of the European "Social Charter", and the 
possibility of a change in the political climate in the UK may mean that the 
future for unions is not all bleak, particularly given their apparently growing 
awareness of the need to adapt themselves to the needs of a changing 
workforce. 
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TOADE UNION mm 8ERSHIIP AMD D E M I ITY IN THE UK, 195 8-89. 
1 2 3 
Year Membership Employees In Union 
COO'S Employment 
COO'S 
Density 
(%) 
1950 9289 20758 44.75 
1951 9535 20970 45.47 
1952 9588 20916 45.84 
1953 9527 21041 45.28 
1954 9566 21404 44.69 
1955 9741 21702 44.89 
1956 9778 21985 44.52 
1957 9829 22058 44.56 
1958 9639 21884 44.05 
1959 9623 21421 44.92 
1960 9835 21899 44.91 
1861 9897 22233 44.51 
1962 9887 22452 44.04 
1963 9934 22509 44.13 
1964 10079 22816 44.18 
1965 10181 23085 44.10 
1966 10259 23257 44.11 
1967 10188 22813 44.66 
1968 10191 22655 44.98 
1969 10470 22624 46.28 
1970 11178 22479 49.73 
1971 11126 22139 50.26 
1972 11351 22137 51.28 
1973 11447 22679 50.47 
1974 11755 22804 51.55 
1975 12184 22723 53.62 
1976 12376 22557 54.87 
1977 12846 22631 56.76 
1978 13112 22789 57.54 
1979 13289 23137 57.44 
1980 12947 22991 56.31 
1981 12106 21892 55.30 
1982 11593 21414 54.14 
1983 11236 21067 53.33 
1984 10994 21238 51.77 
1985 10821 21423 50.51 
1986 10539 21387 49.28 
1987 10475 21584 48.53 
1988 10376 22276 46.58 
1989 10158 22751 44.65 
Sources: Union Membership - Bailey and Kelly (1990: 269) and Employment Gazette, various issues. 
Employees in employment - Economic Trends, Annual Supplement, 1991, p111. All employees 
in employment, unadjusted for seasonal variation, June each year. 
Union density equals (1)x100/(2). 
(All figures refer to UK) 
Note: There is some controversy regarding the appropriate denominator in union density calculations (Kelly and 
Bailey, 1989). Given that UK unions are essentially organisations representing the employed, who do not 
usually actively recruit amongst the unemployed, we have chosen to exclude the latter from our 
calculations. However, to the extent that a small proportion of the unemployed, and indeed the retired and 
the self employed, are union members, the above will overstate the true density amongst the employed. 
Bailey and Kelly (1990) suggest that in 1986 the unemployed represented around 2.06 per cent of union 
membership, whilst the retired accounted for a further 5.75 per cent. They assume that the self employed 
were an insignificant proportion. This suggests that the above membership figures overstated the 
employed membership by as much as 8 per cent in 1986, implying a true density of 45 per cent in that 
year. 
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\AMPLE UmOMS'. MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE 1980s 
In this study, we base our analysis on the experience of a sample of nine 
unions. Table A2.1 ranks them according to the percentage membership loss 
over the period 1979 to 1989, whilst table A2.2 provides full membership 
figures. 
TABLE A2.1 : Sample Unions: Rank Order by % Membership Loss , 
1979=89 
Union Membership Loss Absolute Membership 
(%) Loss 
(OOO'S) 
AEU 43 568 
TGWU 39 815 
GMB 34 425 
UCATT 26 91 
All unions 24 3168 
USDAW 20 94 
EETPU 17 77 
NUPE 13 87 
NALGO 0 2 
BIFU* (29) 08) 
* = Membership increase 
Source: Membership data from Annual Report of the Certification Officer, various years. 
During this period, aggregate union membership fell by 24 per cent, but 
the experience of particular unions varied considerably. 
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T A B L E Rflembsrahlp ©f Sample ©If Unions, 1975-1989 
Yoar Total 
Union 
KtoWp 
AEU BIFU EETPU GK!B NALCO NUFE TGWU UCATT USOAW 
1975 11656 1294 102 427 1153 625 384 1856 278 377 
1876 12133 1259 112 429 1188 683 651 1930 297 413 
1977 12719 1268 117 433 1221 709 693 2023 308 442 
1978 13054 1293 128 438 124S 729 712 2073 325 462 
1979 13212 1310 132 444 1248 753 692 2086 349 470 
1980 12636 1252 141 439 1180 782 699 1887 312 450 
1981 12311 1099 148 429 1109 739 704 1698 275 438 
1982 11744 1070 152 416 1049 726 702 1633 261 417 
1983 11300 1009 156 405 975 780 689 1547 260 403 
1984 11084 1001 155 394 942 766 673 1491 250 392 
1985 10819 975 157 385 917 752 684 1434 249 385 
1986 10598 858 159 374 898 750 658 1378 249 382 
1987 10480 815 166 369 883 759 651 1349 258 387 
1988 10387 794 168 370 864 755 635 1313 250 397 
1989 10044 742 170 367 823 751 605 1271 258 376 
NOTES: AEU Includes the AUEW Constructional. Engineering and Foundry sections before 1985 (but excludes TASS). GMB Includes Amalgamated 
Society of Boilermakers and APEX tor the whole period. 
SOURCE: Annual Report of the Certification Officer, various years. 
The AEU experienced far greater membership losses than the average, losing 
43 per cent of its 1979 membership. This reflected the particularly heavy job 
losses in the engineering industry, where the AEU's membership was 
concentrated. However, the decline in AEU membership also represents a 
clearing-out of lapsed members, particularly during 1986, when the union 
recorded a 12 per cent drop in membership (Financial Times, 14 November 
1987: 5). Thus, AEU membership as a proportion of total employment in the 
metal goods, engineering and vehicles industries (SIC 3), used as a proxy for 
AEU membership penetration, declined only slightly from 1979 to 1981, 
thereafter increasing up to 1984, and only falling significantly with the 
membership shake-out after 1985 (see Table A2.3). 
Both the TGWU and the GMB experienced above-average falls in 
membership, reflecting the major job losses amongst blue collar workers in 
manufacturing industry, and in sectors such as transport and public utilities. 
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UCATT lost proportionately more members than even the TGWU during the 
early 1980s, but its recovery in membership growth came rather earlier than 
for the other private-sector blue-collar unions, with static membership in 1986 
and growth in 1987 and 1989. These trends reflect to some extent the 
marked cyclical pattern of employment in the construction industry, with 
employment growth resuming after 1986. 
During the early 1980s, USDAW's membership declined almost in line with 
aggregate union membership. However, as in the case of UCATT, the 
recovery in membership came rather earlier than the average, reflecting 
strong employment growth in distribution after 1983. In spite of this, however, 
USDAW's share of distribution employment continued to decline to the end of 
the decade. 
The EETPU lost 77 thousand members in the period 1979 to 1989. Whilst 
this was less than for many unions, it still represented 17 per cent of the 1979 
membership, and can again be attributed largely to job losses in 
manufacturing and the public utilities, as well as to the growth of self 
employment in electrical contracting. 
By 1989, NUPE had lost 13 per cent of its 1979 membership, losing 46 
thousand members in 1988 and 1989 alone. Unlike most of the other unions, 
NUPE's losses appeared to be heavier towards the end of the decade, rather 
than in the early 1980s. This may reflect the fact that the recession of 1980-
81 had a less profound impact on NUPE's public sector job territories, with the 
main challenge coming from privatisation measures later in the period. 
However, potential losses in the early 1980s may well have been masked by 
large-scale defections during the strikes of 1979, with some recovery of these 
losses in succeeding years. 
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The other two unions in our sample experienced less of a problem of 
declining membership during the 1980s. NALGO lost only two thousand 
members, and BIFU recorded a membership increase over the decade. 
NALGO's growth was rather erratic, perhaps reflecting the changeable mood 
of the workforce in what was an unsettled period for local government and the 
public utilities, where NALGO's mainly white collar membership was 
concentrated. In contrast, BIFU grew in every year but for 1984, with a 29 
per cent increase in membership over the period 1979 to 1989. To a large 
extent, this was simply the result of employment growth in banking, insurance 
and finance, from 646 thousand in 1979 to 915 thousand in 1989, an increase 
of over 40 per cent (GB, SIC 81,82). Thus, in spite of strong membership 
growth, BIFU membership as a proportion of total employment in banking, 
insurance and finance increased by less than two percentage points between 
1979 and 1983 and thereafter declined steadily (Table A2.3). 
In sum, the predominantly blue collar unions with large numbers of members 
in the private sector tended to suffer the more marked losses in membership, 
whilst the white collar and/or public sector unions tended to suffer rather less. 
However, with the exception of NALGO and BIFU, all the unions in our 
sample experienced a significant fall in membership. NALGO experienced 
falling membership towards the end of the period and even BIFU faced a 
slowing of its rate of growth and failed to keep pace with employment growth 
in banking and finance. Thus, to a greater or lesser extent, all of our sample 
unions might be expected to launch initiatives designed to cope with the 
challenges of the 1980s. 
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TABLE M@Gffi)[b©!r! ship sis si Pir®p@irai®[fi) @f © B Einmpll©^® 
Uoiomis and Of radlystirits 
Year Union and Industry (SIC) % 
AEU/Metal Goods, BIFU/Banttlng and UCATT/Conatruetlon USDAWASmo+asala b 
Engineering & Finance, Insurants Retail Distribution 
Vohlcloo 
(3) (81,82) (S) (31,04/33) 
1877 382 19.2 262 16.4 
1978 38.7 20.1 28.0 15.9 
1979 39.3 20.4 29.1 15.7 
1980 38.8 20.9 25.9 14.9 
1981 38.1 21.5 25.0 15.0 
1982 39.7 22.1 25.1 14.7 
1983 40.1 222 25.6 142 
1984 41.1 21.5 243 13.5 
1985 40.5 
21 a 25.1 132 1986 36.7 212 25.8 13.1 
1987 35.5 21.1 26.0 132 
1988 34.1 19.7 24.6 132 
1989 31.6 18.6 24.9 12.0 
NOTE: Shows union membership divided by GB employment. Should not be read as an Indicator of union density, since Industries are multi-union, 
and unions have some members In other sectors, outside GB and non-employed. 
SOURCES: Union membership - Annual Report of the Certification Officer, various years Employment - Employment Gazette, various Issues. 
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ApptmidliH 3 
SCHEDULE FOR INTERVIEWS WITH LOCAL UMIOM OFFICIALS 
INTRODUCTION 
Aims of Research 
Personal Confidentiality 
YOUR OWN ACTIVITIES AS A UNION OFFICIAL 
I would like to begin by finding out a little bit about your job. 
1. What is your job title? 
2. Please rank the following according to the amount of time you spend 
on each. 
CARD (a) Helping or advising union stewards or 
representatives. 
(b) Negotiating with employers. 
(c) Preparing for negotiations. 
(d) Attending union branches/committees. 
(e) Helping members with individual problems. 
(f) Recruitment. 
(g) Routine office work. 
(h) Others (please specify). 
Have any of these become significantly more time consuming over the 
last 3 to 5 years? Why is this? 
CARD 
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4. Have any of these become significantly less time consuming over the 
last 3 to 5 years? Why is this? 
CARD 
5. Which of these would you like to spend more time on? Why? 
CARD 
RECRUITMENT 
I would like to go on now to discuss recruitment in particular. 
6. What is the typical approach to recruitment in your union? 
Probe areas: Role of full-time official? 
Role of lay members? 
Specialist recruitment officials? 
7. Who is responsible for monitoring and coordinating recruitment activity 
within your union? 
Probe areas: Monitoring of membership and recruitment? 
Reporting system? 
Copy of report forms? 
Local level? 
National level? 
Any recent changes? 
How information used? 
Recruitment quotas or incentives? 
8. Has the union launched any recruitment campaigns in recent years? 
Details? 
Probe areas: Why/not? 
Target groups? 
Why these? 
Method of target selection? 
Seeking to expand field of recruitment? 
Source of initiative? 
National or local campaign? 
Impact on your work? 
Copies of literature? 
Innovations in approach/methods? 
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9. How successful have these campaigns been? 
Probe areas: Recruitment figures? 
Recognition? 
Cost-effectiveness? 
Continuing campaigns? 
Future plans? 
10. What are the most common problems you face in recruiting members? 
Probe areas: Specific examples? 
Reasons? 
Recent trends/developments? 
11. What are the most common problems you face in retaining members? 
Probe areas: Specific examples? 
Reasons? 
Recent trends/developments? 
12. What is the union doing to try to overcome these difficulties? 
I would like to look briefly at developments in the union's services and 
benefits. (IDENTIFY INNOVATIONS, WHERE APPROPRIATE). 
13. Have there been any/any other initiatives on services or benefits? 
Probe areas: Literature? 
Local initiatives? 
14. What is the thinking behind the new services? 
Probe areas: Source of initiative? 
Your views on them? 
Interest from members? 
Evidence? 
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15. In your experience, do the new services and benefits referred to help 
in the recruitment and retention of members? 
16. Do they allow you to recruit and retain members even where you lack 
recognition from the employer? 
Probe areas: Evidence? 
Envisage being possible in future? 
17. Do you feel that you would lose members to other unions if you did not 
develop new services and benefits? 
Probe areas: Evidence? 
Which sectors/unions? 
18. What future developments in services and benefits do you envisage? 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Having looked at the benefits of union membership, it seems sensible to finish 
by looking at the costs. 
19. What is the current level of contributions? 
Probe areas: Categories? 
20. When was this last increased? 
Probe areas: Details? 
Any controversy? 
21. Is the level of contributions a problem in the recruitment and retention 
of members? 
Probe areas: Evidence? 
Conscious of rates of other unions? 
22. In your opinion, does inter-union competition keep contribution rates 
down? 
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Are there any comments you would like to make? 
Probe areas: Key issues omitted? 
Questions? 
Thanks. 
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MEMBERSHIP TUmOmH: SOME EXAMPLES 
The level of union membership is a stock, which is affected by inward and 
outward flows, and can be influenced by policies aimed at either of these 
flows. Three simple examples, shown in Tables A4.1, A4.2 and A4.3, will 
illustrate the point. 
TABLE M . 1 : TGWU Memborehlp, 1985=9 
000's less mm 1987 1988 1989 
Membership, 1 Jan 1 1,491 1,434 1,378 1,349 1,313 
Membership Lost2 277 294 270 281 324 
Members Recruited3 220 238 241 245 282 
Membership, 31 Dec 4 1,434 1,378 1,349 1,313 1,271 
1 8 , 4 From Annual Reports of the Certification Officer. 
2 Equals (1) plus (3) minus (4). 
3 From TGWU Record, September 1990, p10. 
During 1989, a net fall in TGWU membership of almost 42 thousand was 
produced by a loss of 324 thousand (25 per cent of 1988 membership) and 
a gain of 282 thousand (21 per cent of 1988 membership). Even in the 
apparently unfavourable climate of the late-1980s the union was able to 
recruit over a quarter of a million members during the year. 
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TABLE M.2: USOAW CMeimltoirsllillp, 11988 
@0©'@ 
Membership, 31 December 1988 395 
Members Lost During the Year 135 
Members Recruited During the Year 115 
Membership, 31 December 1989 375 
i@ys"g@: Financial Times, 23 April 1990, p.8. 
Similarly, during 1989, USDAW suffered a net fall of around twenty thousand 
members. In spite of recruiting over 115 thousand new members during the 
year (equal to almost thirty per cent of its 1988 membership), the union lost 
over 135 thousand members during the year (over a third of its 1988 
membership). 
TABLE A4.3: AEU Membership, 1988-9 
080'S 
Membership, 31 December 19881 794 
Members Lost During the Year 2 110 
Members Recruited During the Year 3 58 
Membership, 31 December 19894 742 
Notes: 
1 3 4 From AEU Annual Report and Accounts, 1989. 
2 Equals (1)+(3)-(4). 
The AEU lost 110 thousand members during 1989, equivalent to nearly 14 per 
cent of its membership, whilst recruiting 58 thousand or 7 per cent of its 
membership. 
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Appendix 
THE DEMAND FOR UNION SERVICES: 
A TIME-SERIES AFFROACK1 
In this appendix, we briefly describe our attempt to estimate a demand for 
union services model, using data for the period 1951 to 1988 (see Appendix 
7 for details of the data). Our approach is broadly similar to that of Pencavel 
(1971). 
Vairialbllds Us@dl M th® Analysts 
The dependent variable is union density (UDEN), preferred to union 
membership because density has the advantage of separating out any growth 
attributable simply to employment growth. 
The "price" variable is real union income from members per head of 
membership (RPCMIN). This is taken to represent the average contribution 
paid, measured in £'s per annum. This variable is an imperfect proxy for the 
average contribution rate for three reasons. Firstly, it ignores the fact that 
some of those in membership on 31st December (the date at which 
membership figures are assessed) will only have been contributing for part of 
the year. This may be offset by those who contribute for some of the year, 
but who are no longer in membership on 31st December (although unions are 
notoriously slow to adjust their records to take account of non-payers, and 
members may be in arrears with their contributions for long periods before 
being removed from the membership register). 
Secondly, some unions levy entrance fees for new members, in addition to 
annual contributions, and these are included in the data under the heading of 
"income from members". Hence, PCMIN will tend to be an overestimate of 
the annual average contribution rate when membership is increasing. This 
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overestimate is, however, likely to be small, since entrance fees were 
restricted mainly to the older craft unions. 
Thirdly, unions tend not to collect all the contributions that are due, because 
of inefficiencies in their collection systems, so that PCM IN will underestimate 
the true contribution rate. This distortion is likely to have become less 
important in recent years, to the extent that check-off and direct debit have 
led to greater efficiency in the collection of contributions due. 
In spite of these difficulties, however, we feel justified in following Pencavel's 
example in using PCMIN as a proxy for the average contribution. The above 
distortions will to some extent net off against each other, and in the absence 
of an alternative covering such a long period, PCM IN represents the best 
available series. 
As is usual in demand estimation, we include an income variable, in the form 
of real personal disposable income per head of population (RINCPC). 
Following Pencavel (1971), we estimated the equation in linear form, and we 
specified a partial adjustment process by including the dependent variable 
lagged by one year (UDENt-l)as an additional independent variable. The 
assumption here is that actual union membership takes some time to adjust 
to its desired level. Thus, when contributions are reduced, we expect the 
increase in membership to be delayed because of inertia on the part of 
workers, by possible employer resistance to unionisation and by possible 
union inertia in meeting any latent demand for union services in previously 
ununionised sectors. When contributions are increased, we expect the fall in 
membership to be delayed because of inertia on the part of workers and also 
because members ceasing to pay contributions are usually allowed to accrue 
several months' arrears before being officially excluded from membership. 
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The estimating equation is of the following form: 
UDENt = Ao + A1 .UDENt-1 + A2.RPCMINt + A3.RINCPCt + Ut 
The short-run demand curve has a slope equal to the estimated value of A2, 
whilst the long-run demand curve has a slope of A2/(1 -A1). Elasticities can 
then be calculated in the usual way. 
EmpSrieal [Rasyite 
The results are shown in Table A5.1, and the implied price elasticities appear 
in Table A5.2, evaluated at their 1988 levels. We present the OLS results as 
equation I. However, the Durbin h statistic is suggestive of autocorrelation, 
and so we followed Pencavel (1971: 188) in using an instrumental variables 
approach presented as equation II, whereby lagged values of the other 
independent variables (RPCMINt-1 and RINCPCt-1) are used as instruments 
for the lagged dependent variable (UDENt-1) in an attempt to ensure 
consistency of the estimates. We found that this made little difference to the 
estimates. 
The estimated adjustment coefficient (1-A1) is around 0.15, suggesting that 
union density achieves about 15 per cent of any desired adjustment over a 
one year period. This is consistent with complete adjustment in almost seven 
years, which does appear to be rather slower than one might expect, and 
compares with an adjustment coefficient of 0.46 in Pencavel (1971). 
Judging from the significant positive coefficients on the real income variable, 
union services are a normal good. 
The implied price elasticities from our equations are presented in Table A5.2, 
evaluated at their 1988 levels. In clear contrast to those of Pencavel (1971), 
our results suggest that, whilst the short-run price elasticity of demand for 
union services is less than unity, over the long run demand is highly elastic. 
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TABLE AS.H: ©©mand iter Union S@rwte@s: Tiinra©=S®iri@s R@syOSi 
(Dependent variable is UDEN) 
a 
OLS 
i f 
nwv 
DBA 
OLS 
UDENt-1 0.864319*** 
(15.18693) 
0.821932*** 
(7.79458) 
RPCMINt -0.526166*** 
(-4.05836) 
-0.657557*** 
(-3.74493) 
-1.714944*** 
(-5.97369) 
RINCPCt 0.003447*** 
(3.35266) 
0.004521*** 
(2.77501) 
0.015768*** 
(9.71333) 
Constant 8.639914*** 
(3.85050) 
10.442884*** 
(2.83440) 
38.234290*** 
(11.29732) 
R2 adj 0.97533 0.97119 0.79360 
F 475.40225*** 405.48520*** 72.13211*** 
DW 1.38307 1.51842 0.54836 
Durbin's H 1.89048 1.67240 Undefined 
Significant at: 1% level 
TABLE A5.2: ImnipllSed Proe® Elasticities of D@maodl 
(1988 levels) 
Equation Short Run Long Run 
Elasticity Elasticity 
I OLS -0.41 -3.04 
II INV -0.52 -2.90 
III OLS - -1.35 
We were surprised to find such high estimated price elasticities, given the 
much lower estimates of Pencavel (1971), and the fact that the officials we 
interviewed claimed that contributions increases had only a marginal impact 
on membership. We were also concerned that the adjustment coefficient was 
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rather higher than we expected. Indeed, when we estimated the OLS 
equation in full-adjustment form (ie without the lagged dependent variable), 
shown as equation III, we derived on elasticity of only 1.35. When we began 
to review the literature (Willman and Morris, 1988a; 1988b) and press 
coverage on contributions increases during the 1980s, it became clear that 
most commentators envisaged a causal link from falling membership to 
increased contributions, rather than the reverse as is implied by the price 
elasticity of demand analysis. This view was also suggested by many of the 
union officials we interviewed. 
We find in Appendix 6 that the level of membership and density do indeed 
appear to influence the level of contributions, possibly via some form of 
satisficing behaviour in setting the contribution rate. Whilst we found some 
evidence of a causal link running from contributions to membership and 
density, it does seem that our estimates overstate the true price-elasticity 
effect. 
Furthermore, the presence of positive autocorrelation is suggestive of an 
omitted variable problem, which would also introduce bias into our estimates. 
This is likely, since we make no allowance for the cyclical and structural 
influences on union density, as discussed in Chapter 3, where we alluded to 
the difficulties in estimating a structural demand equation which incorporates 
such variables. 
In sum, there does appear to be a price elasticity effect, although we cannot 
state with any degree of certainty that the elasticity is greater than one. In 
principle, there is a need to allow for the endogeneity of contributions and to 
deal with the likely omitted variable problem by constructing a more 
sophisticated demand equation which draws on the findings of the union 
growth literature. However, we have already referred to the tendency for this 
literature to concentrate on reduced-form equations, due to the difficulties in 
specifying a demand curve (see Chapter 3), so that we do not attempt such 
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an analysis here. Further research on the price elasticity question is clearly 
required, although given the above problems it may be that such research will 
be of a non-econometric nature, for example involving surveys or the direct 
monitoring of the impact of contributions increases. 
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GRANGER CAUSATION TiSTINO OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
REAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND UNION MEMBERSHIP 
The price-elasticity analysis of Appendix 5 appeared to suggest that higher 
contributions would reduce union membership. However, we decided to carry 
out further tests to determine the direction of causation in this relationship. 
Did higher contributions result in lower membership (a price elasticity effect), 
or did falling membership lead unions to raise contributions to restore their 
finances (a price satisficer effect)? 
Granger causation testing offered to provide an answer to this question. 
Following Maddala (1988) we estimated the following equations to test for 
Granger causality: 
MSHIP, = a + Z b, MSHIP,., + Z c ( RPCMIN,., + U, ....1 
M M 
RPCMIN, = d + Z e, RCPMIN W + Z f, MSHIP,_, + V, ....2 
i=1 i=1 
Where: RPCMIN, is real per capita membership income (our proxy 
for contributions) in period t. 
MSHIP, is union membership in period t. 
k is the number of lags included in the equation. 
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In equation 1, we tested the null hypothesis that ci=0 (i=1,2 k), using a 
standard F-testing procedure for restrictions on the model. If the restrictions 
were accepted, this would imply that lagged values of RPCMIN made no 
significant additional contribution to explaining trends in MSHIP, once MSHIP's 
own autocorrelation was allowed for, thus suggesting that RPCMIN does not 
"cause" MSHIP. The same procedure was applied to equation 2, in an 
attempt to determine whether lagged values of MSHIP explained the current 
level of RPCMIN. 
One problem with such a procedure is that it does not usually provide us with 
any guidance on the number of lags to include in the model. Hence, we 
repeated each of the tests for between one and six lags. The associated F -
values for each test are presented in the following table: 
1 -• CiSIKIIP s-©gi*®s§@d ©n lagged MSKIIP and flagged 
r ©1? Lags Caleylaft@d F Sflatiisflos 
1 2.15 
2 1.32 
3 2.01 
4 1.10 
5 1.04 
6 0.94 
Equation 2: EPCMM regressed ©n Bagged RPCMIN and lagged t^SHflP 
jer ©f Lags Oaleulafted F Stetistie 
1 1.05 
2 3.55** 
3 2.41* 
4 3.97** 
5 3.50** 
6 3.46** 
can reject the null hypothesis at 10% level of significance, 
can reject the null hypothesis at 5% level of significance. 
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Thus, we have some grounds for rejecting the restrictions on equation 2, but 
not on equation 1. This suggests that it is more plausible to argue that 
causation runs from MSHIP to RPCMIN, since lagged values of MSHIP do 
appear to contribute towards explaining RPCMIN, but not vice versa. Similar 
results were found for tests using union density (UDEN) in place of MSHIP, 
with UDEN "causing" RPCMISSJ rather than the reverse. The restrictions on 
equation I were rejected only once, at the ten per cent level, for the single-lag 
version. Similar results were also found using annual proportionate rates of 
change rather than levels of MSHIP, UDEN and RPCMIN. 
However, we cannot necessarily rule out the possibility of some causal link 
from RPCMIN to MSHIP. When we repeated the above tests with current 
RPCMIN and/or real income per capita (RINCPC, the other independent 
variable used in Appendix 5) included as additional regressors along with the 
lagged variables, we rejected the null hypothesis for equation 1 in the single-
lag version, although the null hypothesis of no causal link was still accepted 
with k greater than one. For equation 2, the restrictions were again rejected 
for all but the single-lag version. 
What emerges from the above is that the relationship between MSHIP and 
RPCMIN appears to be dominated by a price-satisficing effect in the long run, 
with the level of membership and density influencing the level of real 
contributions, with a lag of two years or so. Whilst we cannot rule out a 
price-elasticity effect, this may be of a more short-term nature (as suggested 
by the disappearance of any "causation" with k greater than one). It seems 
that the long run elasticity estimates of Appendix 5 are likely to seriously 
over-state the true impact of contributions on membership. 
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Appendix 7 
©ETAiLS AIM© SOURCES OF DATA USE© ON 
TOE TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF UNION CONTRIBUTION 
This appendix discusses the data sources for the time-series analysis 
presented in Appendices 5 and 6. The analysis covers the period 1951 to 
1988 inclusive. 
The variables used were as follows: 
1. Aggregate un'mn sromtedrariip {In OQO's). 
Sources: 1951-71 Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly 
Societies, Part 4 (London: HMSO, 
annually). 
1975-88 Annual Report of the Certification Officer 
(London: Certification Office for Trade 
Unions And Employers' Associations). 
2. R ta l per capita memberslhiip iraeom© (in £ OOO's) 
This is calculated by dividing gross income from members by aggregate 
membership. The general index of retail prices is used to convert to 
1985 prices. (The GDP deflator was also used, with no significant 
differences in the results). 
Sources: Gross membership income and aggregate union membership 
- as 1. 
General index of retail prices - Economic Trends Annual 
Supplement (London: CSO, 1991). 
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3. IR@al p©rs@misill disp@esi[bl® Dineoimi© p@ir Itesxdl ©f popySntoGT) (ion £ 
OOO'S). 
Income (in £ millions) is deflated by the implied consumers expenditure 
deflator (1985=100), and divided by UK population (in OOO's). 
Sources: Income - Economic Trends Annual Supplement (London: 
CSO, 1991). 
Population - Annual Abstract of Statistics (London: CSO, 
1981 and 1991). 
mTE: 
The Registrar of Friendly Society data for 1972 to 1974 inclusive is 
incomplete, due to the deregistration of unions during this period. We dealt 
with this by interpolating the membership and membership income series to 
derive values for the missing three years. 
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Appm$m 8 
DETAILS AMD SOURCES OF DATA USED IN THE 
CROSS-SECTION ANALYSIS OF UNION CONTRIBUTIONS 
This appendix discusses the data sources for the cross-section analysis 
presented in Chapter 7. Much of the data is taken from the TUC Annual 
Returns (1980 and 1985), and we begin with a discussion of this return. 
The TUC has requested an annual return from affiliated unions since 1971. 
This was initiated following the passage of the Conservative government's 
1971 Industrial Relations Act. TUC unions refused to register under the new 
Act, and so did not submit returns to the Registrar. The TUC has continued 
to request and publish returns even after the repeal of the Act, and the 
establishment of the Certification Office in 1976. The TUC returns thus 
provide an additional source to the latter. 
TUC affiliates are not, of course, bound by statute to submit a return to the 
TUC (as they are to the Certification Office), but the response rate is generally 
good. In 1985, 78 per cent of affiliated unions submitted a return, covering 
97 per cent of the affiliated membership. 
The TUC allowed us access to returns for 1985, from which we extracted the 
following information for each union: 
1. Total membership as at 31 December. 
2. Female membership as at 31 December. 
3. Total income for the year to 31 December. 
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4. Total income from members (mainly comprises income from 
contributions but may also include smaller amounts from sales of 
diaries etc). 
5. Total expenditure. 
6. Total expenditure on members' welfare benefits (all benefits except for 
7.) 
7. Total expenditure on dispute benefits. 
8. Remuneration and expenses of staff and officials. 
9. Total assets at year end. 
10. Weekly contribution rates. Unions were asked to record up to five 
different rates according to category of membership. Where given, 
these were recorded by us in full. 
11. Number of members contributing at each of the above rates. 
12. Whether each of the above rates has subsequently been increased, 
and if so by how much. 
13. Whether or not each of the following services/benefits were provided to 
members during the specified year: 
(a) Dispute benefit 
(b) Unemployment benefit 
(c) Sickness/accident benefit 
(d) Permanent incapacity 
(e) Superannuation (members, not officials or staff) 
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(f) Death/funeral benefit. 
(g) Benevolent grants 
(h) Legal aid 
(i) Others (specified). 
In addition to the above TUC annual return data, we collected the following 
data on each union: 
1. Whether or not the union had a political fund. (Source: Certification 
Officer - Annual Report, relevant years). 
2. The TUC Trade Group to which the union belongs (Source : TUC 
Annual Reports). 
3. The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 2 digit) to which the union's 
primary job territory belongs. (This categorisation was inevitably 
subjective, particularly since many large unions have members in 
several industries. The categorisation was based on the classifications 
used in the Dept. of Employment's Directory of Employers' Association, 
Trade Unions, Joint Organisations & C. , HMSO). 
4. The density of union membership within the union's primary job 
territory, as defined under 3. above. This data comes from the 1984 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, and relates to that year. 
(Source : Millward and Stevens (1988)). 
5. Whether the union organises a majority of public or private sector 
workers. (This was based on information provided in Eaton and Gill 
(1983)). 
444 
Whether the union organises a majority of white collar or blue collar 
workers. ( Source : Eaton and Gill (1983)). 
The average gross weekly earnings of male manual workers in the 
union's primary SIC (as identified under 3.), April 1985. (Source : New 
Earnings Survey, 1985). 
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Appendix 9 
OIHOW TEST ©M THE DBWDS1QM OF TIHIE CIR©SS~SE(DTI]©M SAMPLE 
MTQ BLUE- ANB WHITE-COLLAR UNI 
Separate equations were estimated for the two sub samples. The residual 
sum of squares of these equations were compared with that for the common 
equation reported in Table 7.5 using the formula: 
F = (SR - S)/k 
S/(Ti +T2 -2k) 
SR = residual sum of squares of the common equation. 
S = combined sum of squares from the two 
sub-sample equations. 
K = number of parameters in the common equation. 
T, +T2 = total observations. 
This gives a calculated F - value of 0.2815 for the PCMIN equation and 
0.5068 for the MCR equation, both of which are less than the respective 
critical values (degrees of freedom 7 and 58, and 6 and 49 at 10% level) of 
1.82 and 1.93. This leads us to accept the null hypothesis that the common 
equations are acceptable. Thus we reject the splitting of the sample. 
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CATEGORISAT ION © F UNIONS ACCORDING TO TIHE OE<5RI 
OF ORGANISATION OF CORE J O B TERRITORIES 
The analysis in Table 9.5 is based on the fol lowing, which categorises unions 
according to the level of density in their assumed "core job territories". W e 
have identified core job territories from Eaton and Gill (1983), whilst union 
densit ies are f rom Millward and Stevens (1988). The aim here is not to 
determine the precise density in the unions' job territories, but s imply to 
dist inguish between those unions which have a significant core of members 
in h igh ly-organised job territories and those which organise primarily in lower -
density sectors. The distinction is thus more qualitative than quantitat ive. 
T A B L E A 1 0 . 1 : Un ion D t n s l t y In Com Job Te r r i t o r ies 
Core Job Territories WIF3S 1984 
Union 
SIC 
Density 
Comments (%) 
High Density 
AEU 31-37 Engineering/Manual 66 to 93 
EETPU - General 58* 
GMB - General 58* 
NALGO 91 Public Admin/Non-Manual 80 
NUPE 91/93/95 Public Sector/Manual 57 to 73 
TGWU - General 58* 
Low Density 
BIFU 81/82 Banking, etc/Non-Manual 45 
UCATT 50 Construction/Manual 42 
USDAW 61-65 Distribution 32 to 34 
* Have assigned density level for "all employees" to these multi-industry unions. 
SIC is Standard Industrial Classification (1980). 
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